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PREFACE
A dictim in psychology states that each of us 
arrives at being what he totally is, and at viewing the 
world as he uniquely does, by virtue of all his yesterdays, 
and that no two people have had the same yesterdays. My 
own yesterdays (my initial training was as a psychologist) 
are such that the reading of literature always calls to 
mind various principles of psychology. It was thus natural 
that my preference for dissertation topic emphasize that 
aspect of French literature that is one of its most 
fundamental depiction of man's psychological state.
I would like to express gratitude to Dr. Melvin 
Toison for the many hours he has spent, subsequent to the 
initiation of the study, helping in all aspects of its 
preparation. I am particularly grateful also to Drs.
Besse Clement, Lowell Dunham, John Alley and Donald Maddox 
for their graciousness and recommendations. Finally, I 
express unique indebtedness to Dr. Seymour Feiler who 
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Most great writers have been first rate psycholo­
gists; as examples, recall Cervantes, Shakespeare, Moliere, 
Stendhal and Faulkner. Their special gift has tended to be 
insight into man first of all, and secondly the ability to 
record that perception and insight. Even Freud himself 
asserted that, "The poets and philosophers before me dis­
covered the unconscious, what I discovered was the scientific 
method by which the unconscious can be studied."^ Lucas, 
in discussing psychology and literature, similarly concluded 
that modern psychology may know more of Madame Bovary than 
Flaubert himself knew, more of Hedda Gabier than Ibsen; 
but it also reveals how amazingly true the intuitions of
^Lionel Trilling, The Liberal Imagination (Garden 
City: Doubleday Anchor Book^ 1953), pi 327
these writers have been.^ This has seemed to be true of 
French literature beginning as early as the Chanson de 
Roland and (in spite of protestations to the contrary) 
continuing through the New Novel. It is definitely the 
case with Denis Diderot. He of course knew nothing of 
modern psychological principles per se, but his insights 
into man and the human condition were impressive. His 
importance as a literary psychologist will undoubtedly 
increase in proportion to study devoted to his works. This 
study will emphasize some of his psychological insights as 
seen through the framework of Abraham Maslow's theory of 
hierarchy of motives. Many theories and psychological 
frameworks are available, but this particular one seems 
especially suited for placing Diderot's unique concept of 
man's psychological state into perspective. The following 
chapter will be aimed at explaining the theory and the 
reasons for its choice.
^F. L. Lucas, Literature and Psychology (Ann Arbor:
University of Michigan Press, 195TT P- 321.
CHAPTER I
THE BACKGROUND THEORY: MASLOW'S
MOTIVATIONAL HIERARCHY
Sigmund Freud has long been recognized as the 
philosophical and intellectual father of psychiatry and 
psychoanalysis. His pioneering insights were monumental, 
and set the tenor for the entire discipline. His major 
contributions came, however, from clinical evaluations of 
neurotics, and psychoanalysis quite logically came to be 
regarded as %he probing into the psyche of a disturbed 
individual in search of causative experiences and associa­
tions-^ Subtly, by extension, the entire field of psycho­
analysis, and to a degree all of psychology, became somewhat 
synonymous with the study and handling of abnormalcy, or at 
least normalcy.
A companion feature of the late Nineteenth, and 
early Twentieth-Centuries, that profoundly influenced inter­
pretations of man, was that of Darwinian theories. Darwin's
^Richard 1. Evans, "Gordon Allport", Psychology 
Today, IV, No. 11 (197I), p. 56.
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findings and theories led away from biblical interpretations 
of man, his origin and development, and led toward the viewing 
of man as the ultimate in an evolutionary process. Man,
Darwin extrapolated, was the result of eons of evolution and 
adaptation, wherein some species maintained themselves or 
progressed, while others, unable to change to meet environ­
mental demands, disappeared. Quite naturally, these concepts 
found their way into psychological usage and have remained. 
Typical examples include: "maintenance" of self-concept,
psychological "flexibility" and psychological "adaptability".
Logically enough, as with any pioneering efforts 
such as those of Freud and Darwin, new insights and pro­
posals and questions were to be raised against the pioneered 
framework. One such theory is that of Abraham Maslow, late 
of Brandeis University. He has tended away from the abnormal, 
maintenance, adaptation-for-survival emphasis (Freudian/ 
Darwinian); away from a stressing of the similarities between 
man and other forms (Darwinian Evolution, Stimulus-Response, 
Atomistic, Behavioristic Psychology theories), to another 
interpretation of Darwinism, that of total growth and real­
ization of potential, (Holistic Psychology and Self Theory). 
Maslow stresses that inner forces in man exist which lead 
him not only to maintenance and survival but to maximal 
development and to positive relationships, of whose existence 
and possibility, the neurotic or psychotic or merely self- 
maintaining individual would not even be aware. Maslow does
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recognize that man must first of all survive. In fact he 
proposes that physiological gratifications must be met 
before higher levels of activity can be activated. Once 
these basic needs have been met, however, man is released 
to progress by a series of steps toward an increasingly 
greater realization of his total potential (self- 
actualization). Maslow's is then a positivistic, optimistic
psychology which thinks rather highly of man which prefers
to address itself to man's potential rather than to his 
limitations. It is the same type of psychology which seemed 
to motivate the Eighteenth-Century French philosopher Denis 
Diderot. Diderot, though atheistic, and possibly even due 
to his atheism, placed great emphasis on man and his innate 
rights and potential, which he felt the autocratic Church 
and the decaying feudal system were stifling. The matching 
of Maslow and Diderot thus seemed potentially fruitful. It 
will therefore be the object of this study to apply Maslow's 
theory of self-actualization and hiereurchy of motives in a 
general way, to Diderot and his century, and then more 
specifically to Diderot's novelistic works.
What constitutes a novel is not always readily
determined. In the case of Diderot this is even more of a
dilemma. Benac says that Diderot himself was not consistent
as regards his own works:
... 11 appelait le Neveu de Rameau une satire 
et en revanche, dans sa correspondence, 
qualifiait de conte le Supplément au voyage
de Bougainville. Aussi devons-nous nous 
contenter d'une définition très large: 
nous classons parmi les oeuvres romanesques 
de Diderot, celles dans lesquelles le 
récit d'une aventure vécue par des personnages 
animés par l'auteur tient la part la plus 
importante.1
For the purposes of this study the above criteria will be 
retained and thus included will be Le Neveu de Rameu, La 
Religieuse, les Bijoux indiscrets, and Jacques le Fataliste. 
As an initial step then, let us more fully establish the 
working background against which Diderot, and more specifi­
cally his novelistic works, will be placed, that is to say, 
Maslow's concept of human motivation. This then in general 
is the theory.
Man is a wanting animal, whose behavior is need- 
fulfillment oriented. while some of any individual's 
actions will be random, non-motivated, most are directed 
ultimately toward the fulfillment of some specific need. 
Further, not only are these basic needs the same for all 
men, they also can be arranged into a hierarchy of importance 
which is the same for all men, and their order of prepotency 
is predictable. This would mean that an individual would 
direct his efforts to the gratification of the more basic 
needs first, then to the successively less basic, each in 
turn. Thus if there were ten needs, being numbered from
^Henri Bénac, éd., Diderot. Oeuvres romanesques 
(Paris: Gamier, 1962), p. viii.
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one to ten in descending prepotency, the individual would 
concern himself first of all with need number one. Only 
after it had been partially or largely gratified would the 
individual direct his efforts to number two. The process 
would continue with the direction of effort being in the 
order of immediacy or urgency of need of gratification.
Logically enough, the needs that occupy the
primordial category, those requiring most immediate and
prompt gratification, are the physiological ones air,
water, food.
What this means specifically is that in the 
human being who is missing everything in 
life in an extreme fashion it is most likely 
that the major motivation would be physio­
logical needs rather than any others. . . .
For the man who is extremely hungry no other 
interests exist but food. He dreams food, 
he remembers food, . . .  he perceives only 
food . . . .  anything else will be defined as 
unimportant. Freedom, love, community 
feeling, respect, philosophies, may all be 
waved aside as fripperies.1
Society, the work life, family life are all designed,
however, to militate against the average person ever
experiencing hunger or thirst to the above extremes. In
most modern societies chronic extreme hunger or thirst is
a rarity. What happens then is that physiological needs
are only rarely, and normally only indirectly, seen as
^Abraham Maslow, Motivation and Personality (New 
York: Harper and Brothers! 1954) , p! Ü2.
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potent movers. The resulting state of chronic gratification 
of physiological needs results in other needs emerging, 
those categorized roughly as safety needs.
An understanding of safety needs is most efficiently 
obtained by observation of infants and children, in whom 
these needs are simple and obvious. Children ". . . d o  not
inhibit this reaction at all, whereas adults in our society 
have taught to inhibit it at all c o s t s . I l l n e s s  and pain 
are postulated as making a child fearful of his world. 
Children prefer undisrupted, routine and rhythm. They prefer 
a predictable, orderly, organized world in which the 
unexpected, the unmanageable and dangerous do not threaten, 
and typically view parents as powerful persons who can pro­
tect them and help them order and control their world. The 
normal, healthy adult of modern society is largely satisfied 
in his safety needs as in his physiological needs. To the 
degree that he is not however, these needs may be powerful 
motivators. Cases where this is so tend to be limited to 
the neurotic and psychotic who in essence are still carrying 
in their make-up the needs and fears and unsolved problems 
of childhood.
With adequate air, water, and food, and in absence 
of a threat to one's safety, there emerge needs having their 
basis in belongingness, affection and love. The individual
^Maslow, Motivation, p. 85.
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concerned is moved to seek a more unique place in his 
immediate group and intimate acceptance by a specific person 
or persons. In certain individuals this even becomes the 
most basic and dominant of all needs, though generally it 
becomes operative only as the physiological needs have been 
met. Indication of its strength is the fact that in our 
society the thwarting of these needs is the most commonly 
found core in cases of maladjustment and more severe psycho­
pathology.^ It should be pointed out at this point, too, 
that love is not synonymous with sex. Both are generally 
multidetermined and involve elements and considerations 
often quite afield from each other. Obviously even sex 
itself is most often much more complex than mere physio­
logical release. True love also involves giving as well as 
receiving.
Convinced subjectively that he belongs, and that 
some person or persons actively care for him, the individual 
experiences esteem needs, that is to say self-regard, as 
well as the regard coming from others. This goes beyond 
mere belonging and acceptance, and even differs from love.
A person might be accepted and loved, but still not be 
esteemed. These esteem needs are classified into two sub­
sidiary sets. The first involves the desire for strength,
^Ibid., p . 91.
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achievement, adequacy, mastery, confidence, independence and 
freedom. The second involves the desire for reputation, 
prestige, status, dominance, recognition, attention, impor­
tance or appreciation. Satisfaction of the self-esteem 
need leads to feelings of self-confidence, worth, strength, 
capability and adequacy, of being useful and necessary in 
the world. But thwarting produces feelings of inferiority, 
of weakness and of helplessness. It would be apropos to 
state that the above thwarting gives rise in turn to dis­
couragement, to compensatory or neurotic behavior. Further, 
the most healthy self-esteem is based on deserved respect 
rather than on external fame or celebrity.^
As the individual feels himself well-regarded by 
those whose opinions he values, and comfortable with himself, 
cognitive needs arise. These needs are much more subtle, 
more positive and are thus easily overlooked in our clinically, 
pathologically-oriented psychology. These needs involve 
positive groifth desires, those of understanding, systematizing, 
organizing, analyzing and looking for relationships and 
meanings, and of constructing a set of values. "Studies of 
psychologically healthy people indicate that they are as a 
defining characteristic, attracted to the mysterious, to the 
unknown, to the chaotic, unorganized and unexplained."
^Maslow, Motivation, p. 91- 
2Ibid.
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Where for some reason these needs do not become motivators, 
after the above-mentioned more basic needs have been 
gratified, one encounters boredom, deterioration of intel­
lectual life, to include a lowering of tastes and even self­
dislike. This is often applicable to the frustrated housewife, 
to people trapped in humdrum jobs or unfulfilling lives.
A great many people in life never proceed any farther in 
the hierarchy than this. They become satisfied with meeting 
their physiological, safety and belongingness and love needs, 
and with experiencing a certain degree of self acceptance 
and positive regard.
When cognitive needs are activated, and, at least 
in part, gratified, aesthetic needs manifest themselves and 
command the attention of the individual concerned. This is 
seen as being repulsed by ugliness and as being an active 
craving for beauty. It is close to the cognitive need for 
order and symmetry. As with cognitive needs, aesthetic ones 
do not become active in all people. Yet on the other hand 
they may become the unique driving force. Witness the 
starving artist who seeks only to express aesthetically 
himself, or the Baudelaires who will create beauty out of 
other men's ugliness.
Finally, as all of the preceding needs have at 
least in part been successfully dealt with, the capstone 
of all motives emerges, that of the need for self-actualization. 
This manifests itself in discontent, restlessness, a seeking,
12
until the individual concerned feels he has become, or is 
becoming, that which he in total potential is most capable 
of becoming. "What a man can be he must be-"^ It is the 
desire to become more and more what one most fundamentally 
"is." It does not necessarily imply or involve renown, but 
it does involve maximal usage of capacity. It is this 
quality that most readily calls forth Diderot.
^Maslow, Motivation, p. 91-
CHAPTER II 
DIDEROT THE MAN AND MOTIVE HIERARCHY
With the foregoing theory of man's motivational 
hierarchy in mind, and at the same time recalling Diderot's 
astonishingly full life and his complex, sometimes paradox­
ical personality sind life-style, it would seem only natural 
to superimpose the theory on the man. Such is not the major 
purpose of this study, but since the theory seems so fully 
to fit, and since he was the creator of the fictional 
characters to be considered, some comments are in order.
The first and most important thing that should be 
said concerning Diderot and motive hierarchy is that he 
resoundingly reached the level of self-actualization. Recall 
that this need is felt as other needs have been met, and 
that it involves a drive to become that of which one is 
intrinsically capable, to do that for which one is poten­
tially most fitted, in short to accomplish the very most in 
life that one's potential allows. By this definition,
Diderot is a self-actualized man par excellence. No man 
of his time, or for that matter few men of any other time, 
have so completely and so meaningfully filled their years.
13
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Henri Meister in describing Diderot of the Salons says
that when he recalls Diderot, the immense variety of his
ideas, the amazing multiplicity of his knowledge, the rapid
flight, the warmth, the impetuous tumult of his imagination,
all the charm and all the disorder of his conversation, he
likens his character to Nature herself. He is Nature as
Diderot himself used to conceive of her---rich fertile,
abounding in germs of every sort, gentle, fierce, simple
and majestic, worthy and sublime, but without a master,
without a God.^
Diderot had earned the degree of Master of Arts
2in philosophy by the age of Nineteen (1732), led the life
of a prodigal, directed the single most important philosophical-
-Îinformational publishing venture in history (The Encyclopedia) 
founded art criticism , renovated the theater, and left some 
of the century's most vital prose. All this in addition to 
being a good father (if he was not the best husband it is 
not entirely his fault), the lion of the salons and a friend
^Will and Ariel Durant, The Story of Civilization, 
Vol. IX: The Age of Voltaire (New York: Simon and Schuster,
1965), p. éyô.
2Georges R. Havens, The Age of Ideas: From
Reaction to Revolution in Eighteenth-Century France (New 
York : Collier, 19^2), pi 296.
3 Phillipe Van Tieghem, ed., Denis Diderot, Récits 
(Paris: Hachette, 1959), p.ll5 .
4Norman L. Torrey and Otis Fellows, Editors,
Diderot Studies, Vol. I (Syracuse: Syracuse Uniyersity
Press, 1949) , p. viii.
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of royalty. If records were available so that specifics 
could be cited, Diderot's century, as any other century, 
would be seen to be replete with men who never progressed 
beyond physiological, safety and belongingness needs in 
their most rudimentary forms. It is true that the Revolution 
that was to follow Diderot and for which he was at least 
in part responsible, was largely aimed at helping fulfill 
men's needs. The feudal system had resulted in the fact 
that many men were unable to gratify even the most basic 
of their needs. All their time, energy and thought had of 
necessity to be directed to questions of physiological
necessity food, protection from the elements, and safety
(the serfs or peasants very life was often threatened). It 
is small wonder that, given their life-conditions, they had 
no great esteem needs, that cognitive or aesthetic needs 
almost never exhibited themselves and that concern for self- 
actualization was for all practical purposes unknown among 
them. In the worst examples, even belongingness and love 
needs seem tc have existed at practically animalistic levels. 
It would be difficult to conceive of a system more effective 
in thwarting the fulfillment of not only basic needs, but 
more particularly of any higher needs. These conditions 
had been ameliorated by Diderot's time, but vestiges of the 
feudal hierarchy still made it difficult for many men to 
fulfill even their need for self-esteem, and this of course 
precluded going on to higher needs. On this point the
16
critical concern of the Estates-General convened May 5, 1?89
was that some men considered themselves intrinsically of more 
worth than otners; that the vote of a man of the Third Estate 
was not equatable to that of a man of the other two Estates.
These same esteem needs were to trouble two of 
Diderot's contemporaries. Neither Voltaire nor Rousseau 
would ever quite settle within himself the question of rank 
and birth. Both were destined to waste much energy in this 
inner struggle. It is to his credit, and is another example 
of Diderot's self-actualization, that he never had to direct 
much of his energy toward his own esteem needs. He firmly 
believed in, and actively worked for equality for all, but 
he took his own for granted. He seems to have known himself 
to be the equal of any man and so considered the matter 
closed. He could move with equal ease from nobleman to 
artisan, from salon to cottage, to the palace of czars. So 
it was that the eminently well-adjusted Encyclopedist felt 
no compulsion to engage in the defensive behavior that on 
occasion beset Voltaire and Rousseau. The writings and 
activities of both of these latter men indicate that they 
never did arrive at the off-handed manner which the question 
seems to have always had for Diderot. An example of this 
quality in Diderot is eminently illustrated in the sixty- 
year-old Diderot's visit to Catherine II of Russia, subse­
quent to her purchase of his library. He was so completely 
at ease with her that she felt obliged to place a table
17
between them. Havens comments that, ” . . .  Catherine 
must have been highly astonished at the complete lack of 
awe manifested by this mercurial Frenchman, in such sharp 
contrast to the justly feeurful courtiers by whom she was 
surrounded.”^ Jean- Jacques and even Voltaire would have 
treated a royal patron with much more deference, or con­
ceivably, under certain circumstances, either may have 
acted with some disdain. The point of import is that 
Diderot saw her as a fellow human, neither above nor 
beneath him. She posed no threat to his self-esteem, so 
his actions with her were the same as they would have been 
had he been visiting an old neighbor in his native Langres.
One additional observation is in order as concerns
Diderot's es eem needs. He did not have the typical author's
need to have his works immediately published, to see his
name in print. He was content to let history take its
course and to await posterity's verdict. André Billy points
out that he wrote works such as La Religieuse and Le Neveu
2de Rameau " ... sans intention de les publier. ..." It is 
true that he drew some of his characters from real life, 
even to the point of retaining their names. Further, after 
spending time in prison, he was not anxious to print
Havens, Age of Ideas, p. 36?.
2André Billy, ed., Denis Diderot Oeuvres Complètes 
(Paris: Bibliothèque de la Pléiade, 195l) pi 22.
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controversial material, (though much of the Encyclopedia was 
just that). Nevertheless the fact remains that he was not 
publication-for-the-sake-of-publication oriented. Here 
again he displays a marked maturity. There was no question 
in his own mind as to his feelings of worth; he exhibits a 
near total lack of other-orientation. His behavioral guide­
lines largely came from within. " ... N'est-ce pas d'ailleurs 
dans cet approfondissement de soi-même que se trouve la 
seule vérité dont on soit certain par expérience?"^
Considering other needs in the hierarchy, and 
Diderot's handling of them, we again get the picture of the 
eminently well-adjusted, self-actualized man. Recalling 
cognitive needs as the desire for understanding, systema­
tizing, organizing, analyzing, looking for relationships, 
and establishing a set of values, it is obvious that Diderot 
has few peers. On this point, even his initial bohemian 
existence in the capital included "ten full years of sober 
and undramatic reading of everything he could get his hands 
on . . . good books, bad books, old books, new books so
much that the printed word contained of knowledge, of inspira-
2tion, of wisdom in the difficult ar t of life.'" Later for 
some twenty-six years, ending in 1772, he was the prime 
mover, and often the author itself of the monumental.
^Bénac, éd.. Oeuvres, p. xiii.
2Havens, Age of Ideas, p. 301.
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twenty-eight volume Encyclopedia seventeen volumes of text
and eleven volumes of finely engraved plates with more than
900 double-columned pages per volume. Had this been his
only contribution one would say that he had maximized this
need. His ocher more personal works, dealing with his
attempts to give meaning to life and order to the cosmos,
are too well known to mention, but they underline the degree
of his cognitive needs and the maximal manner in which he
fulfilled them.
More and more, Diderot is being regarded as the
high point of Eighteenth-Century thought. Fellows and Torrey
see him " . . .  as the most profound thinker, and indeed,
the most interesting and provocative figure of the French
eighteenth century, . . Lovejoy says he was the first
2convinced proponent of transformism and evolution. For
Jacques Barzun, Diderot is a finder and an initiator, not a
3concluder or finisher. Even his contemporaries saw his
towering cognitive processes. Voltaire called him a
4"pantophile", a "Socrates", a "Plato". Rousseau, after his
^Fellows, Studies, Vol. I, p. vii.
^Ibid., p. viii.
3 Jacques Barzun, "Why Diderot" in Varieties of 
Literary Experience, Ed. by Stanley Burnshaw (New York: 
New York University Press, I962), p. 33.
4Fellows, Studies, Vol. 1, p. vii.
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years of hating Diderot, was to say that at the distance of 
some centuries Diderot would seem a prodigious man. People 
would look from afeir at that universal head mingled with 
admiration and astonishment.^
Aesthetically, the picture of Diderot is little 
different. As alluded to above, he founded art criticism 
and single-handedly renovated drama. Peyre calls him
. . the outstanding esthetician and literary critic of
2his age, . . . "  Exhibitions of paintings and sculpture. 
Salons , had been held in the Louvre since 1737- Thus it 
was that in 1759 Grimm, editor of the Literary Correspondence, 
persuaded Diderot, friend of artists since his bohemian 
youth, to write articles on the exhibitions. This Diderot 
was to continue until I78I. He reported some nine Salons . 
Current critics may not agree with Diderot's evaluations 
or tastes but one is obliged again to recognize the degree 
to which he was aesthetically moved. His work in the theater 
is a companion feature of the same need. His appreciations 
and insights led to the genesis of method-acting, bourgeois 
drama and greater realism in the theater. He was aestheti­
cally one of the most developed of men, even authoring the 
article on "Beauty" in the first volume of the Encyclopedia.
^Durant, Age of Voltaire, p. 679.
2Fellows, Studies, Vol. I, p. viii
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One might reply that this is natural since he was the editor. 
However, the fact is that he made every attempt to have those 
people best qualified in each discipline write specific 
articles. The likelihood was that he was best qualified to 
speak on this aesthetic question.
Belongingness and love needs in Diderot's life are 
closely related to his esteem needs. In both cases he seems 
to have felt secure to the point that gratification was 
assured. By this is meant that Diderot seems to have had 
a self-concept such that he just assumed people would like 
and respond to him. This is not to imply arrogance. There 
is nothing that would lead one to suspect any sort of inflated 
feelings of self-worth. Rather he seems to have been able 
to assess his strengths and weaknesses and accept himself 
as he was. Once this is done, as any current theory of 
personality will attest, acceptance by others is decidedly 
easier, if not automatic. Diderot was comfortable with 
himself and most everyone was comfortable with Diderot.
This is in marked contrast to his contemporary, Rousseau, 
whose lack of self-acceptance led him to a life of tension 
and despair, and to little personal peace. Rousseau was 
destined to remain the eternal Saint-Preux. To make such 
observations detracts nothing from Rousseau as a writer; 
many of his best pages came from his probing for belonging 
and love, and the necessity he felt to justify past behavior. 
Typical are his Confessions (1770), and Rousseau Judge of
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Jean-Jacques (17?6) , two of his last works, wherein he 
attempts a Justification of his behavior.
It is this very quality of complete self-integration 
that is so striking in Diderot. He seems to have had no 
■unmanageable, loose ends in his personality. This is not 
to deny him his emotive qualities or his mercurial, sometimes 
paradoxical thought process. " ... Un sage et un fou, 
c'est bien ce qu'a été Diderot."^ As a matter of fact, the 
unhesitating manner with which he tackled paradox tends to 
reinforce the completeness of his self-integration. Diderot 
recognized contradiction in himself and seemed to welcome 
paradox. He made no attempt to hide his emotion or his 
"instability" and dynamism. All these elements were part of him, 
he recognized them and accepted them, and got on with the 
process of "becoming" and living; whereas, Jean-Jacques 
spent much of his energy trying to "shore up" his image and 
make himself acceptable. Rousseau spent much time attempting 
to show himself to be consistent. Diderot had such inner 
strength that he didn't care whether he appeared consistent 
or not. Rousseau's retreat from society is merely a negative 
manifestation of his lack of self-integration and self- 
acc eptanc e.
As has been implied, each of these are as considered 
thus far in Diderot's motive hierarchy could be expanded and
^Billy, ed., Oeuvres, p. 26.
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detailed were that the major intent of the study. Of none 
of these motive areas is this more true than belongingness 
and love needs. He seems to have had an unusual capacity for 
giving warmth and drawing it from others. Witness the depth 
of his long-standing relationship with Sophie Volland. At 
the time of their first encounter (1756) he was forty-three 
and she was the forty-year-old unmarried daughter, Louise- 
Henriette Volland, (Diderot added "Sophie" due to her wisdom) 
of a salt merchant, Jean-Robert Volland. "Elle était sèche, 
malingre ... entichée de philosophie et de morale. ... Que 
Diderot ait été son amant, ses lettres ne permettent pas 
d'en douter, mais quelles singulières amours."^ Of this 
relationship Julien Teppe writes : "Admettons-le, non sans
rétorquer que son sentiment envers Sophie Volland, méritait 
bien l'adjectif 'grand' tant par sa qualité que par sa
2constance, puisqu'il se manifesta trente années d'affilée."
Among other things it was on the strength of friendship 
that he wrote the Salons for his great and good friend Grimm.
He remained a true friend, though Grimm was noc always 
deserving. "Drôle d'homme que ce Grimm, froid et dur, 
compliqué mais si intelligent! Quel est le secret de 
1 'attachment que lui avait voué le Philosophe? Comme
^Billy, éd., Oeuvres, p. 23.
2Julien Teppe, Histoire libertine des grands 
écrivains français (Paris : Editions Belleville, 196I )
p . 16 2.
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l'amour, l'amitié a ses mystères."^ Other observations con­
cerning Diderot and belongingness and love needs, reinforce 
the picture of Diderot as a man unusually capable of deep
relationships. One observer says he counted his friendships
2to be the chief solace and inspiration of his life. Another
says his devotion in friendship and his selflessness in the
3name of a cause constituted a habitual way of life.
He felt paternal love also in a degree that was 
marked for the time. His wife Antoinette was by disposition 
dour and by intellect unendowed, so Diderot showered affec­
tion on his daughter, the future Mme de Vandeuil. "II 
avait pris son parti des incommodités conjugales et s'en 
consolait en donnant des soins vigilants à l'éducation de
sa fille,..."" He even sold his most precious possession, his 
library, to be able to see her well married. One should also 
add that much of the reason for his having mistresses, notably 
Mme de Puissieux, Sophie Volland and Mme de Prunevaux, 
parallels that of his attention toward Angélique.
Safety needs were for Diderot almost non-existent.
This again is in contrast to the haunted Rousseau who at times
^Billy ed., Oeuvres, p. 23*
2Durant, Age of Voltaire, p. 677-
3Herbert Josephs, Diderots Dialogue of Language and 
Gesture: '*Le Neveu De Rameau* (Ohio State University Press,
4Billy, ed., Oeuvres, p. 25-
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acted as though he feared for his very life. The latter was, 
in point of fact, in flight for his psychological life. An 
autocratic government and church did pose some threat to 
Diderot. The following example shows, however, that safety 
needs were minimal among Diderot's prime motives. In 1758 
D'Alembert had written to Voltaire expressing the conviction 
that the editors should abandon the Encyclopedia and complete 
it at a more favorable time, which he admitted would perhaps 
never come. D'Alembert subsequently withdrew on October 10 
of the same year.^ Even Voltaire urged that the enterprise 
be transferred to Lausanne. Further, on March 8, 1759, the 
King's Council officially revoked the privilege which had 
been granted in iy46. In spite of all this, Diderot urged 
going right ahead at Paris. A more safety-conscious man 
would have hesitated, since conditions were such that he 
could have abandoned the project without loss of face. One 
other incident illustrates Diderot’s actualization and cogni­
tion needs preempting safety needs. In 1764, Le Breton, 
publisher of the Encyclopedia, had taken it upon himself 
to censor some of the more "dangerous” elements of Diderot's 
work prior to printing. Diderot was furious. Billy comments
Ainsi, la plus grande entreprise littéraire 
qu'il y eut eu depuis l'invention de l'imprimerie 
fut livrée par la persécution à l'imbécilité 
et à la timidité d'un imprimeur qui s'en
^Billy, éd., Oeuvres, p. l8.
2Havens, Age of Ideas, p. 5l6
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rendit l ’arbitre en dernier ressort avec une 
hardiesse dont je ne crois pas qu'il y ait 
d 'ex^mp]c.
Diderot had known the dungeons at Vincennes. He
was arrested 24 July 1?49 and was not released until 3
November. Interestingly, Andre Billy characterizes Diderot's
behavior at Vincennes as "pusillanime." However, he does
go on immediately thereafter to say:
Toutes les faiblesses qu'on peut lui reprocher 
s'éffacent devant le courage et l'acharnement 
qu'il mit à poursuivre son oeuvre. 11 y apporta 
une ardeur véritablement mystique. Son caractère 
fut, au moins dans ce domaine professionel, à 
la hauteur de son intelligence.^
The first level on the hierarchy of needs, physio­
logical, is as illustrative of Diderot and of his paradoxical 
personality as any. One observer recounts that in his early 
Paris years, " ... Diderot mena une vie de sacripant. 11
3était porté vers le sexe et n'y regardait de trop près."
Henri Bénac says, " ... Il aimait la bonne chère, le plaisir,
l'amour. ... Dans sa Jeunesse il n'a guère cherché de sens
à ses actes, emporté qu'il était par son ardeur sensuel."
Bénac adds that " ... en un mot il aimait la vie et en
4jouissait pleinement." Though Maslow in his hierarchy
^Billy, éd.. Oeuvres, p. 19*
2Ibid. p. 22.
^Ibid., p . 10.
4Bénac, éd.. Oeuvres, p. vi.
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placed sex more akin to love than to physiological need, it 
would appear that sex was almost strictly sense gratifica­
tion for the young Diderot. He was destined, due to his 
regard for the '-natural" man and "natural" appetites, to 
retain somewhat this same evaluation. His deeper self, 
however, did not permit that this be completely true of his 
relationship with Sophie Volland. Though he would have 
liasons with, among others, Mme de Maux, when his relation­
ship with Sophie became more nearly only platonic.
Considering another facet of physiological gratifica­
tion, most introductions and notes accompanying Le Neveu de 
Rameau point to the fact that the nephew is, at least in 
part, one facet of Diderot, and that he took the descriptions 
of the ever-hungry nephew from his own earlier bohemian life. 
He has the nephew say that there are some men who are gorged 
with everything while others, who have a stomach just as 
importunate as theirs, a recurrent hunger like theirs, 
haven't a bite to put between their teeth. This is, says 
Havens, remininsent of Diderot's youth, when he had with 
difficulty dragged himself home due to hunger-caused weak­
ness.^ In all probability, Diderot had known lean days. In 
his later years in the salons, Diderot was to know the best 
of foods and wines. He could appreciate them as well as
^Havens, Age of Ideas, p. 359-
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any man and likely more fully than most, but still he did 
not seem to have become a slave to the physiological. He 
was to have Moi tell Rameau that only the philosopher who 
wants nothing is able to escape this humiliating subservience. 
By subservience he was referring to people who must strike 
attitudes in order to survive. By extension, however, he 
seems to be also implying that man should remain free of any 
form of slavery, even that of the senses. Diderot's sen­
suality (used here in the broad sense) seems to have been 
studied and controllable. To this point, an incident related 
by Madame de Vandeul is recounted by Havens, which illustrates 
that this was the case even during his moneyless years. He 
seems to have operated by a law higher than adequacy of 
food and shelter, or even than gourmandism. In order to 
provide for himself, his allowance from his practical father 
having been cut off, Diderot acted as tutor. He had been 
employed in this manner by a certain Brandon de Boisset. 
Wearying of the routine, Diderot announced his demission;
Mais, monsieur Diderot, quel sujet de mécontentement 
avez-vous? Vos appointements sont-ils trop faibles?
Je les doublerai. Etes-vous mal logé? Choisissez 
un autre appartement. Votre table est-elle mal 
servie? Ordonnez votre diner: rien ne me coûtera
pour vous conserver. - Monsieur, regardez-moi; un 
citron est moins jaune que mon visage. ... Je suis 
mille fois trop riche et trop bien dans votre 
maison, mais il faut que j'en sorte; l'objet de 
mes désirs n'est pas de vivre mieux, mais de ne 
pas mourir.1
Denis Diderot, Oeuvres Complètes, ed. Assézat- 
Tourneaux. 20 Vol. (Paris : Garnier, lS75-77), I, xxxiii.
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Had Diderot been a slave to the senses he would not 
have thus reacted. His shelter would have been assured, he 
could have had the most delicate of foods and with the 
doubled salary could have entertained any young lady of his 
choice. Motives other than sense-gratification were opera­
tive in Diderot even as a young bohemian. This is corroborated 
by the fact that regardless of his financial condition, he 
never appeared to be overly concerned for the meeting of 
his bottom-of-the-hierarchy needs. For example, he never 
returned to Langres to become a rich and comfortable cutler. 
Freed of any emotional concern as regards fulfilling physio­
logical, safety or even belongingness needs, Diderot at a 
very early age directed himself to needs of cognition and 
estheticism and to self-actualization. Few men seem to 
have 30 completely and so successfully followed their own 
drummer. As time passed, Diderot more and more ” ... vit 
une aventure personnelle qui le conduit à chercher de plus 
en lui-même le sens de la vie."^
Even this brief analysis has shown Diderot to have 
been operative largely in the area of higher motives. He 
was in no wise ascetic. He could enjoy, and accept as good, 
what was natural to man, whether that be appreciation of 
a fine soup or a voluptuous woman; but, at the same time, he
^Bénac, éd.. Oeuvres, p. xiii.
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could philosophically do without. If he was no ascetic, 
neither- was he a lower-need-gratification slave. One might 
propose that the press and tenor of the Encyclopedia dis­
ciplined him and gave direction to what might have become 
simply another self-directed Eighteenth Century intellectual. 
In any event, the totality of his effort markedly points to 
someone striving, as few have, to realize his potential, 
and his potential appears to have been monumental.
One other prime characteristic of Diderot should be 
pointed out; this has to do with his general quality of 
goodness, naivete and positive orientation. Mme D'Epinay 
says his contemporaries admired his genius, but that his 
character was the object of their particular enthusiasm.
Some felt him to be the most perfect mortal. To his friends, 
his faults were those of a child naively frank.^ Loy says;
"Few authors have been so humbly and good-naturedly sincere
2with themselves." André Billy says of him: "II voulait
3rendre service à l'espèce humaine, ..." He rather straight­
forwardly went about rendering this service by clearing away 
centuries of prejudice and falsehood. His great service was, 
as Roland Desné says, to have been " ... une machine de
^Durant, Age of Voltaire, p. 6?4.
2John Robert Loy, Diderot's determined fatalist: 
a critical appreciation of~"Jacques le fataliste". (New 
York : Kings Crown Press, 1950), p . 109•
3Billy, ed., Oeuvres, p. 26.
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guerre contre l'absolutisme et l'obscurantisme."^
It will be immediately evident that Diderot the man, 
viewed from the point of view of motive hierarchy, could be 
the object of much more extensive study. It will suffice 
for the purposes of this study to have applied in a general 
way the same hierarchy to the author that will now be 
applied to his creations. It will thus be the intent of 
the remainder of this study to analyze Diderot's major 
romanesque creations, to see what kinds of motives move 
the characters of one of the most insightful and self­
actualized men of any age. The general grouping of motives 
used for Diderot will be retained: self-actualization,
aesthetic, cognitive, esteem, belongingness and love, 
safety and physiological. Diderot, of course, never heard 
of the concept of motive hierarchy but therein lies a good 
deal of the charm of the task.
^Roland Desné, éd., Denis Diderot, Satires (Paris: 
Club des amis du livre progressiste, 19b 3 ) , pi ïx.
CHAPTER III
MOI VERSUS LUI: ACTUALIZATION
VERSUS ESTEEM FIXATION
It has been frequently observed that Diderot, as 
early as 1747, came to discover in the dialogue the most 
effective vehicle for conveying the dynamism of his thought 
process.^ As much as anyone whose thoughts have been 
recorded and subjected to study, Diderot reserved the right 
to let his ideas evolve. He would not allow himself to be 
trapped, as was his compatriot Rousseau, into endlessly 
defending a thought he might have uttered or a position he 
might have at one time taken. Diderot's sparkling mind was 
dynamism itself. This accounts for the obvious conclusion 
by most writers on the subject that, able to see all sides 
of any given question, he simply could not neatly package 
his conclusions into one character and let him be his mouth­
piece. He gave his thoughts full freedom to evolve and so 
of necessity needed at least two minds at work in any given
Herbert Josephs, Diderot's Dialogue of Language and 
Gesture, Le Neveu de Rameau" (Columbus: Ohio State University
Press , 1969 ) p"! vii .
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treatise, in order to make the result have a semblance of 
logic for the reader. For Diderot himself there was no 
difficulty in entertaining opposing positions on any given 
question- To help his readers, however, and probably to 
help clarify his own thinking, he turned to dialogue. 
Further, Diderot was capable of such an inconceivable array 
and depth of thought patterns that even he could see it 
would be necessary to create at least two fictional char­
acters to contain them. This he has done admirably well 
in Le Neveu de Rameau, utilizing Lui, Rameau's nephew, 
hereafter called Rameau or the Nephew, and Moi . the 
philosopher or Diderot.
It is important for comprehension of the work to
determine what Rameau and the philosopher represent. Do
they in fact represent disparate elements of the enigmatic
author as is frequently stated? Jean Fabre in his critical,
definitive edition of Le Neveu says he feels this is so.
Rameau est, au naturel, un autre Diderot, un 
Diderot sans politesse, ni conséquence qui ne 
songerait pas à se surveiller. Mêmes poumons, 
même gesticulation forcenée, mêmes sautes 
d'humeur ou d'idées. Plus précisément encore.
Rameau, compagnon de jeunesse et de bohème, 
est resté ce que Diderot a été, ce qu'il a 
failli devenir, ce qu'il se félicite, mais ^
aussi regrette parfois, de n'être pas devenu.
Herbert Dieckmann cornes to similar conclusions that the two
represent elements, albeit superficially disparate, of
^Jean Fabre, ed., Denis Diderot"Le Neveu de Rameau" 
(Genève, Droz, 1950), p. Ixvi.
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Diderot past and present. Speaking of what Rameau might
represent for the mature Diderot, Dieckmann says:
Comme lui il a mené une existence de bohème 
pendant une bonne partie de sa vie; il est cet 
être aux passions fortes, il est ce turbulent 
personnage dont Catherine II écrivait à Mme 
Géoffrin: "J'ai été obligé de mettre une table
entre lui et moi pour me mettre à l'abri de 
sa gesticulation"; il a ce don de mime qu'il 
attribue au Neveu; il est celui dont il dit:
"J'avais cenr physionomies diverses, selon la 
chose dont j'étais affecté, j'étais serein, 
triste, rêveur, tendre, violent, passionné, 
enthousiaste. ...^
Dieckmann adds "N'a-t-il pas voulu se dépeindre lui-même?"
He then answers, "Non pas tel qu'il était, mais plutôt tel 
qu'il aurait pu être tel qu'il serait si on isolait un de 
ses multiples aspects pour le soumettre à un fort grossisse­
ment?" Thus Dieckmann sees Rameau as being at least some­
what exaggerated but still part of a dynamic self portrait 
coming from the interior of the author.
Henri Coulet, in a recent work, envisions the basic
elements of the novel/satire as being " ... le personnage
connu qu'était J. F. Rameau et les conversations qu'il avait
pu effectivement avoir avec Diderot; ..." He adds, however,
that they might have been " ... puissamment métamorphosés par
2l'imagination créatrice de l'auteur." Lionel Trilling in a
^Herbert Dieckmann, ed., Diderot Le Neveu de Rameau 
(Paris: Le Club du meilleur liv r el 195 7 ) , p"i xxxv.
2“Henri Coulet, Le Roman Jusqu'à la Révolution (New 
York: McGraw-Hill, 196?), p. 505.
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somewhat similar interpretation gives a Freudian explanation.^ 
Herbert Josephs, in an excellent recent critical work, 
stresses that there can indeed be found a parallel in 
Diderot's other writings for every thought, sublime or 
perverse, uttered by the Nephew. He states, however, that 
there is no want of evidence to support the idea that the 
fictional Rameau is very close to the real Jean-Francois 
Rameau. Any attempt, Joseph says, to identify Rameau too 
closely with Diderot disregards the facts. He was a profes­
sional parasite in bondage to Diderot's avowed enemies, the 
anti-philosophes. Any attempt at satire was aimed at these
anti-Enlightenment financiers and tax-collectors such as
2Bertin, Rameau's protector. Somewhat akin to this idea is 
that offered by Georges Hay that Diderot's anguish from attacks 
against the philosophes and from his sense of failure as a
dramatist led to orienting the work in the manner that he
3did. Finally the narrator serves to amalgamate the two 
interlocutors and in fact is closer to representing Diderot, 
if in fact Diderot is not represented by all three combined.
^Lionel Trilling, "The Legacy of Sigmund Freud", 
Kenyon Review, II (1940), p. 153-
2Josephs, Dialogue, p. 108.
3Georges May, "L'Angoisse de l'échec et la genèse 
du 'Neuveu de Rameau'", Diderot Studies III (I96I), pp.
285-307.
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Rameau would then seem to be at origin a real person 
with whom Diderot did in fact converse. There would also 
seem to be ample evidence to support the thesis that he is 
so closely reminiscent of elements of an earlier Diderot 
that it is very probable that the real Rameau was much like 
the Diderot of his early Paris years or that Diderot added 
these qualities to the real Rameau.
There would seem to be less cause for doubt concerning 
Moi. the philosopher half of the dialogue. This has seemed 
to be such a foregone conclusion that few critics in writing 
on the work even give it much place in their analyses. 
Obviously this stems in large measure from the fact that 
even beginning with the title, the central character is 
Rameau. Four or five times more space is devoted in the 
work to Rameau than to the philosopher. Even Josephs, whose 
handling and analysis of the philosopher exceeds that of most 
other critics, lets the philosopher share a chapter with 
Rameau while devoting three additional chapters to Rameau 
alone. The reason for the above seems to be that observers 
have simply felt that the philosopher merely represents the 
solid bourgeois elements of society, and that he is there 
to serve as contrast with the strikingly unique Rameau.
Josephs says that in the philosopher, Diderot has reduced 
himself to conventional respectability and rigid intellectual- 
ism, said characterizes the philosopher's counsel to young
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Rameau as simplistic solutions.^ Goethe in his translation
of the work into German, gave it as title Rameau's Neffe
2Bin Dialog von Diderot. It seemed clear to him that the 
dialogue had been authored by Diderot, but he did not go 
so far as to use mit instead of von. It would seem 
reasonable to assume that Moi does in fact represent Diderot 
himself as closely as any one character can at all. This 
rests on the fact that Diderot, not intending to be published 
in his lifetime, took no pains to give pseudonyms or to 
alter circumstances. Even though he used Lui and Moi, he 
immediately tells us who Lui represents, and does not even 
consider it necessary to comment on Mci. Further support 
of this idea comes from the fact that throughout the dialogue, 
the Neveu refers to Moi as monsieur le philosophe, and Moi 
often says of his ideas or attitudes that they are those 
of the philosophers. If there was anything Diderot was 
wont to consider himself it was a philosopher, in both 
the traditional as well as Eighteenth-Century connotations.
The analysis that this study will present will be based on 
the obvious parallels between Diderot and Rameau's philosopher 
One final factor concerning the interpretation of 
Moi's personality seems in order. As noted, many observers 
see him as conservative bourgeois. One possible explanation
^Josephs, Dialogue, p. ii.
2Dieckmann, ed., Neveu, p. xlix.
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as to why so many have in somewhat a priori fashion made 
this judgement may rest in the chronology of the genesis of 
the work. Diderot had begun writing the work in l?6l and 
1762. He was retouching and revising it until 1774.^ He 
was thus sixty-one at the time of its completion. It would 
be very natural to assume that whatever representation a 
sixty-one year old would give of himself, would be that of 
a conservative bourgeois. This does not, however, take 
cognizance of the individual with whom one is dealing. Our
century has the tendency to assume that one is conservative,
and past real mental growth, by age sixty or at least by 
age sixty-five. Consequently, average sixty-year-olds react 
in the same way that children do who continue to hear through 
their growing years that adolescence is a trying period.
When they come to that age they subconsciously feel they 
must go about fulfilling the expectations. The average 
sixty-year-old will react similarly, and become conservative 
and less productive. However, Diderot of all men was not
average. He in no wise patterned his life to fit any popular
norm. He was an unusual adolescent and an unusual oldster. 
The masterpiece Jacques le fataliste was even to come from 
the same period in his life. It is the thesis of this study 
that Diderot was experiencing complete self-actualization at
^Josephs, Dialogue, p. viii.
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the time Neveu was composed and that consequently, any rep­
resentation he would fictionally make of himself would not 
be that of a fixated bourgeois dispensing simplistic solutions 
to Rameau, but would rather be that of a vitally alive self- 
actualizer. It would appear that he was reporting himself 
as he most fundamentally was.
In hierarchy-of-motives terms then, what seems to be 
at play is the bringing together on the same stage of a self­
actualized individual who has fulfilled all the lower need 
requirements and is now self-directive, and an individual 
who is still struggling with the most basic of needs. They 
can then represent two separate individuals or can in fact 
be a before-and-after treatment of the same person. It 
could well be that this is Diderot self-actualized, giving 
a last look at his former lower-need-centered self. An 
important point in this regard would be that though Diderot 
disapproves of being totally lower-need-centered, he does 
not reject lower needs. He is thus disapproving of Rameau's 
emphasis, but is not disapproving of any legitimate lower- 
hierarchy gratification. If we make the assumption that 
Rameau is what Diderot would have been had he not adequately 
responded to and adequately fulfilled each of his need levels 
in succession, what we have at hand is something of a con­
trolled study. We could pose a hypothetical situation and 
say, "What would happen in hierarchy-of-motives terms if we 
keep the heredity and early child-rearing constant and vary
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the early-adult pattern of need fulfillment?" In the case 
of subject A, that is to say Diderot or the philosopher, he 
gratified each need in succession, including esteem, aesthetic 
and cognitive needs and moved on to self-actualization. In 
the case of subject B, Rameau, (and assuming that here we 
have Diderot had he made different need-gratification deci­
sions as a young man), we have someone who never felt as 
though his physiological and esteem needs were adequately 
gratified. We have someone who never got to the business 
of fulfilling higher needs. Interestingly enough then, the 
Neveu de Rameau portrays characters operative at both extremes 
of Maslow's hierarchy.
The following analyses will be in exemplification of 
the above summaries of the philosopher and Rameau. The 
philosopher proves to be so close an example of Maslow's 
self-actualizing group that the procedure employed in his 
analysis will be that of a point by point comparison of him 
with Maslow's characteristics. In the case of Rameau, much 
of his analysis will be incidental to and necessarily implicit 
in that of the philosopher. Points that remain unfinished 
or untreated will be handled following treatment of the 
philosopher. First then to the self-actualizing philosopher.
Acceptance of self, others and nature is one of the 
qualities par excellence of Maslow's self-actualizers. They 
can accept themselves in the stoic style and can accept what 
they are becoming without justification or complaint.
4l
" . . . they can take the frailties and sins, weaknesses and
evils of human nature in the same unquestioning spirit with 
which one accepts the characteristics of nature."^ Likewise 
they do not argue with nature for having done things as she 
did. In this characteristic, Rameau's philosopher is a 
decided self-actualizer. After Rameau has inveighed against 
the inequalities he has encountered in life, the philosopher 
counsels :
Acceptons donc les choses comme elles sont. Voyons 
ce qu'elles nous coûtent et ce qu'elles nous rendent, 
et laissons là le tout que nous ne connaissons pas 
assez pour le louer ou le blâmer, et qui n'est peut- 
être ni bien ni mal, s'il est nécessaire comme 
beaucoup d'honnêtes gens 1'imaginent.^
This is stoicism, and acceptance of things over which 
one has no control, in the best Montaigne tradition. He 
seems to be saying exactly what Maslow says he found to be 
true of his select group. Another excellent example comes 
as the philosopher is describing his daughter of eight and 
her adjustment to life. The entire situation here, to 
include the daughter, is of course reminiscent of Diderot 
himself.
Puisque la nature a été assez ingrate envers elle 
pour lui donner une organisation délicate avec une 
âme sensible, et l'exposer aux mêmes peines de la 
vie que si elle avait une organisation forte et un 
coeur de bronze, je lui apprendrai, si je peux, à 
les supporter avec courage.^
^Maslow, Motivation, p. 206.
2Bénac, éd.. Oeuvres, p. 40$. 
^Ibid., p. 420.
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'i'll j s is at one and the same time evidence of the 
philosopher's wholesome acceptance of life, quite removed 
from pathological pessimism, and is a beautiful example 
of a self-actualizing parent. The philosopher's greater 
maturity gives him a vision of life that his young daughter 
cannot grasp alone. He will thus help her to see things in 
a way that will make her years on earth more realistic.
Concerning the characteristic of acceptance of 
others, time and again the philosopher shows himself accepting 
of Rameau. In the following example there is admirably shown 
the tendency of the self-actualizing to make a distinction 
between the person and the deed. One can dislike the act, 
but still be accepting of the doer. The philosopher tells 
Rameau that, " ... en dépit du rôle misérable, abject, vil,
abominable que vous faites, je crois qu'au fond vous avez 
l'âme d é l i c a t . T h e  adjectives here chosen by the philos­
opher to characterize Rameau's actions show that he considers 
them to be among the most base imaginable. Nevertheless he 
accepts Rameau as having a delicate soul. Somewhat God-like, 
(for Maslow's self-actualizers are in a way rather God-like), 
the philosopher distinguishes between Rameau as a person 
and the quality of his deeds. In the same vein, after 
Rameau has listed his sins for shock effect, the philoso­
pher's reaction is still that of understanding and acceptance:
^Ibid., p . 444.
43
"La faute que vous avez commise est-elle si impardonnable?"^
One additional instance, and also one of the most
charming parts of the work, shows the philosopher's complete
yet honest acceptance of others. Rameau and the philosopher
have just noticed each other and the philosopher greets him
by saying: "Je ne pense guère à vous quand je ne vous vois
2pas. Mais vous me plaisez toujours à revoir." This 
greeting shows the rare combination, at least in adult 
behavior, (it would be more observable in children), of 
complete acceptance along with absolute sincerity. Normal 
adult behavior would not allow for one to say to another 
that in his absence he does not think about him. The obvious 
result would be shattered friendships and offended egos.
Here, however, there is complete absence of sham; there is 
the freshness and naivete of a child, another quality defini-
3tional of self-actualization. The philosopher can be so 
forthright because he is totally accepting and knows that 
Rameau knows this. No self-respect or self-concept is 
threatened when one is dealing with a self-actualized indi­
vidual. By very definition, they have as one of their aims 
the promotion of other's feeling of self-worth. Being 
completely comfortable with themselves and self-accepting,
^Ibid. , p . 409 .
^Ibid., p. 398.
3Maslow, Motivation, p. 208.
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they have no need to debase others in order to elevate them­
selves. It is small wonder then that Rameau felt safe in 
pouring out his inner self to the philosopher.
A second characteristic of the self-actualizing is 
that they will, more often than people in general, feel a 
sense of duty, of obligation and responsibility toward their 
fellow beings. They will have a mission, a task-orientation 
outside themselves.^ In this characteristic, Rameau's 
philosopher seems to be in direct juxtaposition to Rameau. 
Rameau feels duty only to self, to the ensuring of his own 
gratification and well-being. The philosopher on the other 
hand feels a duty to his country, " ... défendre sa patrie?"; 
to friends "Servir ses amis ?" ; to society, "Avoir un état
dans la société et en remplir les devoirs"; to one's family
2and offspring, "Veiller à l'éducation de ses enfants?".
The philosopher is obviously other-oriented in the wholesome 
sense of the term. All of the above bespeak someone who is 
growth, rather than deficiency motivated. The philosopher 
is altruism and growth in action.
In a later discussion of what Rameau should be 
absorbing from his reading, the philosopher declares: "La
connaissance de ses devoirs, l'amour de la vertu, la haine
^Maslcw, Motivation, p. 211.
2Bénac, éd.. Oeuvres, p. 429.
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du vice."^ It may be only happenstance that the philosopher 
should have placed the learning of one's duties as the first 
of things one should learn from one's reading, nevertheless 
he did place it there and it is obviously of prime importance 
to him. He again shows what Maslcw says his self-actualizers
showed problem and task-centering rather than ego-centering.
Here the philosopher's id, ego and superego seem to be more 
collaborative and synergistic than divided. Conversely,
Rameau is largely id-centered. What ego-orientation he 
displays is merely the guise that experience or reality 
(ego) has shown him are necessary to ensure id gratification.
A characteristic of self-actualization which some­
what overlaps the two already considered is that of 
gemeinschaf tsgef iihl. This is a term coined by Alfred Adler.
The person exhibiting this quality feels toward humanity a
. . . deep feeling of identification, sympathy
and affection in spite of occasional anger, 
impatience or disgust. . . . However far apart
he is from them at times, he nevertheless feels 
a basic underlying kinship with these creatures 
whom he must regard with, if not condescension, 
at least the knowledge that he can do things better 
than they can, that he can see things that they 
cannot see, that the truth that is so clear to 
him is for most people veiled and hidden.
This is in essence an older more insightful person compassion­
ately attempting to convey to someone less insightful and 
possibly even unwilling, truths and facts that will ameliorate
1Ibid. p. 447.
2Maslow, Motivation, p. 2l8 ,
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It is rather like Diderot, through love and a sense of 
obligation, struggling to place in the hands of the people 
beclouded by superstition, information in the form of an 
Encyclopedia that would greatly improve their condition. 
Carried to its logical extension, gemeinschaftsgefuhl char­
acterizes a tolerant Deity attempting to instruct a wayward 
people. Rameau in this analogy is not unlike what one would 
expect from a personification of the attributes of the 
Children of Israel. They, like Rameau, are bent on immediate 
gratification. They cannot await Moses' message from an 
unseen distant God, but must rather fashion a golden calf 
which will more strikingly, more immediately fill the need 
they are experiencing. Like Rameau, they do not learn from 
their teacher. Rameau does not profit from the philosopher's 
counsel, nor do the Children of Israel heed Moses. Thus in 
a sense, in Rameau and the philosopher, Diderot has produced 
a sort of two-person Old Testament.
On a more prosaic level concerning Rameau and the 
philosopher, the latter continually attempts to show the 
former the obvious advantages of more forthright behavior.
The following is typical of Rameau's replies: " ... Je ne
m'accomode point de votre félicité, ni du bonheur de quelque 
visionnaire comme vous." The philosopher replies in a manner 
reminiscent of Maslow's gemeinschaftsgefuhl: "Je vois, mon
cher que vous ignorez ce que c'est, et que vous n'êtes pas 
même fait pour l'apprendre."^ Here the philosopher realizes
^Bénac, éd., Oeuvres, p. 435*
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that Rameau has not understood and is in fact incapable of 
understanding. Still he is compassionate and will try some 
other approach, aware that he has understandings that could 
prove helpful to the wayward Rameau. Without citing further 
examples, suffice it to say that the entire relationship 
between the two is evidence of gemeinschaftsgefuhl in the 
life of the philosopher.
Time and again in the course of their conversation, 
admittedly rather extended, the philosopher exhibits signs 
of a democratic character structure. This is another of the 
traits common to self-actualizers, and is akin to those of 
acceptance and gemeinschaftsgefuhl. In the first place the 
very fact that he would so extendedly converse in public with 
a person of the bizarre appearance of Rameau indicates a 
democratic soul. By the time of this writing, Diderot was 
rather established and was a person of note. From this we 
can infer that the philosopher was as well. A lesser man 
would have avoided, like the social plague, anyone even 
approaching Rameau's appearance and actions. The philosopher 
is totally above such nonsense and will befriend whom he will. 
The point of importance here is that the philosopher is not 
merely amusing himself nor passing an interesting afternoon 
at the expense of a social oddity. He democratically accepts 
Rameau as a human being worthy of the respect due any member 
of the race. Maslow says of his self-actualizers that they 
tend " . . .  to give a certain quantum of respect to any
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human being just because he is a human individual."^ They 
attempt to see that no one is robbed of his dignity and 
individuality, even a scoundrel.
An exemplary case in point comes as Rameau wishes 
he had the philosopher's talents in order to more effectively 
carry on his vices. He praises the philosopher, all the 
while coveting his talents for evil purposes. The philoso­
pher could have very readily railed against him, decrying 
his evil. Instead he chose to criticize in a positive way, 
allowing Rameau to retain a dignity of sorts. "Et tout cela, 
vous le savez mille fois mieux que moi. Je ne serais pas 
même digne d'être votre écolier." Obviously he in no wise 
wants to learn what Rameau might have to teach, and has no 
intention to become his pupil; but even so, he has demonstrated 
his democratic attitude and has also shown himself, in a 
manner of speaking, to be teachable.
A few additional comments at this point will bring 
to light one additional quality of self-actualization manifested 
by the philosopher. Not only does his afternoon spent with 
Rameau show his democratic character structure, it also 
gives evidence of a quality of interpersonal relationship 
of which few people are capable. It is difficult to imagine 
that Rameau would enter into the type of relationship he has
^Maslow, Motivation, p. 220.
2Bénac, éd., Oeuvres, p. 4y8.
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here with the philosopher, with any other person. Rameau 
trusts and respects him. Ego boundaries are virtually 
eliminated. The relationship is decidedly profound, given 
the facts of the infrequency of their meetings, and the 
disparity of their lives and value systems. The philosopher 
seems to have effortlessly established a rapport that would 
be the envy of the most accomplished of psychiatrists. He 
seems to care in a very meaningful way, and communicates 
this to Rameau who responds by baring his soul. They have 
communicated as artlessly and unreservedly as children.
As has been evident of the prior indicators of self- 
actualization, none are mutually exclusive nor totally inde­
pendent. This was acknowledged by Maslow and is true of the 
following which are not unlike a syndrome. Self-actualizing 
people are resistant to enculturat ion and maintain a certain 
detachment from the accepted and common. They have a need 
for privacy and have an intense coneentrational capacity 
which might lead to absent-mindedness. They retain an autonomy 
and find satisfaction based on inner rather than social cri­
teria. They are not dependent on opinion nor even on affec­
tion, though they are themselves capable of giving and 
receiving love in a very profound w a y .^ They tend to hold 
to their own interpretation of a situation, rather than to
^Maslow, Motivation, p. 241.
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rely upon vrhdt might be a more popularly held opinion, and 
do not "need" other people in the same way that most men 
do. Their determinants of satisfaction are inner-individual 
and not social.^ An excellent example of this quality of 
self-direction aiid offhanded detachment in Diderot's philoso­
pher is offered on the book's initial page, as the philosopher 
describes some of his personal habits.
Qu'il fasse beau qu'il fasse laid, c'est mon 
habitude d'aller sur les cinq heures du soir 
me promener au Palais Royal. C'est moi qu'on 
voit toujours seul, rêvant sur le banc d'Argenson- 
Je m'entretiens avec moi même de politique, 
d'amour, de goût ou de philosophie. J'abandonne 
mon esprit à tout son libertinage. Je le laisse 
maître de suivre la première idée sage ou folle 
qui se présente.2
This sounds surprisingly like what Maslow has just 
proposed. It is descriptive of a man content (not the same 
as self-satisfied) with life and with himself; of a man who 
has a quiet assurance of his own worth. In a way it is like 
an intrapersonal salon. The above is supremely indicative 
of psychological good health. Our philosopher has been able 
to let Rameau completely speak his mind and never felt as 
though he had to answer defensively. By the same token, the 
philosopher is able to step somewhat aside in this intraper­
sonal salon, and let his own thoughts take their course.
^Ibid., p . 214.
^Bénac, éd., Oeuvres, p. 395-
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completely unthreatened by what might be the possible outcome. 
Like the truly self-actualized man, he is unthreatened by 
the bizarre or the unknown. The philosopher counsels some­
what the same action for Rameau when Rameau seems to be unsure 
of his place in society. The philosopher proposes toward the 
end of the novel, that rather than debasing himself in order 
to obtain a rich table, Rameau should ” ... se renfermer dans
son grenier, boire de l'eau, manger du pain sec et chercher 
soi-même."^ This sums up much of what the philosopher (i.e., 
Diderot) has probably done to arrive at his state of self- 
discipline, self-integration and self-knowledge. Obviously 
it is reminiscent of another stoic and philosopher, Michel 
de Montaigne, who had a profound influence on Diderot. All 
elements of the proposed regimen are aimed at self-mastery: 
foregoing of luxurious accommodations, eating and drinking 
to sustain life rather than as ends in themselves, and most 
importantly, forcing oneself to discover who and what he is.
In discussing his self-actualized individuals, Maslow asserts 
he is in total agreement with Erich Fromm " . . .  that the 
average, normal, well-adjusted person often has not the
slightest idea of what he is, of what he wants, or what his
2own opinions are." It is evident that the philosopher has 
the same opinion of Rameau and hence offers his regimen for
^Ib id. , p . 482.
2Maslow, Motivati on, p. 210.
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change. Like Fromm's average individual, however, Rameau 
will likely continue on, ignorant of his real self and 
equally ignorant of his potential.
When Rameau shows no inclination to master himself 
and to modify his life-style to the point of becoming inde­
pendent of servitude and servility, (a characteristic par 
excellence of self-actualizers), the philosopher explodes:
"Je veux mourir si cela ne vaudrait mieux que de ramper, de 
s'aviler et se prostituer."^ To be abundantly clear he 
spells it out in slightly different terms for the unteachable 
Rameau. He points out to him the great price he is paying 
in order to fill his stomach in the manner that he does; and 
that this price, self-regard, is too great a sacrifice to 
make for the mere meeting of lower needs. He implies rather 
directly that Rameau would do infinitely better to see reality 
more clearly and pay the price that he, the philosopher, has 
paid: hard work and self-mastery.
Les choses de la vie ont un prix sans doute mais 
vous ignorez celui du sacrifice que vous faites 
pour les obtenir. Vour dansez, vous avez dansé 
et vous continuerez de danser la vile pantomime.^
This is probably the first time the above state of 
affairs had been put to Rameau in terms of his own sacrifice. 
He seems to have concluded previously that his own means of
^Bénac, éd.. Oeuvre s , p. 489. 
^Ibid., p . 490.
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obtaining life's goods was infinitely less expensive than 
the means employed by others. The philosopher straightens 
out his muddled thinking.
Diderot was obviously familiar with the humor of 
Moliere and Voltaire. Both of them had ends beyond humor 
alone and this was of course even more the case with Diderot.
He employs humor much less than did either of the above two, 
and in a sense what humor he does use is more intrinsic than 
superimposed. This would be obviously true of his more 
philosophic works, cUid would be less so of works such as 
Les Bijoux indiscrets. Further, his humor, as with Voltaire's, 
tended to be an ally to his philosophy. This is probably 
even truer of Diderot than Voltaire who was at moments super­
ficial in his desire to be humorous. Diderot's humor elicits 
a smile rather than a laugh, generally because the tenor of 
all that has preceded has been rather weighty. A good 
example, and one which places the philosopher in Maslow's 
self-actualization category, is the following: Rameau has
been attempting to make the philosopher see that he (the 
philosopher) has talents that could very well be put to 
"better" use such as making money or seducing women. The 
philosopher counters with soft philosophical humor that makes 
his point but at the same time shows that no hostility is 
intended. "Mais c'est qu'il y a des gens comme moi qui ne 
regardent pas la richesse comme la chose du monde la plus
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précieuse: gens bizarres."^ The humorous addendum is remi­
niscent of Voltaire, but it is less biting and more humanis­
tic than it would have been coming from him. All in all the 
philosopher is not a humorous individual in the accepted 
sense. He rather fits Maslow's description of this quality 
in his subjects. He says that, "It should not be surprising 
that the average man, accustomed as he is to joke books and
belly laughs, considers our subjects to be rather on the
2sober and serious side." This is very true of the philoso­
pher. He is capable of humor, but he would rather influence 
by the cogency of his thought, than by a humorous twist 
imposed on his material.
The self-ac tualizer, says Maslow, does not coii^use
-3means and ends and is ethically strong."' Diderot has the 
philosopher consistently show his long-range adherence to 
nature and truth. " ... Je crois que si le mensonge peut 
servir un moment, il est nécessairement nuisible à la longue, 
bien qu'il puisse arriver qu'il nuise dans le moment."
One other example serves to show the ethical strength of the
^Ibid., p. 478- 
2Maslow, Motivation, p. 223-
 ̂Ib i d . , p . 221.
4Bénac, éd., Oeuvres, p. 401.
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philosopher. The following is especially interesting consid­
ering the state of morals and integrity during the eighteenth 
century. Rameau asks, "Mais à votre compte il faut donc 
être d'honnêtes gens?" The philosopher replies, "Pour être 
heureux? assurément."^ The philosopher's reply is an extremely 
important one. He did not infer that one should be honest 
in order to avoid a confrontation with police or legal 
authorities or even in order to have better relations with 
one's neighbors and peers. All of these are of course some­
what implicit in his answer but they are only a fraction of 
the totality of his reply. Nor does he reply that one should 
do good or be honest in order to obtain a celestial reward. 
Post-earth-life rewards of course were not at all part of 
Diderot's, nor of his philosopher's, motives. what the 
philosopher seems to be saying is that for a man to be truly 
what he most fundamentally can be, and to be most fundamen­
tally true to himself, he must be honest and ethically 
strong. Here, the philosopher is at one and the same time 
realistic and idealistic. He realizes that ultimately human 
relationships must be based on certain predictables, on 
certain laws and precepts on which one and all can rely.
If nothing that any man says can be taken at face value, if 
no man is honest, much of the reliability and predictability 
of life is lost. This leads immediately to apprehension and
^Ibid., p. 432.
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despair. Thus he avers that man's natural state, that state
which will lead to happiness, involves honesty. It is small
wonder then that this is characteristic of Maslow's self-
actualizers as well as of Diderot's philosopher, as an
integral part of their total self.
Another example comes as Rameau recounts all the
untruths he tells and the insinuations he makes in order to
mislead his protectors into thinking he is something he is
not. He tells the philosopher how he drops names to make
others think he is being awaited here and there. The
philosopher asks:
Moi: Et cependant vous n'êtes attendu nulle part?
Lui: Il est vrai.
Moi: Et pourquoi employer toutes ces petites viles
ruses-là?l
As insightful as he is, the philosopher finds it difficult 
to see why Rameau would want to live a lie. The philosopher 
has to remind Rameau, on one occasion, that he wants their 
relationship to have none of the sham that Rameau's rela­
tionships with others seem to have. "Je suis un bon homme;
ayez la bonté d'en user avec moi plus rondement et de laisser 
2là votre art- " The philosopher practices himself, and 
wants from Rameau, predictability and honesty.
It is readily evident that in the final analysis, 
truth is a more correct and efficient perception of reality.
^Ib id. , p . 424.
^Ibid., p . 443.
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given that the perception of reality involves perceiving 
and interpreting things as they most actually are. Truth 
assumes a perception of reality which is free from the 
falsity of judgement that comes when perception is influenced 
by the perceiver's needs or fears. In this characteristic, 
the philosopher is again juxtaposed with Rameau. All Rameau's 
decisions and perceptions are made through the distortion 
created by his own needs. He can no longer accurately inter­
pret reality. The philosopher on the other hand has mastered 
himself to the point that his own needs no longer distort.
In a manner of speaking the philosopher is no longer per­
sonally involved. He is committed in the Sartrean sense 
but his personal involvement is nil because he is now growth 
oriented rather than need oriented.
Along the same general line of correctness of per­
ception, the philosopher points out that often men of genius, 
i.e. the philosophers and others, with their greater capacity, 
will see a truth which remains hidden from the common man.
In a word, the genius has had a clearer, more complete per­
ception of reality. Time will eventually exonerate the 
genius, i.e.the man with clearer perception, but it will 
often be the case that in the meantime he will be the " 
victime du préjugé et des lois."'*' Maslow implies that the 
genius (self-actualized man) will also be able to more
^Ibid., p . 401.
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accurately perceive reality because he is unfrightened and 
unthreatened by the unknown. He will be more in the real 
world than in the man-made world of concepts and stereotypes. 
Again this seems to be definitional of the genius of which 
the philosopher speaks.
Two characteristics of those proposed by Maslow as
definitional of self-actualizing people remain to be applied
to our philosopher. As with others mentioned, they tend to
be overlapping. These include the quality of creativeness,
here defined by Maslow as a child-like, naive way of viewing
the world.^ The second is that of continued freshness of
appreciation, of still feeling wonder and awe from the
2everyday experiences of life. Suffice it to say at this 
point that these are intrinsic in all the philosopher says 
and does. Everything we know of him bespeaks a man who 
could still find beauty in a sunset or amazement at another 
birth. The very fact that he habitually takes walks and 
that he seems to derive so much pleasure from them implies 
he is a man who finds joy in the natural and in the common­
place. His totally direct and naive acceptance of Rameau 
attests to the same kind of freshness. One final but decid­
edly important citation will be made in this regard. It
^Maslow, Motivation, p. 223. 
^Ibid., p . 214.
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points out the philosopher's guilelessness, his freshness, 
and his spontaneity. It exemplifies all that has been said 
concerning the total self-integration that can be realized 
by men of this type. Here there is no chagrin or embarrass­
ment at fulfilling his lower needs; he has them, fulfills 
them, and then gets on to caring for higher-level ones. It 
is an extremely felicitous passage for someone attempting 
to exemplify the fulfillment of Maslow's hierarchy. It is 
written almost as though its author had first consulted 
Maslow before sitting down to write. It is the example 
par excellence of total self-integration, of total self­
acceptance and of a man who is now growth rather than
deficit motivated. The philosopher here summarizes himself 
freshly and candidly for Rameau:
Je ne méprise pas les plaisirs des sens: j'ai un
palais aussi, et il est flatté d'un mets délicat
ou d'un vin délicieux; j'ai un coeur et des yeux, 
et j'aime à voir une jolie femme, j'aime à sentir 
sous ma main la fermeté et la rondeur de sa gorge, 
à presser ses lèvres des miennes, à puiser la 
volupté dans ses regards, et à en expirer entre 
ses bras; quelquefois avec mes amis, une partie de 
débauche, même un peu tumultueuse, ne me déplait 
pas. Mais, je ne vous le dissimulerai pas, il 
m'est infinement plus doux encore d'avoir secouru 
le malheureux, d'avoir terminé une affaire épineuse, 
donné un conseil salutaire, fait une lecture agréable, 
une promenade avec un homme ou une femme chère à 
mon coeur, passé quelques heures instructives avec 
mes enfants, écrit une bonne page, rempli les 
devoirs de mon état, dit à celle que j'aime quelques 
choses tendres et douces qui amène ses bras autour 
de mon col. Je connais telle action que je voudrais 
avoir faite pour tout ce que je possède. C'est un 
sublime ouvrage que Mahomet, j 'aimerais mieux avoir 
réhabilité la mémoire des Calas.^
Bénac, éd.. Oeuvres, p. 432.
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A final word concerning the philosopher. It would 
seem that any number of the preceding examples, even this 
last one cited, would serve to point out that the philosopher 
is infinitely more than a mere symbol of bourgeois ethics.
As concerns Trilling's evaluation, it would also seem appro­
priate to say that the foregoing examples point out the 
philosopher to be much more than a Freudian ego representa­
tive. The philosopher goes much beyond the reality principle 
and is, in a sense, operative at a stage even beyond the 
superego. The counsel he offers to Rameau is not merely 
simplistic, it is vital and philosophic in a very meaningful 
way. If there is anything a present-day psychiatrist would 
propose to Rameau it would be to reevaluate his value system, 
and to define for himself more exactly who and what he is, 
in a cosmic, as well as in a limited sense. The philosopher 
in almost no way resembles a security-oriented, esteem- 
oriented bourgeois.
It remains now to complete and broaden the analysis 
of Rameau. Obviously, he was absorbed in lower-hierarchy 
needs; in this he is almost a complete pole apart from the 
philosopher. He is possibly what Diderot, unbridled, and 
lacking self-control and direction, could have become. It 
seems highly likely that Diderot on "creating" him, could 
have felt constrained to say to himself that there, but for 
some insight and self-discipline, was he, Rameau seems at 
first glance almost physiologically fixated. These lower
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needs have taken on an importance for him out of all propor­
tion to their normal value. Immediately after their having 
encountered each other, the philosopher inquires as to what 
he had been doing. Rameau answers in terms that make him 
appear dedicated solely to fulfilling immediate physiological 
requirements. " ... J'ai eu faim, et j'ai mangé, quand 
l'occasion s'est présentée; après avoir mangé, j'ai eu soif, 
et j'ai bu quelquefois. Cependant la barbe me venait, et 
... je l'ai fait r a s e r . Later the philosopher seems to 
interpret Rameau in terms not unlike those one would use 
for a boa constrictor or a lion. The philosopher has been 
encouraging him to write down some of his ideas. Rameau 
argues he does not have time for that. The philosopher presses 
further, asking him about his " ... heures perdues, lorsque
l'angoisse de votre estomac vide ou la fatigue de votre
2estomac surchargé éloigne le sommeil. ..." The philosopher 
here implies that there would logically be only two reasons 
why Rameau might lie awake at night. Both of these reasons 
have to do with a stomach that sounds like either a hungry 
or a bloated carnivore. He infers that, like a boa constric­
tor, Rameau would respond to hunger pangs, and when oppor­
tunity presented itself he would eat to satiation. Then, 
stomach painfully distended, he would lie down to await 
digestion.
^Ibid. , p. 399*
^Ibid., p . 442.
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Though this is probably part of the truth concerning
Rameau's physiological needs, it does not seem to account
for all the ramifications of his eating habits. Rameau is
not merely fulfilling the need for nourishment, he is rather
fixated on filling the need in a specific way, on filling
it as he would if he were famous and rich as had been his
uncle. This would seem to imply then that Rameau's eating
and drinking habits unconsciously fill esteem needs, not
physiological needs alone. One gets the impression that
Rameau, even desperately hungry, would not just eat any type
of nutriment. He must eat in a sumptuous surrounding at a
sumptuous table, of the best of foods. When asked what he
would do were he rich he shows that his tastes decidedly
tend toward the exquisite: " ... boire de bon vin, se
gorger de mets délicats, se rouler sur de jolies femmes,
se reposer dans des lits bien mollets. Excepté cela, le
reste n'est que vanité."^ On another occasion he makes
nearly the same wish list: " ... bonne table, bonne
compagnie, bons vins, belles femmes, plaisirs de toutes
2les couleurs, ..." From the adjectives employed here it 
is evident that not any old table or just any wine will do. 
Thus, to merely conclude that Rameau is carnally and sensually 
oriented is to miss the idea that his emphasis here has been
^Ibid., p . 429.
^Ibid., p . 404.
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on the quality of each item, not on their mere availability.
To eat and live in this manner fills esteem as well as 
nourishment needs. One senses that this is the case in the 
following instance. The price Rameau had to pay for remain­
ing at the table was to remain silent. This is of course a 
direct assault at his need for recognition. Rameau on these 
occasions ” ... se taisait et mangeait de rage." If on 
occasion he were put in his place, " ... la fureur étincelait 
dans ses yeux et il se remettait à manger avec plus de 
rage. On both occasions the inner reaction is evident.
He is not eating the food merely to gratify some caloric or 
vitamin need, rather it symbolizes for him those who are 
trampling on his esteem needs, and he is symbolically attacking 
them. There is no possibility of a wisdom-of-the-body inter­
pretation of his eating. Like all else he did, it was symbolic 
of his frustrated need for prestige, recognition, and accom­
plishment .
In his more lucid moments, Rameau shows himself
capable of understanding the very heart of this need of all
men. "II faut qu'il y ait une certaine dignité attachée à
2la nature de l'homme, que rien ne peut étouffer." Not 
even a Twentieth-Century psychologist could say it more
^Ibid., p. 397.
“Ib i d ., p . 4ll.
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clearly. Fundamentally, he wants to walk with his head
erect so that " ... la conscience te rendrait témoinage à
toi-même de ton propre mérite, ..."^ Like all men he needed
to feel " ... q u 'on ne pouvait se passer de moi, que j 'étais
2un homme essentiel." Had Rameau been able to retain some 
portion of this insight for any extended period, his troubles 
would have been minimal. His Achilles heel, however, was 
his name. He could not graciously bear it. His interpreta­
tion of what it forcedly imposed upon him was his demise. 
"Rameau? S'appeler Rameau, cela est gênant." It became 
impossible for him to make any sort of reasonable compromise 
between what he was, and what his name inferred he should be. 
What he had hauntingly, continually in front of him, was 
that he ought to " ... avoir fait ou faire quelque chose qui 
excitât l'admiration de l'univers." He felt he must in 
some way live up to the family name. The genius and power 
of his pantomimes and mimicry show how closely he could come 
to a masterful creation. An equal talent and an equal 
energy expended on a real clavecin or violin would have 
made him a virtuoso. His problem was that he was not 
clear-headed enough to see how close he was to artistic 
genius, and yet he was too clear-headed to accept what he
^Ibid., p . 406. 
^Ibid., p . 451. 
^Ibid., p . 48l.
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did do as adequately meeting his need for achievement and 
recognition.
His frustration turned his energies in compensatory
fashion into various avenues. One of these was that of
irritation at anyone else's success. ”Je n'ai jamais entendu
louer un seul que son éloge ne m'ait fait secrètement
enrager." He would then try to bring these people down to
his level since he was unable to ascend to theirs. Thus,
whenever he would hear some degrading remark about a person
of note, he would listen with delight " ... car cela nous
rapproche."^ Compensatory fancies would seize him and he
would envision himself rich and powerful. " ... je serais
le plus insolent maroufle qu'on eût encore vu. ... J'aime à
commander et je commanderai. J'aime qu'on me loue et l'on 
2me louera." If fantasies did not suffice, Rameau and his 
types would resort to taking out their frustrations on 
scapegoats who were lower in the social hierarchy than 
themselves.
II faut voir, quand l'humeur nous prend, comme 
nous traitons les valets, comme les femmes de 
chambre sont souffletées, comme nous menons à 
grands coup de pied les parties casuelles pour 
peu qu'elles s'écartent du respect qui nous 
est dû."3
^Ibid., p . 406.
^Ibid., p. 428.
^Ibid., p . 443•
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Rameau's frustrated state led him to a variety of
distortions of reality. For him, procuring became " ... un
état honnête. Beaucoup de gens même titrés s'en mêlent."^
In Celestina fashion, and almost with professional pride
he says: "J'ai plus de cent façons d'entamer la séduction
d'une jeune fille, ... Je possède surtout le talent d'encourager
2un jeune homme timide, ..." He does betray later what this 
might mean for him. "Si cela était écrit je crois qu'on
3m'accorderait quelque génie." This same frustration- 
induced distortion has led him to a rather unique way of 
arriving at greatness. When asked why he did not record 
his Celestina-like practices he likens himself to Cesar,
Turenne and Vauban. He will be like these men who " ...
I.lisent peu, pratiquent beaucoup.""* This same distortion led 
him to set up a type of merit scale for evil. Great evil, 
like great good, ought to be lauded. Ordinary evil is 
reprehensible but " ... l'atrocité de l'action vous porte 
au delà du mépris." He wants to draw from the philosopher 
the admission that he is " ... au moins original dans mon 
avilissement, me placer dans votre tête sur la ligne des 
grands vauriens."^ An additional point of import here seems
^Ibid., p. kOk. 
"Ibid., p. 44l.
^Ibid.
4Ibid., p . 442.
^Ibid., p. 462.
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to be that for Rameau there is no point in being a good-for- 
nothing for its own sake. Even his baseness and loathsome­
ness must be aimed at securing recognition from the philosopher 
The pattern continually returns to the fact that Rameau can 
be or do nothing for its own sake. All must eventually go 
toward paying off in some way his recognition needs. Coupled 
even with the matter of playing the fool, he makes the 
philosopher admit his supremacy. "II faut convenir que vous 
avez porté le talent de faire des fous et de s'avilir aussi 
loin qu'il est possible."^
Rameau could not always be so positively forthright 
with his demands.ng of regard and esteem. Very frequently 
he feels unconsciously uncomfortable enough with what he is, 
and with what he has done, that he must shift some of the 
responsibility elsewhere. A frequent resort is that of 
saying that everybody is doing it. "Je ne m'avilis point 
en faisant comme tout le monde." Parallel shifting of 
responsibility is evident when he disavows authorship of
2the world's vilainy. "Ce n'est pas moi qui les ai inventées." 
In the following instance he shifts blame for what he is to 
his protectors: "On m'a voulu ridicule et je me le suis
fait." As to other more vicious elements, " ... nature
^Ibid., p. 439.
"Ibid., p . 425.
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seule en avait fait les f r a i s . Even here he must blame 
genetic s -
One final indication of his need to protect his
inner self from loss of esteem is shown by his manner of
giving music lessons. Admitting first of all to knowing
nothing about what he professes to teach, he justifies
nevertheless his taking of the money on the grounds that
" ... ils n'avaient rien à désapprendre, et c'était toujours
2autant d'argent et de temps épargné." With this kind of 
reasoning, Rameau keeps some sort of a positive self-picture. 
Anyway, he says, the people from whom I steal the money have 
acquired it in some dishonest way from someone else and 
"Nous faisons justice les uns des autres sans que la loi
3 _s'en mêle." It is evident that Kameau could here serve in 
almost classic fashion, as a case study of the displacement 
of responsibility. He does not have the fortitude to be 
what he knows he can and should be, nor does he have the 
graciousness nor psychic strength to accept himself as he is.
Rameau makes a rather succinct summary of his motive 
hierarchy while speaking about the happiness of his son. He 
gave indication of a rather profound concern for the boy, 
as much as one would expect from a Rameau, and seemed
^Ibid., p. 449. 
^Ibid., p. 442. 
^Ibid., p. 42 7.
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genuinely concerned for his future. He declared that he
wanted his son to be happy and he then proceeded to spoil
out jus I what he envisioned by happiness. If we assume that
all men seek as their major goal, happiness, this should
mean that Rameau's definition of it should by and large
reveal his value system. Rameau declares: "Je veux que
mon fils soit heureux, ou ce qui revient au même, honoré,
riche et puissant."^ From all the foregoing discussion of
Rameau's needs, this summary is entirely consistent. The
prime element of happiness, by virtue of the fact that he
has placed it at the first of his list, is "to be honored".
This succinctly summarizes all his frustrated recognition
needs, and shows why he must try to associate himself with
people of notoriety, such as Mademoiselle Hus. By associating
with notables, he partakes of some of their acclaim, and
eases his battered ego. He cannot escape his uncle and his
name. Rameau realizes how insignificant money or being rich
is to the philosopher, and so he feels he must clarify what
he means by his proposing of money as the second ingredient
necessary to happiness. If his son does have money, Rameau
tells the philosopher, '' ... rien ne lui manquera, pas même
2votre estime et votre respect." The point of importance
^Ibid., p . 476.
“Ibid.
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is that what money or wealth really means is more of the 
first ingredient, that of honor or, as he says, esteem and 
respect. Thus very clearly the first two ingredients of 
happiness are nearly parallel, and in point of fact fulfill 
the same need, that of esteem and recognition. The use 
of "même" and "votre" do show that Rameau values the philoso­
pher's recognition above that of many others, but it is 
evident also that he is after a universal type of acclaim.
Item three on Rameau's list of happiness ingredients, 
that of "powerful", seems likewise directed at the same 
basic need as the first two. Power has no meaning in the 
absence of other people. Honor cannot be self-bestowed, it 
must come from others, and specifically from those whose 
opinions one values. Even wealth has no meaning aside from 
other people, since Rameau already defined it as being 
capable of buying respect and esteem. Power very definitely 
entails others since it has no meaning unless it is exercised 
over someone. Obviously this is a more aggressive means of 
gratifying the need than is that of being honored or esteemed, 
but the same fundamental need is being met. The goal-object 
group may be different. That is to say, it is usually the 
case that one seeks honor, (and it is even more true of 
esteem), from those viewed at least as one's peers; whereas, 
those over whom one desires power, are usually viewed at best 
as peers and more often as inferiors. Happiness, Rameau says 
very clearly, is having one's esteem and recognition needs met
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One other example helps in succinctly establishing 
Rameau's hierarchy, and at the same time shows that he was 
capable of some vision beyond esteem needs. The discussion 
of the moment centered on the idea of the noble savage, 
ignorant of civilization's ways or of education. Rameau, 
by using this example, shows what he considers the natural 
tendencies of man to be. If he were to bring in this 
young savage, he says, he would by nature want to be 
" ... richement vêtu, splendidement nourri, chéri des hommes, 
aimé des femmes, et rassembler autour de lui tous les 
bonheurs de la vie."^ "Tous les bonheurs" is too broad 
to be helpful, but the other items of his naturaJ_-to-man list 
give an adequate picture. "Richement vêtu" does in part 
fill belongingness needs; being well-dressed could make one 
more acceptable to certain people from whom acceptance is 
sought. This is not unlike a fraternity jacket: there is
a feeling of belonging that comes from what the clothing 
signifies, that one is part of an accepted group. In the 
case of Rameau’s fine clothes, this would make him auto­
matically classified as part of an accepted group, rich 
people. Respect and esteem needs that can be derived here­
from are obvious.
To be "chéri des hommes" seems to imply a more 
profound relationship. It goes beyond mere acceptance to
^Ibid., p. 479.
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a much more personal and tender association. This would 
seem to fulfill both belongingness needs as well as those 
of regard and esteem. "Aimé des Femmes" has similar impli­
cations. The former is more platonic while the latter may 
involve love. Contrary to what else Rameau has said else­
where about his use of women (he lumps them together with 
"good wane" and "every pleasure imaginable"), he seems here 
to be more genuinely personally concerned. At least it 
shows him capable of a degree of understanding of what 
affection implies to others. Finally, it is noteworthy that 
he must qualify "nourished" with an adverb such as 
"splendidement". This indeed goes beyond mere sustenance.
He again did not say "sufficiently" or "appropriately" or 
even simply "nourished." The manner and form are all import­
ant. His savage would, he feels, naturally tend toward 
wanting to be nourished in a manner that would also fill 
needs of regard or esteem. In summary, Rameau's use of the 
example of the natural man underlines his overpowering need 
for regard and acclaim. However, it does at the same time 
imply that he was capable of some appreciation of needs of 
belongingness sind love.
The final comments concerning Rameau and need 
hierarchy are grouped ground the comments most often made 
of him in the brief literary anthologies. This has to do 
with his genuineness and naturalness. Typical of critics' 
comments is the one by Fabre which implies that Rameau
73
enjoys a sort of self-diroctedness, that ho nad ” ... conquis
par son renoncement même, le droit d'avouer et de vivre son 
é c h e c . Such comments are based on assertions from Rameau 
such as the following: " ... je puis faire mon bonheur
par des vices qui me sont naturels que j'ai acquis sans 
travail, que je conserve sans effort, ..." Another often 
cited is: " ... pourquoi voyons-nous si fréquemment les 
dévots si durs, si fâcheux, -si insociables? C'est qu'ils 
se sont imposés une tache qui ne leur est pas naturelle; ..." 
Rameau almost convinces us that he is natural and self­
motivated, and thus self-actualized in a manner of speaking. 
He reinforces this idea by inveighing against hypocrisy 
while declaring his own freedom from it. "Heureusement je 
n'ai pas besoin d'être hypocrite; il y en a déjà de toutes
2les couleurs sans compter ceux qui le sont avec eux-mêmes."
He offers the picture of one who is honest with himself, of 
one who is true to his own nature. Again he gives the 
impression of self-actualization when he asserts: "II faut
3que Rameau soit ce qu'il est."
Taken in isolation, the above do allude to a sort 
of self-development, to a sort of self-actualization. In 
context, however, the picture is somewhat different. On
^Fabre, ed., Neveu, p. Ixvii. 
2“Bénac, éd.. Oeuvres, p. 433. 
^Ibid., p. 434.
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the page immediately following the one which includes many 
of the foregoing assertions of self-directedness and natural­
ness, he again makes the point that hypocrisy and virtue are 
unnatural to him. This time however he elaborates, and his 
elaborations give a more complete picture* they explain some 
of the seeming naturalness and seeming lack of hypocrisy
and show his actions to be as calculated as are those of
the people he reviles. He says:
La vertu se fait respecter, et le respect est 
incommode; la vertu se fait admirer et l'admiration 
n'est pas amusante. J'ai à faire à des gens qui
s'ennuient, et il faut que je les fasse rire, il
faut donc que je sois ridicule et fou; et quand 
la nature ne m 'aurait pas fait tel, le plus court 
serait de le paraître.^
Here Rameau plainly shows that he is what he is, 
not out of any genuineness from within, but from the necessity 
of being what is demanded or commodious or profitable. In 
the Eighteenth-Century, virtue is not à la mode and so he 
is not virtuous. Even if it is perchance admired, he will 
not be virtuous because with those with whom he deals, 
admiration is hardly an amusing quality and he must at all 
cost be amusing. Rameau has to do with people who have been 
sated, who are weary and whose senses and values have been 
dulled. They can be reached and drawn from their lethargy 
only by the extravagent, only by the bizarre, only by the
^ I b i d . , p . 434.
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ridiculous. Rameau considers that what they have to offer 
him is adequate payment for him to play the roles they 
demand. So Rameau's seeming genuineness does not survive 
close scrutiny, and his "naturalness" is calculation and 
sham. He even uses the verb "paraître" which alone would 
undercut any idea of his being true to his nature. Even if 
he did have some vision of self-directedness, his other needs 
preclude any real success. He will not, he says, become 
" ... un homme vertueux, rongeant sa croûte de pain, ..."^
He might just as well have said that he could not stand the 
threat to his unique self-concept if he were to be reduced 
to eating crusts of bread. His needs here are reminiscent 
of the impoverished but proud "hidalgo" of Lazarillo de 
Termes who had to fill his esteem needs in spite of the cost 
to other needs in his hierarchy.
In conclusion, Diderot has depicted two men whose 
motive levels make them a pole apart. The one is fixated at 
a lower need level, largely that of concern for esteem. He 
would seem to be hopelessly entangled. The other has mastered 
all the lower needs and is now in the process of growth toward 
total realization of his potential. He is an excellent example 
of Maslow's actualizing man. One conclusion should be drawn 
as a logical consequence of the analyses the question as
^Ibid., p . 435.
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to identity of Lui and Moi . There seems to be little 
doubt that Moi is Diderot. It is of course not the total
Diderot and it is not Diderot as he always was. He was
much too dynamic to be amenable to easy definition or 
characterization. The picture presented, however, does seem 
very consistent with what one would expect a sixty plus year 
old actualizer to be. He is still dynamic and vital, still 
growing; but he is a Diderot mellowed by all that the
Encyclopedia was and represented, and by all that his unique
insight into men and life over a sixty-year span would 
produce. Is the nephew Diderot as he was as a young man?
Yes and no. Yes he was dynamic, filled with a myriad of
energies that needed expression. Yes he loved food, con­
versation and beautiful women; in a word he allowed himself
free physiological expression. But no, Diderot was not
physiologically fixated. Recall his leaving the tax-farmer 
because he considered himself too well cared for and because 
he had to get on with things more important in life than 
mere delicate food or wine or even women. As much as Diderot 
loved all these he showed too much self-mastery to be classif­
ied as physiologically fixated. Finally, no, as a young man 
he was not esteem-fixated as was young Rameau. He did want 
ultimate renown as his letter to Falconet shows; however, 
it was not a devouring, blinding passion as it seems to have 
been for young Rameau. It would seem safe to say that 
application of Maslow's hierarchy of needs to Lui and Moi
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substantiates the thesis that there is more at play in his 
depiction of these two than merely an older Diderot, (the 
philosopher), looking back on his younger, materialistic 
self, (Rameau).
CHAPTER IV
JACQUES: A SELF-ACTUALIZER IN THE MAKING
Jacques le fataliste was the last novel Diderot wrote. 
He composed it in 1773, some twelve years after he had begun 
the novel just studied, Le Neveu de Rameau.^ The two pro­
tagonists, Jacques and his Master, are in many ways reminis­
cent of the philosopher and Rameau. The philosopher is 
operating at a self-actualization, growth level, while 
Rameau is still struggling with deficiency motivations. In 
somewhat like manner, Jacques is in the process of becoming 
self-actualized while his Master is still struggling with 
basic deficiency needs. It might be said of Jacques, in 
comparison to Rameau's philosopher, that he is an appren­
tice self-actualizer. His stoicism is borrowed; he has
obtained it second-hand from his captain who, as the author
2says, had read Spinoza. It will obviously take more time, 
and modification, and integration, for Jacques to personalize
^Bénac, éd.. Oeuvres, p. ix.
“Ibid. , p . 6 71
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his Captain's philosophy. It soon becomes evident in fact, 
that Jacques does not in actuality closely follow his Captain's 
determinism. For all the times he discourses on the " ... 
grand rouleau,"^ for all his contention that everything
2that happens of good or ill " ... était écrit là-haut, "
he nevertheless conducts himself " ... comme vous et comme
3moi." Jacques talks determinism but in no wise slavishly 
lives it. As often as not, he relies on his brain rather 
than on destiny. On one occasion he is confronted with a 
reasonably insurmountable danger and so he " ... consulta 
le destin dans sa tête, il lui sembla que le destin lui 
disait: Retourne sur tes pas: ce qu'il fit." Thus he
talked reverence for his Captain's determinism but it was 
reason that guided his action. Jacques is in the process 
of fashioning a personal philosophy. He is a dynamic being, 
as was his creator, Diderot, who is trying on determinism, 
stoicism, and other approaches to the human condition, to 
see qualitatively and quantitatively, what can best be 
integrated into his own motive hierarchy. Jacques is, 
however, near the point of being self-directive. He is
^Ibid., p . 503. 
^Ibid., p . 493• 
^Ibid. , p . 671. 
^Ibid., p . 543•
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near to the stabilizing of a philosophy, and near acquiring 
a value system which will make him largely independent of 
external circumstances. He has largely solved his basic- 
need demands. He is not fixated on food nor sex nor esteem 
needs as was Rameau. Belongingness and love needs in no 
wise occupy him. He is secure in being loved by Denise and 
is obviously absolutely essential to his Master. His cog­
nitive needs are continually being met as he ponders the 
cosmos, man's role in it, and the role of nature in man's 
daily affairs. It now rests for Jacques to create himself 
and his unique value system and to grow into self-actualization, 
The Master on the other hand is reminiscent of Rameau 
in that he is stymied with lower-hierarchy needs. The Master 
does not have Rameau's vitality nor his lusty pursuit of 
lower needs. He is in fact outdistanced by Rameau in any 
measure. For example, both have strong esteem needs, and 
give evidence of frustration; but where Rameau actively 
pursues and improvises fulfillment, the Master passively 
and tiresomely invokes precedent and the quality of his 
birth to fill his needs. Rameau's life style is despicable, 
and he is often vile; but he is nevertheless fascinating 
and forgivable. The Master, by contrast, is weak, routine- 
ridden and completely unimaginative . He commits no offense, 
but his life style is so colorless and repetitive, and his 
actions are so weak and lacking in self-directedness that he 
not only does not invite empathy, he rather invites complete
8i
disinterest. He exists, but only a devoted Jacques could
care, and even Jacques seems to weary of him frequently.
Are we confronted in Jacques and his Master with
more elements of the mult i-faceted Diderot? Is he again
exposing portions of himself in these two characters? Was
it again impossible for him to integrate them into one
character? Many writers interested in Diderot seem to think
that this is the case. Mornet considers the Master to be
the moralist and sensitive Diderot and Jacques to be the
moralist philosopher. The Master would represent that
aspect of Diderot concerned with liberty and responsibility
while Jacques stands for determinism-^ Loy says that
Diderot is very much Jacques; the very hesitations of Jacques
are Diderot's hesitations, his reactions to the strong
things he has said in Le Rêve de d'Alembert. He is, in a
lesser degree, the Master, for the Master is basically
interested in safeguarding a workable and necessary morality.
But from the standpoint of complete espousal of either doc-
2trine, he is neither of them. Elsewhere Loy summarizes 
his impression that "Diderot is both Jacques and the Master
3and yet still Diderot." Similarly, another author feels
^Daniel Mornet, Diderot, 1'homme et l'oeuvre (Paris 
Boivin, ig4l) p. l40.
2John Robert Loy, Diderot's Determined Fatalist, A 
Critical Appraisal of "Jacques le fataliste" (New York: 
Kings Crown Press, 1950), p7 149.
^Ibid., p . 90.
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the two Diderots act in the presence of a third who is judge
and arbiter.^ For some, Diderot is in both, but hates himself
equally for being identifiable as one or the other. With
his usual frankness, he has represented all of himself
2graphically to convince that self.
What of the relationship between Jacques and Diderot
3alone? For Bénac, Jacques is in very fact Diderot. Bénac 
elsewhere says that Jacques ” ... incarne les deux aspects 
antagonistes de Diderot; la croyance du savant dans le 
déterminisme, et l'intérêt personnel de chaque être 
humain." Loy says that for some he represents anti-Spinoza 
elements in the way that Candide represented anti-Leibnitz 
elements.  ̂ He is also seen as the ill-disguised Bordeau of 
Le Rêve de d'Alembert.^ For Crocker, Jacques represents a
7theory of determinism so radical as to shade into fatalism. 
Grimsley sees him less as a facet of Diderot's personality,
g
than as an essentially human figure. And Fabre concludes
^Mornet, Diderot, p. l40.
2Loy, Appraisal, p. 151.
3Bénac, éd.. Oeuvres, p. 892.
4Ibid., p . xvi.
^Loy, Appraisal, p. I87 .
^Ibid., p . 89•
^Lester G. Crocker, "'Jacques le fataliste', an 
Expérience morale ", Diderot Studies, III (I96I), p. 75-
g
Ronald Grimsley, "Morality and Imagination in 
'Jacques le fataliste'", Modern Language Quarterly, XIX
(1958) p. 287. -----------  -----------
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"Nous ne saurons sans doute jamais (le savait-il lui-même?) 
quelle était l'intention de Diderot quand il s'attachait à 
l'écrire."^ It should be said that Jacques embodies many 
elements of the picaro. He has had a variety of masters, 
similar to Gil Bias or to Quevedo's Buscon. Like them also, 
he is extremely enterprising, and is, as they often are, a 
better man than his Master. Similar also to the picaresque 
novel in general, particularly similar to Don Quijote, much 
action takes place in inns and in route on horseback.
Finally, some writers see in him a character out of Rabelais. 
This is due to his love of his gourd (drink) which he con­
sults ad nauseum, and because of certain traits of indepen-
2denee and love of life.
What specifically of the Master? Loy sees him as 
the careful traditionalist both by social position and state
3of mind: as the routine-ridden editor of the Encyclopedia.
He also says that the Master is convinced, without any 
cogent reason for his stand, that there is a usually accepted 
code of moral values : that virtue exists and is the only 
merit of human action. Jacques' dangerous doctrine frightens 
him, for it questions for the first time the traditional
^Jacques Smietanski, Le Réalisme dans "Jacques le 
fataliste" , Préface de Jean Fabre (Par is : Nizet, 1965), p. 5
^Ibid. , p . 38 .
Loy. Appraisal, p. 88.
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attitudes toward crime and law which he had presumed to be
the basis of every decent man's judgements. His reactions
to Jacques' unorthodoxy are naive, Loy says, but impulsive
and natural.^
Grimsley suggests that the Master is the type of
person who passively accepts everyday conventions and values.
He readily acquiesces to traditional views of vice, virtue
and free will. He lacks individuality and it is significant
2that he is known only as the Master. He was the type of 
person v.n • whom Diderot suspected, with too much jus tifica-
311 on r 1 liking, that he had become identified.
It now remains to analyse in more detail the two 
protagonists from the motive-hierarchy point of view, and to 
draw some conclusions from that analysis that will add to 
what is already known of Diderot and his created characters. 
The approach will again be, as it was with Rameau and the 
philosopher, to assume, as do motivational psychologists, 
that all men experience the same basic needs, that all men 
work to fulfill those needs as effectively as possible, and 
that no two people will go about the process of filling any 
given need in exactly the same way. The attempt then will 
be to try to determine specifically which need any given
^Ibid.
2Grimsley, Morality, p. 287.
3Loy, Appraisal, p. 58.
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action seems to be fulfilling. First then as to Jacques.
It was suggested above that Jacques is in the process 
of achieving self-actualization. He should be thus in com­
parison, somewhat like an adolescent, where, in the analogy, 
deficiency motivation or lower-need motivation would be 
represented by childhood, and self-actualization by adult­
hood. As with adolescents, Jacques will not be totally con­
sistent because he is trying out various roles, philosophies 
and behaviors, in his search to know himself, in his search 
to see what will, with consistency and harmony, integrate 
into his self-image. Jacques is trying out honesty, morality, 
determinism, independence, possible marriage and family life 
in this search for self-integration. Likewise, in the same 
way that adolescence is characterized by vestiges ox child­
hood and even occasionally infantile behavior, so Jacques 
should exhibit vestiges of deficiency motivation. What are 
the indications that Jacques does appear to be a self-actualizer 
in the process of becoming?
Concerning this point, it is interesting that 
Jacques should practically say this of himself. He and 
his master have been discussing a point made by Jacques' 
captain. The Master, confused, asks if Jacques has made 
any sense of the point in question, that of prudence arrived 
at by experience. Jacques answers, "Assurément, peu à peu je 
m'étais fait à sa langue. Here he gives the impression
^Bénac, éd.. Oeuvres, p. 50^-
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of a process, -whereby, little by little, he came to understand, 
and then to internalize, his Captain's principles. The 
Captain, not surprisingly, was a stoic similar to Rameau's 
philosopher. In commenting on Jacques toward the end of 
the novel, the author himself seems to paint a pic ture of 
Jacques in the process of finding himself. "Souvent il 
était inconséquent comme vous et moi, et sujet à oublier 
ses principes, excepté dans quelques circonstances où sa 
philosophie le dominait évidemment."^ Another incident 
shows Jacques groping to find himself, attempting to master 
himself, but finding it to be somewhat difficult to accom­
plish, Like Maslow's self-actualized people or Rameau's 
philosopher, Jacques does not seek asceticism, but rather 
for being what he most fundamentally is. Here Jacques gives 
a near definition, albeit general, of many aspects of the 
self-contained man. Jacques wanted to get to the point 
where he was no longer dependent on deficiency motives.
He wanted to become " ... parfaitement maître de moi, à me
trouver aussi bien la t§te contre une borne, au coin de la 
rue, que sur un bon oreiller." He sees, however, that he 
still has a way to go "Tel je suis quelquefois; mais le diable 
est que cela ne dure pas, et que dur et ferme comme un 
rocher dans les grandes occasions, il arrive souvent qu'une
^Ibid., p . 671.
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petite contradiction, une bagatelle me déferre. ..." This 
is a description par excellence of someone in the process 
of self-actualization. Jacques ends by declaring that he 
has finally decided to be himself. "J'y ai renoncé; j'ai 
pris le parti d 'être comme je suis; et j'ai vu, en y pensant 
un peu, que cela revenait presque au même en ajoutant: 
Qu'importe comme on s o i t ? This sounds very much like 
decisions that Maslow's self actualizers have probably made. 
They have, more than most people, arrived at the point of 
being comfortable with what they do and are. They are trying 
to impress no one; their esteem needs, even those of self­
esteem, are comfortably filled. They are now in the process 
of becoming more and more truly themselves. They strike no 
poses; to whom would such behavior possibly be directed?
They seem to ask "Why be anything other than genuinely 
yourself?" This is exactly what Jacques is saying when he
says " ... j 'ai pris le parti d ' ^ r e  comme je suis ...
2qu'importe comme on soit?"
A specific example of his acting mid-way toward 
actualization occurs when Jacques Is explaining how he 
paid the peasant and his wife in advance for caring for him 
following his knee wound. Having thus paid in advance, he 




removed, left him to fend for himself. The Master chides 
that this should be a lesson to Jacques not to pay in advance. 
Jacques replies somewhat as a young wounded soldier. "Non, 
mon maître; ce n'était pas le temps de moraliser mais bien
celui de s'impatienter et de j u r e r - J a c q u e s  hadn't quite
arrived at the philosophical point of accepting this injus­
tice without malice or complaint. (Self-actualized people 
do accept others' shortcomings.) He implies that this may
come later but for now he will 'jurer'. Another "in
process" example is evident as Jacques, in a moment of self-
analysis, says: " ... j'oublie mes principes ou les leçons
2de mon capitaine et ... je ris et pleure comme un sot."
There does thus seem to be substantial evidence that Jacques 
is a man in the process of becoming. He is a man who has 
thought much about himself and the condition of man, and is 
in the process of integrating into his self-concept, those 
things which most harmoniously belong. He regresses at times 
but is becoming more and more self-directive. The next 
portion of the analysis will explore those areas in which 
he does give evidence of the fact that what he is becoming, 
is a self-actualized man.
One of the most obvious examples of Jacques' self- 
actualization tendencies concerns the area of acceptance
^Ibid., p. 568.
^Ib id., p . 656.
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of nature ̂ of self and of others. This would be expected 
in a book which purports to deal with determinism, but it 
has already been shown that Jacques is not a determinist 
automaton. Similar to Rameau's philosopher, Jacques begins 
by accepting the universe as it is, realizing he cannot 
change it. The Master, however, is concerned about who 
writes on the great scroll which dispenses happiness 
to some and misery to others. He vows he would give anything 
to know the answer. Jacques counters that he doesn't even 
care to know " ... car à quoi cela me servirait-il? En 
éviterais-je pour cela le trou où je dois m'aller casser 
le c o u ? Here he accepts Nature and whatever she might 
have in store because he realizes he can do nothing to alter 
cosmic, natural events. He seems to conclude "Why expend 
energy in a useless cause? Rather, make the best of life 
as it is."
Jacques' acceptance of others parallels that of his 
acceptance of Nature. It is continually evident that he is 
aware of his master's shortcomings; but just as he is accepting 
of Nature, even knowing her to be at times hostile, so he 
accepts his Master in his profoundest weakness. Time and
again the master's ineptness or cowardice could have been 
seized upon by Jacques as a means of exposing his master as
^Ibid., p . 503•
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a dolt. Jacques does not succumb. Even after the Master
has childishly allowed his own horse to be taken from under
his nose, Jacques merely comments: "Eh bien, monsieur, n'y
pensons plus, c'est un cheval de perdu, et peut-être ...
qu'il se retrouvera."^ What good would it have done to rail
against a man such as the Master, since he would not have
been capable of profiting from the lesson. The Master is
what he is, and Jacques accepts him at face value.
In the area of self-acceptance Jacques is nearly
definitional of self-actualization. Maslow says actualizers
tend to be good hearty fellows who enjoy themselves without
2regret, shame or apology. Jacques does this marvelously
well. He is in no wise fixated at physiological-need levels, 
though he heeirtily enjoyed fulfilling these needs. He con­
sidered them a normal part of life, and a normal part of 
himself. They were to be enjoyed along with all other facets 
of life. Thus, when the hostess brings up some wine as a 
peace offering after the two of them had had a falling-out, 
"Jacques la prit par le milieu du corps, et 1 'embrassa 
fortement; sa rancune n'avait jamais tenu contre du bon vin
3et une belle femme." Jacques' acceptance of himself, like
^Ibid., p . 521.
2Maslow, Motivation, p. 207.
3Bénac, éd.. Oeuvres, p. 6ll.
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his acceptance of the universe, is complete. He gives no 
evidence whatsoever of overriding guilt or shame. Nor does 
he exhibit the smugness that typically accompanies a lesser 
man's self-satisfaction. Jacques is no saint, he is no 
ascetic. He gratifies normal needs. Yet, he so follows 
rationality and goodness and natural law, that he emerges 
from each day, able to accept unreservedly what he has done 
and been, what he currently is, and what he is becoming. 
Jacques as a consequence can live life serenely and effort­
lessly because he does not need to protect vulnerable spots 
nor be alert to covering up for anxiety-producing frailties. 
Like Maslow’s self-actualizers, Jacques is somewhat child­
like. This is to use "child-like" in the sense of uncom­
plicated, candid, without poses, and without guile or guilt. 
Again this does not imply sanctity to all Jacques is or does. 
Rather, it implies that what he is and does is meant to be
wholesome and good, and that he can accept his best effort
without shame or self-recrimination.
Typical of this quality, in our "in-process" self- 
actualizer, is his recovery of his master's watch. Jacques 
had returned for a forgotten purse and for his master's watch
when he recognizes the watch among the wares of a roadside
peddler. Jacques explains to the peddler that the watch is 
his master's, and that he will return it to its owner. 
Following this explanation he simply takes the watch and 
then proceeds saunteringly toward town to get the forgotten
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purse, even after the peddlex begins to cry out to workers 
in a nearby field that he has been robbed. Jacques is so 
forthright and basically good that he considers all other 
men will readily understand. The peddler is much more 
devious and complex however, and hopes to recover his ill- 
gotten watch by making Jacques appear to be the villain.
Jacques is so completely guilt-free and serene that when 
the workers arrive to help the peddlar they refuse at first 
to believe his story. How could anyone, sauntering casually 
along the road toward town, have just robbed this shouting 
peddlar. Here Jacques' inner serenity and guilt-free self­
acceptance become manifestly visible. Later, at the place 
where they had lodged, the purse is found on the person of 
a young girl. She claims that Jacques had given it to her 
for favors she accorded him during the night. Jacques had 
never seen the girl before but instead of fearing for his 
esteem or feeling guilt, he says nothing and allows the host 
to pay the girl a reasonable amount from his purse. Thus 
not only does Jacques never lie to simplify a situation to 
save face, he can even accept what would appear to a lesser, 
unactualizing man, to be a loss of face or self-regard. One 
could even propose that Jacques' self-acceptance is so 
healthy, that it can stand repeated attack. The difference 
between this realistic self-acceptance and that of the 
genuinely self-centered or even defensively self-centered 
man is obvious. Neither of the latter two types of individuals
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can withstand analysis or even implied attack. They immedi­
ately react defensively in order to protect and preserve 
their image. Jacques is so healthily accepting of self and 
nature as to make defensive reaction completely foreign to 
his life-style.
A companion feature of acceptance of others is that 
of gemeinschaf tsgefiihl, or a feeling of identification with, 
and empathy for, human-kind. An incident recalled by Jacques 
demonstrates this quality in himself and also reads somewhat 
like a New Testament parable. (As a matter of fact a good 
case could be made for Jacques' similarity to New Testament 
persons. Diderot didn't accept the philosophical basis cf 
Christianity but he, more than most, accepted the day-to-day 
principles of justice and goodness of the New Testament.) 
Jacques came upon a group who were surrounding a grief- 
stricken woman. She had been returning with a jug of oil on 
her head (obvious New Testament flavor) which she had pur­
chased for her master. Tripping, she had broken the jug.
She would have to repay the oil and was grief stricken because 
she had no money. Like Pharisees, the crowd bemoaned her 
fate but did nothing to help. "Tout le monde la plaignait; 
je n 'entendais autour d'elle que « la pauvre femme^ mais 
personne ne mettait la main dans la p o c h e . J a c q u e s ,  like
^ I b  i d ., p . 571'
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the Good Samaritan, was in the least likely position to 
help. He was on crutches and far from home. Yet he was 
the one moved by enorgh compassion to give her his money.
His compassion, is even more striking considering the fact 
that the surgeon would be expecting money, and that Jacques 
would be unable to pay. A further New Testament similarity 
is noted when some ruffians who witnessed his generosity, 
robbed him, later on his way home, of what little money he 
had remaining. This incident shows Jacques' gemeinschaftsge- 
fühl. He gives evidence of feeling that all men are of 
the same family, that they are here together and must assist 
each other through life's harsher moments. In New Testament 
fashion, Jacques said of the incident, " ... mes entrailles
s ' émurent de compassion, ..." Th^ i ns ao. e vjL üvf M c V ex ,
points up that Jacques was still just in the process of
self-actualization. He was unable to live comfortably with
his compassionate act for very long. This indicates it was
not yet a completely integral part of him. In speaking of
his act to his Master he says: "Je fis une sottise, ne vous
déplaise. Je ne fus pas à cent pas du village que je me le 
2dis; ..." Evidently his own needs for the now-given-away




compassion of a few minutes before when he had been confronted 
with the grieving woman. This is a purely normal reaction 
on Jacques' part; however, a fully self-actualized Jacques 
would not have reverted so readily back to his own needs. 
Still, in spite of his afterthoughts, Jacques acted more 
compassionately than did anyone else, and evidences signs 
of an individual on the route to self-denial and self- 
fulfillment .
We even see here some evidence that Jacques' Master 
is capable of some compassionate insight. After Jacques 
has doubted the wisdom of his compassion, his Master vacil­
lates momentarily, ready to agree, then says: "Non non
Jacques, je persiste dans mon premier jugement, et c'est 
l'oubli de ton propre besoin qui fait le principal mérite 
de ton action."^ One might then be tempted to say that here 
at least the Master was more compassionate than Jacques.
In after-the-fact fashion possibly this is true in this 
instance. It is inconceivable, however, that the Master 
would have given the money in the first place, whereas 
Jacques' entire life-style is one of acceptance of duty 
toward mankind. The Master, rather than identifying closely 
with, and being committed to mankind, isn't even wholeheart­
edly committed to anything. He is not even healthily
^Ibid., p. 571.
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id-orientcd as was Reimeau. His only commitment seems to be 
to exist. He is a rather weak specimen.
Closely related on a more intimate basis to the 
characteristic of gemeinschaftsgefuhl in the self-actualized, 
is that of interpersonal relationships. The self-actualized 
tend to be capable of deeper and more profound relationships 
than other people. They seem capable of greater love, more 
perfect identification, and more complete obliteration of 
ego boundaries.^ Application of this to Jacques explains 
why the innkeeper's wife showed obvious preference for him 
over his Master. It explains why Jacques, rather than any 
of his rivals, won the affection of Denise, even considering 
the fact that these rivals included men of rank and means.
It also helps to explain why dame Marguerite and dame Suzon 
were not only willing but anxious to risk their husbands' 
anger and even possible loss of face in order to win Jacques' 
regard and teach him about life. It seems evident that 
they recognized qualities and depths in Jacques that they 
did not find in their husbands. It would also give some 
explanation for the obvious affection and trust Jacques' 
Captain must have shown him. The implication is that 
Jacques and the Captain dealt on personal terms. It seems 
to have been much more than merely a wise Captain educating
^Maslow, Motivation, p. 2l8 .
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a young member of his unit. Jacques' actions and his refer­
ences to the Captain give evidence of a real bond of under­
standing between them.
Along with a greater capacity of love, the self­
actualized desire to help other people improve, to help 
others more nearly live up to their potential. Therefore, 
the criticism that the actualized make of others is never 
vindictive but rather for the good of the individual. They 
are saddened when people do not become what their potential 
implies they could have been and they abhor men's injustice.^ 
Commenting on Jacques' attitudes toward men's errors, the 
author says:
II se mettait en colère contre l'homme injuste, 
et quand on lui objectait qu'il ressemblait 
alors au chien qui mord la pierre qui la frappe:
Nenni, disait-il, la pierre mordue par le chien ne 
se corrige pas; l'homme injuste est modifié par le 
baton.“
Discipline as administered by Jacques obviously does not 
mean exacting payment for a crime or a weakness but rather 
re-education. His goal was to change behavior, not to demand 
expiation. His motives stemmed-from his much greater capacity 
to enter into deep relationships with his fellowmen.
Maslow says of his self-actualized subjects that he 
has found none of them to be "chronically unsure about the
^ I b i d .. p . 219.
2“Bénac, éd.. Oeuvres, p. 671-
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difference between right cind wrong. . . . they rarely showed
in their day-to-day living the chaos . . . so common in the
average person's ethical dealings."^ In this regard again
Jacques is like his author and Rameau's philosopher. Without
being maudlin, Jacques just naturally shows ethical strength.
A series of incidents leads the Master to conclude that
Jacques' end is near; that some evil committed in his past
will probably soon result in his death. He therefore counsels
Jacques to set his affairs in order. Jacques replies there
is nothing in his past that has to do with men's justice.
2"Je n'ai ni tué, ni volé, ni violé." Even more indicative 
of his basic goodness is the incident where Jacques is being 
transferred to the great chateau from the doctor's house.
As he is about to leave, the doctor's wife asks him to help 
get her husband installed as the surgeon at the chateau. 
Jacques asks if there is not already a surgeon there. She 
answers that there is, but that Jacques owes something to 
her husband. Jacques' reply shows the depth of his ethical 
strength. He could have merely replied that he would do 
what he could; then, once at the chateau, he could have just 
conveniently forgotten the entire affair. Or, out of grati­
tude to the surgeon for helping him save his leg, he could 
have used his influence to oust the existing chateau surgeon
^Maslow, Motivation, p. 221.
2Bénac, éd.. Oeuvres, p. 5^8 .
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and install the one who had operated on him. Jacques, 
however, replies in a way that shows his unbiased commitment 
to all of mankind and to universal justice: "Et parce que
votre mari m'a fait du bien, il faut que je fasse du mal à 
un autre? Encore si la place était vacante. ..."^ Jacques' 
reply not only shows his strength at being able to clear up 
a question on the spot rather than allowing himself the 
easy route, but also places him alongside the self-actualizing 
people who feel kinship and empathy for all. Jacques will 
not violate basic ethics to incur favor nor to ameliorate 
his position. He has taken a decision to not confuse means 
and ends, and seems to have the strength of character to carry 
out that aspect of his value system. It is in ways such as 
these where Jacques no longer even slightly resembles the 
picaro. The latter have no scruples and invent right and 
wrong as circumstances dictate. For all of their other 
admirable qualities, picaros were by definition fixated at 
the lower-hierarchy level of self-preservation. Jacques 
has progressed infinitely beyond self-preservation to concern 
for all men.
Another facet of ethical strength, of discrimination 
between ends and means in the self-actualized, revolves 
around the belief in God. Do they exhibit ethical strength
^Ibid., p . 588.
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out of orthodox religious belief, or are they in fact 
associated with any given religions? Maslow says none of 
his subjects is orthodoxly religious. They enjoy doing 
good for the doing itself. What is merely a means to an 
end for others, such as doing good to get to heaven (the 
good action being the means to the goal, heaven) is an end 
in itself for the self actualized. This seems eminently 
true of Jacques. None of his good actions was accompanied 
by any comment of reward. As a matter of fact when his 
master asks if he believes in life after death, Jacques 
answers: "Je n'y crois ni dëcrois; je n'y pense pas. Je
jouis de mon mieux de celle qui nous a été accordée en 
avancement d'hoirie."^ For Jacques then, the act had to be 
its own reward.
"Self-actualizing people have the wonderful capacity
to appreciate again and again, freshly, naively, the basic
goods of life. . . . however stale these experiences may
2become to others." Jacques has this quality of naively 
and freshly looking at life. His view is of course coupled 
with a sagacity unawaited in a soldier-valet, but considering 
that Jacques represents the vigorous, rising Third-Estate, 
he is believable. Illustrative of this quality in Jacques
^Ibid. , p . 685.
2Maslow, Motivation, p. 215.
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is the following: Jacques' Master asked him to tell an
incident Just the way it happened. (Not unlike the current 
"Tell it like it is".) Jacques could have simply replied 
that it is not always that simple. But he showed the depth 
of his perception of the human condition with a pleasant 
freshness. "Dis la chose comme elle e s t J Cela n'arrive 
peut-être pas deux fois en un jour dans toute une grande 
v i l l e . Continuing his fresh commentaries and perceptions 
he says: "Mon cher maître, la vie se passe en quiproquo."^
He adds: "Si l'on ne dit presque rien dans ce monde, qui
soit entendu comme on le dit, il y a bien pis, c'est qu'on
3n'y fait presque rien, qui soit jugé comme on l'a fait." 
These perceptions are simply not within the possibility 
of the Master, It probably suffices for him to reflect that 
no one is concerned enough about anyone else to really under­
stand what they are saying or doing. Jacques goes freshly 
and wholesomely beyond that, and what is more, does so with­
out overtones of rejection and pessimism. After Jacques 
has said it, one does not feel that he implies life or its 
people are to be disparaged. He seems rather to be matter- 
of-factly, freshly stating a truism of the human condition.
Other incidents are representative of this quality 
and of Jacques' philosophical sense of humor. While Jacques 
has a sore throat the Master has agreed to relate tales of
^Bénac, éd.. Oeuvres, p. 544. 
“Ibid., p. 545.
^Ibid., p . 544.
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his own. Jacques, who found himself frequently interrupted 
by his Master, now becomes the interrupter. When the Master 
complains, Jacques reminds him of what he used to do himself, 
then adds some humorous philosophical amplifications. "Une 
mère veut être galante et veut que sa fille soit sage; un 
père veut être dissipateur, et veut que son fils soit 
économe; un maître veut ..." Here Jacques allows his 
}hster to fill in the remainder of the phrase for himself,
basing it on the prior examples. Here again, the Master
shows his limited capacity for humor, his inability to grow, 
and his reliance on an archaic value system as he answers: 
"Interrompre son valet, l'interrompre tant qu'il lui plaît, 
et n'en pas être interrompu."^ Again he shows himself as 
operating on lower need levels- While Jacques is busy 
growing, his Master is busy fighting battles of esteem that 
he should have won long since. In all the above, Jacques
shows his naivete and freshness. Each day is a new exper­
ience for him. Not that he plunges into each day at a 
gallop, he does not; rather he enters each day at a saunter. 
However, each day he is ready to find experiences and people 
worthy of his attention. The Master on the other hand 
imposes on each new day and each new experience, his tired 
and stale acquiescence.
^Ibid. , p. 73 7 '
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One of the qualities of self-actualized people that 
Jacques most strikingly exhibits, also brings him into 
sharpest contrast with the Master. This is the area of 
clarity of perception of reality. Jacques, along with
self-actualizers, can more realistically judge situations, 
conditions and people than can the Master. An excellent 
example of the clarity cf Jacques' perception as contrasted 
with the inaccuracy of that of his Master is shown in their 
assessments of the quality of their relationship, indeed he 
wants the reader to generalize to all men. As for Jacques, 
it is clear that he is "... un homme comme un autre; ..."^ 
and that the Master has no innate right over him. For 
Jacques, the Master's notion of the existence among men 
of a sort of quality hierarchy, wherein certain men are 
innately of more worth than others, wherein it is given to 
certain men - by virtue of the happenstance of their birth - 
to command while it remains to other men due to the same 
happenstance of birth to follow, is a senseless distortion 
of things as they really are. The Master can bring no 
logic to his position auid is reduced to simply shouting his 
initial statement more loudly: "Jacques, tu te trompes, un
Jacques n'est point un homme comme un autre." Jacques 
realizes reason and reality support his position, and realizes
^Ib i d ., p . 659.
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that by any measure he is " ... quelquefois mieux qu'un 
a u t r e . H e r e ,  Jacques is not merely guilty of the inverse 
of the Master's initial misconception, he is rather recog­
nizing individual differences. 'I ' any observer of humanity, 
it is everywhere evident that one man is at times better 
than another man. An entire section of c.urrent-day psychology 
addresses itself to the obvious fact that any realistic 
appraisal of any given individual would show him to be 
strong in some areas and weak in others. The Master, however, 
sees the world in black and white. He is incapable of rela­
tivity and paradox and is not unlik, the authoritarian 
personality. For him a thing must be this or that. One is 
either born into a family of "qualixy" or one is not. Merit 
and right to command others is no less absolute. These and 
"quality of birth" occur together in rigid correlation.
Thus the Master deals in absolutes and bases himself 
on precedent. His world is one of logic-tight compartments. 
The Master incorrectly assumes to be able to reorder Jacques' 
perceptual distortion by reminding him of things as he feels 
they are. "Jacques, vous vous oubliez. ... souvenez que vous 
n'êtes et que vous ne serez jamais qu'un Jacques." The 
Master's perceptions are obviously distorted by the manner 
in which he has been reared. The Master's universe must
^Ibid., p . 659.
^Ibid.
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remain ordered and in place, or he experiences anxiety as 
does an obsessive-compulsive. When parts of this universe 
do not assume their rightful place, as Jacques' now do not, 
the Master feels compelled to apply pressure to reestablish 
the rigidity and predictability that are necessary to keep 
his anxiety level within manageable limits. The most obvious 
course of action naturally is to rely on Jacques' intelli­
gence and understanding, and to assume that reminding him 
of their relationship of " ... supérieur à subalterne,"^ 
will be all that is necessary to restore predictability and 
order. When this device fails to produce the desired effect, 
the Master feels he must make a test of reality with a sort 
of trial balloon. He thus issues an order to reassure 
himself that conditions have not in fact changed; to reassure 
himself that an order given to a Jacques today is the same 
as an order given to a Jacques yesterday. At the same time 
the order is aimed at modifying reality. Subconsciously, 
the Master can see the untenability of his position. One 
order, however, issued with the firmness "inherent in those 
born to command," and carried out by Jacques, would restore 
equilibrium- It would be oil on disturbed water. The Master 
must therefore issue an order that Jacques would not be 
opposed to carrying out, something that Jacques would
^Ibid., p. 660.
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normally do anyway. What would be more normal for Jacques
than to get down. Hence the Master's order is to "
descendez là-bas-"^ From his point of view, Jacques,
appraising conditions, sees that his obtuse Master has not
understood and so decides to be more direct: "Quand on sait
que tous vos ordres ne sont que des clous à soufflets, s'ils
2n'ont été ratifiés par Jacques; ..." Jacques is here con­
tinuing his attempt at rectifying his Master's reality
perception. He is attempting to make clear that the world, 
as his Master has come to perceive it, has only survived in 
any degree because men such as himself have graciously 
allowed it to. He is telling the Master that he, the Master, 
has failed to see this critical point and that it is a vital 
oversight. The Master must, Jacques implies, integrate this 
fact into his concept of things as they really are.
One or two other incidents bring this same difference 
between the two protagonists into relief. Upon arriving at 
an inn, Jacques and his master secure a room. They soon 
learn that they are quartered next to some boisterous rogues 
who have absconded with all of the inn's provisions. "Jacques 
était assez tranquille ... et ... dévorait quelques morceaux 
de pain noir, et avalait en grimaçant quelques verres de
Ibid., p . 660.
^Ibid., p. 661.
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mauvais vin."^ The Master in the meantime " ... promenait 
son souci en long et en large, ..." Jacques has just 
accepted conditions and has made the best of a bad situation. 
An important point is that there is not in his action any 
useless employment of energy. The most realistic thing to 
do seems to be to make do with what is available. In 
Maslowian-actualization terms he has made a rather realistic 
appraisal of the situation and accommodated his own needs 
to it. Jacques is further correctly interpreting reality 
by realizing that there is no personal affront in the fact 
that the brigands are now eating and drinking that which 
would have been his and his Master's. How could the rogues 
have known whose supper they were commandeering? However, 
while Jacques realistically makes the best of a bad situation, 
the Master aimlessly paces back and forth. For the Master, 
however, it is energy expended without a goal-object. He 
does not take pistol in hand and demand food from the rene­
gades; nor does he take his valet in hand and move to the 
next inn; nor does he take himself in hand and make the most 
of things as does Jacques. It soon becomes evident that the 
Master cannot act, due to the fact that he is immobilized 
between two facets of his safety needs. He wants food and 
drink, that is, he wants to respond to his physiological
^ I b i d . . p . 499'
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needs which are usually primary, but his fear, need for 
safety, intervenes. He wants to fulfill his need for safety 
by leaving, but another facet of safety needs enters in, he 
dare not leave without Jacques, and up to this point, Jacques 
is taking the entire situation in stride and has no inten­
tion of leaving. Even when Jacques, incensed by an affront 
made by the renegades, goes to mete out justice in Quijote 
fashion, the Master can bring himself to do nothing but 
await the outcome " ... en tremblant."^
Jacques' reaction to the brigand's affront might be 
interpreted as indicative that he had not as yet reached 
actualization and self-mastery. One could thus say he is 
reacting to esteem needs. On the other hand, it could be 
indicative of realistic interpretation of reality. Maslow
says actualizers do not base their perception of reality
2on wish, anxiety, over-optimism or pessimism. It could 
be argued then that Jacques more realistically perceived 
conditions as they really were. Rogues traveling in bands 
are usually cowardly and ineffective. He further realized 
he could take them completely by surprise and that making 
them undress and give him their clothes and arms, and locking 
them in their room, would render them harmless. There would
^Ib id., p . 500.
2Maslow, Mot ivation, p. 20k.
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seem to be reason to conclude that Jacques' reality appraisal 
was correct and unlike his Master's appraisal, was not clouded 
by pessimism or anxiety.
The Master, however, still is not able to rise 
above safety needs. He spends the remainder of the night 
in fear, while Jacques blissfully snores. He does not even 
remove his clothes, awakens Jacques at day break and begs 
him to leave. We again see the Master unable to correctly 
assess reality and act meaningfully and independently. He 
dare not take his pistols and leave, putting distance between 
himself and the danger, nor has he enough force to profit from 
the situation and sleep. A victim of his lower needs, here 
safety, he is forced to remain at the disposal of someone 
who is not at the mercy of deficiency needs. As was true 
of Rameau's philosopher, Jacques is not fearful of the 
unknown, he is not fending off nor avoiding imaginary or 
inaccurately interpreted dangers. The Master, however, was 
initially fearful even though the rogues were threatening 
no one. Jacques can thus act infinitely more effectively.
One final exchange between the Master and Jacques 
will be used to illustrate Jacques' grasp of reality.
Jacques was commenting to his Master on the stratifications 
that exist among men and the need all seem to have for 
feelings of worth and mastery. He said it had been his 
observation that even the most abjectly poor people, though 
they might not have enough bread for the family, somehow
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managed to maintain a dog. From this Jacques concludes that 
all men have a need to exercise authority over something 
else, a need to feel capable and of worth. Thus he concludes 
that since in society, animals are found immediately beneath 
the last class of citizens, those commanded by all other 
classes, these people kept a dog in order to be able to 
" ... commander aussi à quelqu'un."^ Jacques goes further 
in his assessment of reality by concluding that " ... chacun 
a son chien. Le ministre est le chien du roi, le premier 
commis est le chien du ministre, ... les hommes faibles 
sont les chiens des hommes fermes."
It should be noted in passing that the above hierarchy 
in society is despicable to Diderot. He labored unceasingly 
against vestiges of the feudal system. Like Maslow's self- 
actualizers, Diderot and Jacques accord respect to all men 
simply because they are human beings. This democratic 
character structure is implicit in all Jacques is and does 
and underpins the entire book. It is obviously one of the 
main lessons to be learned about Jacques and Diderot from 
the exchange discussed above wherein Jacques reminds his 
Master that he is "un homme comme un autre", and even that 
he is "quelquefois mieux qu'un autre." Diderot is, however, 
no revolutionary. He recognizes the error ard works to 
correct it; but Jacques shows his maganimity and democratic 
character structure, combined with an unrelentingly clear
^Bénac, éd.. Oeuvres, p. 667-68
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perception of reality, by advising: "Restons comme nous
sommes ... et que le reste de notre vie soit employé à 
faire un proverbe. ... Jacques mène son maître."^
One final observation concerning Jacques' reality 
perception stems from the discussion of men and their dogs. 
This time the implications are that Jacques had a good 
understanding of belongingness and love needs. Jacques' 
Master notes that he has seen people other than the poor 
surround themselves with dogs. What about the great ladies 
and others who surround themselves with cats and dogs and 
parakeets, he asks? His answer has implications for the 
fulfillment of belongingness and love needs. "Elies n'aiment
personne; personne ne les aime: et elles jettent aux chiens
2un sentiment dont elles ne savent que faire." Jacques 
(Diderot) again evidences marvelous insight into man's needs, 
realizing that if they cannot be filled in one way they will 
be in another. His views are worthy of a Twentieth Century 
psychologist.
As concerns the Master specifically, he has been in 
large measure already defined as a necessary adjunct of the 
analysis of Jacques. Some more specific comments should be 
made however. He is evidently operative at a rather low 
level, physiologically and psychically. It is common
^Ibid., p . 665.
^Ibid. , p . 668 .
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currently to avoid defining intelligence and speak rather
of the total effectiveness with which one deals with one's
environment. From this definitional base, the Mas ter is
not too effective. He exhibits qualities common to persons
operative at a rather low level, that is he seems to profit
very little from interaction with the world around him.
He is not given to reflection, to evaluation, and cannot
bring himself to a state of intensity or animation concerning
any subject or condition. His lethargic state occasionally
leads one to use the adjectives stupid, vegetable-like or
obtuse. He is an expert at nothing and cannot even sleep
effectively. This even his physiological functions seem to
operate substandardly.
II a peu d'ideas dans la tête; s'il lui arrive 
de dire quelque chose de sensé, c'est de 
reminiscence ou d'inspiration. Il a des yeux 
comme vous et moi; mais on ne sait la plupart
du temps s'il regarde. Il ne dort pas, il ne
veille pas non plus; il se laisse exister: 
c'est sa fonctionne habituelle.^
In Eighteenth-Century terms, the Master is a per­
sonalization of the extremely degenerate state of men of rank 
in comparison to the vital, on-the-rise Third-Estate. In 
hierarchy-of-need terms, he is a personalization of those 
for whom no motive, no need, is felt very acutely. The 
Master can occasionally become concerned for his safety.
^ I b i d . , p . 515•
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and also on occasion, experiences esteem needs and their 
frustration. For the most part, however, he is an individual 
largely in a state of drivelessness. He seems to have little 
concern for physiological needs. His financial resources are 
apparently such that these drives never really manifest them­
selves. He has likely never known real hunger. He seems 
little concerned for belongingness and love. His concern 
for hearing Jacques' love life is less to experience any 
identification with people in the process of fulfilling love 
needs than mere boredom relief. As will be seen later, he 
does exhibit a sort of esteem need, but even it is of a 
debilitated sort. His cognition and aesthetic needs are in 
no wise evident. In drive-theory or motive-theory terms, 
the Master is drive-less and motive-less. He is merely 
capable of being. He can reduce himself to an almost plant­
like state. He does seem to find some relief from jast 
existing by listening to Jacques. It is doubtful however 
if even boredom is strongly experienced. What independent 
activity he does engage in supports the notion of an automa­
ton. He could bring himself " ... à prendre du tabac, à 
regarder l'heure qu'il était, à questionner Jacques;...."^
The inanity of these actions, and by extension their useless­
ness, not only for others but even for him, is shown by the
^Ibid., p . 516•
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fact that none of them even fill any basic need. Tobacco 
doesn't fill a physiological need; looking at his watch is 
pointless since he has no schedule to meet and even more so, 
since he doesn't even have a stated geographical, journey- 
goal. One might say that questioning Jacques fills a 
cognitive need. However most of his questioning reduces 
itself to merely trying to get Jacques off a philosophical 
subject and back to his love-life. All three of his activities 
do center around the core condition of someone tired of life. 
His continual checking on the time bespeaks someone weary 
of the state in which he finds himself. To the degree that 
he is capable of any emotion in any depth at all, the Master 
is weary of life. He is incapable of recognizing its chal­
lenge and promise and is wearily awaiting its end. The 
other two activities, taking tobacco and questioning Jacques, 
merely help him more painlessly pass the weary time till he 
does at last reach an exit. Tobacco is a sort of sedative.
Even today, it is known as the most readily available tran­
quilizer. It will help keep him in a semi-sedated state as 
he tediously exists. Jacques' continual drone also helps 
shorten the time from waking till sleep, helps shorten the 
distance from where he is to the point where he will find 
relief in oblivion. He is not unlike the bored, sometimes 
alcoholic housewife who leaves the television at full volume 
while she wearily waits for the end of the day. A further 
comparison is possible. The bored housewife will likely
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not watch educational television, nor does the Master want 
philosophy from Jacques; rather she will turn from soap 
opera to soap opera as the Master will incessantly bring 
Jacques back to his "amours." With time, any narcotic seems 
to lose its effectiveness. This seems to have been the case 
with the Master's three sedatives. It would often be that 
he would check his watch for " ... l'heure qu'il était, sans 
le savoir, ..." He would open his " ... tabatière sans 
s'en douter, et prenait sa prise de tabac sans le sentir; ..." 
He would even do it " ... trois ou quatre fois de suite et 
dans la même ordre.
Thus we have in the Master a weary man leading a 
senseless life. He is in no wise genetically retarded; he 
does show adequate native capacity. He has, however, allowed 
himself to degenerate to an almost irretrievably low state. 
Maslow in discussing people who have let their cognitive 
awareness and cognitive needs degenerate to a low level 
records that he has seen cases wherein " . . .  the pathology 
(boredom, loss of zest in life, self-dislike, general depres­
sion of the bodily functions, steady deterioration of the
intellectual life, of tastes, etc.) were produced in intelli-
2gent people leading stupid lives, . . ." The Master is
almost a personification of the syndrome. He has not had
^Ib id. , p . 715
2Maslow, Motivation, p. 95-
116
the insight to see that along with his privilege came 
responsibility. It is specifically the learning of respon­
sibility that could have saved him: It could have given
his life meaning, a "raison d'être." He has failed to see 
that this is not imposed magically from without but must 
grow from within. Jacques, in the book's final pages, 
finally pointedly tells him how low he has allowed himself 
to come. Jacques is not gloating as a victor, but is merely 
telling things as they are. " N 'avez-vous pas été ma marion­
nette, et n'auriez-vous pas continué d'être mon polichinelle 
... si je me l ’étais proposé?"^ Here at is evident from 
Jacques' choice of images "marionnette" and "polichinelle" 
that to him the Master has become virtually incapable of 
autonomous existence. He can only have movement, that is 
to say, continue to live, as Jacques gives it to him in the 
way that a puppeteer controls his creations. Again we seem 
to have a foreshadowing of the future power of the rising 
Third-Estate.
One other comment is apropos concerning Jacques' 
choice of comparing the Master to a "marionnette." The 
"marionnette" has no needs, drives, or motives except those 
given to him by someone else. In like manner the Master 
seems to have none except the one that has been imposed on
^Bénac, éd.. Oeuvres, p. 775.
117
him by virtue of the circumstances of his birth. This one 
need that the Master is somewhat capable of, even though it 
is itself borrowed, is esteem concern. By this point in time 
this is all that remains within the capacity of those whose 
families had been the leaders of the feudal system. Their 
only concern now is to protect and preserve their image.
This is all the Master seems capable of. He is a vestige 
of the feudal system but has retained none of the vitality 
that once made the relationship of master to serf symbiotic. 
By the time the system arrives at the Master, symbiosis has 
been replaced by parasitism. The Master has nothing to 
offer Jacques; the valet supplies the strength and insight 
for them both. This is not to say that he could not, it is 
to merely say that at this point in their relationship he 
does not. It is interesting also, that it was only Jacques 
who has had a love-life worthy of retelling. Even here the 
Master's esteem needs get in his way. He at one time did 
love a girl named Agathe but questions of honor and esteem 
interceded. When asked if he loves her he says: "J'aime
et beaucoup, mais j'ai des parents, un nom, un état, des 
prétentions, et je ne me résoudrais jamais à enfouir tous 
ces avantages dans le magasin d'une petite bourgeoise."^
This is the firmest stand the Master makes as concerns
^Ibid., p . 732.
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fulfill in.ü; his basic needs in the entire book; and it is 
borrowed. He cannot even autonomously do something most 
anyone else is capable of, exhibit a full-blown basic need.
When he is aroused, however, it is usually in 
response to esteem needs. In this regard, Jacques is 
insightful and tries to be helpful. Sometimes however he 
unwittingly makes it difficult for his Master to fulfill his 
esteem needs. As a case in point, the Master has been relating 
the story of his own amours when at one point Jacques, seeing 
how the train of events is going, offhandedly fills in the 
remainder of an incident. Jacques has thought merely to 
please his Master with his attention to what he has been 
saying. The Master however, worrying about his esteem needs, 
curses Jacques for his insight and says ” ... Je me tais."^
The Master here is rather like an adolescent, who, when 
everything is not going his way, decides to take his ball 
and go home.
More often than not though, the Master's esteem 
concern is seen through his compensatory behavior. This is 
a natural consequence of the low effectiveness level at 
which the Master is currently operating. His ineptness 
often results in his being unable to accomplish successfully 
some goal or activity he sets for himself, or of which he
^Ibid., p. 737.
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considers himself capable. This will mean that he must then 
admit a lack of ability, thus suffering a loss of esteem, or 
must indulge in some sort of protective behavior. The 
Master does not have enough psychic strength to do much 
reality checking nor admitting of ineptness, so he establishes 
defenses to protect his self-picture from attack. So it is 
that he, like neurotics the world over indulges in excessive 
compensatory behavior. His protective devices do keep him 
functional, but at a rather limited level.
With the foregoing in mind, it is interesting to 
read of the Master's reaction to falling and hurting his 
knee. He had been making light of Jacques' insistence that 
a wound in the knee was one of the most painful. At that 
point the Master's horse rears, throwing the Master's knee 
against a rock. He bellows like a wounded calf. As the 
pain subsides and he realizes what a spectacle he has made 
of himself over a very minor variation of what he had just 
been deriding his servant for, he climbs aboard his horse 
and spurs it mercilessly.^ This is not unlike the child 
who, angry at his parents, kicks the dog. The Master sees 
that all that he had been just previously proposing is now 
exposed as ridiculous. He could admit to error and say that 
as a result of his personal experience he now sees Jacques
^Ibid., p. 508.
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was in fact correct. This however would be too damaging to 
his self-esteem. Instead he turns his frustration outward 
from self-recrimination to hostility toward the cause of 
his loss of face. The horse is of course the recipient of 
his wrath.
Another example of the Master's compensatory behavior, 
as a result of thwarted esteem needs, comes as a result of 
his losing his horse. Through gross carelessness and by 
virtue of obviously lethargic physiology, the Master allowed 
his horse to be stolen while he dozed on the roadside. When 
Jacques comes back and awakens him, and asks him where his 
horse is, he " ... se disposait à tomber sur Jacques à 
grands coup de b r i d e . Again as before, he can realisti­
cally admit to gross ineptness and suffer esteem less, or 
he can again protect his unrealistic self-picture. He of 
course chooses the latter course and beats his servant. By 
this action he wants Jacques to infer that he would not have 
fallen asleep and would not have lost his horse, had Jacques 
been more expeditious about returning. The lashing, he 
implies, is deserved because only Jacques' having taken so 
long to recover the lost watch and money could be the cause 
of his embarassingly finding himself now without a mount.
^Ib id., p . 521.
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Once again the Master's unconscious guilt and subsequent 
protective behavior find release on Jacques' back.
One or two final comments concerning the Master.
He was occasionally capable of a degree of concern for his 
valet. On one occasion when Jacques had been severely 
injured in an accident, "Son maître passa la nuit à son 
chevet, lui tatant le pouls et humectant sans cesse sa 
compresse. ..." However it soon is evident that this is 
not his usual behavior because upon awakening the following 
morning Jacques asks what he is doing. The Master replies, 
"Je te veille. Tu es mon serviteur quand je suis malade 
ou bien portant; mais je suis le tien quand tu te portes 
mal."^ Jacques adds his surprise, showing he had considered 
the Master incapable of real affection, "Je suis bien aise 
de savoir que vous #tes humain; ce n'est pas trop la qualité 
des maîtres envers leurs valets."^ One other incident 
showing the momentary and superficial nature of the Master's 
concern comes as Jacques is relating the incident of his 
being robbed after having succored the grieving woman. His
master reacts with " ... j'ai I'ep^e à la main; je fonds sur
3tes voleurs et je te venge." At the end of his account
^Ibid., p. 559.
^Ibid.
^Ibid., p . 572.
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Jacques expresses the precariousness of his position, 
having medical bills to pay and no money, his master, " 
jeta ses bras autour du cou de son valet en s'écriant; Mon 
pauvre Jacques, que vas-tu faire: Que vas-tu devenir? Ta 
position m'effraye."^ The point of import here seems to be 
that there is no more real emotion in the Master's proposed 
defense of his valet than in the tale Jacques is telling.
It seems rather to be merely the Master's contribution to 
the story. His concern is no more profound than Jacques' 
tale.
In the two characters of Jacques and his Master,
Diderot has again juxtaposed persons operative at disparate 
levels of the hierarchy-of-needs continuum. Jacques has 
not reached the integrated level of actualization of Rameau's 
philosopher, but he is "in process." As a matter of fact, 
it would be wholly consistent to propose that the logical 
sequel to Jacques le fataliste would be Jacques le philosophe. 
In the latter book, he would be somewhat freed of his Captain 
and would be largely self-directed. In the former novel, 
he has been testing reality; determining what will harmoniously 
fit into his unique philosophy and self-picture. He is an 
excellent study of someone in the process of actualization 
and self-integration. He is a personification of the adverbal
~^Ibid . , p . 573 -
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en train de. It would seem wholly consistent to see in him 
author Diderot somewhat preceding the Diderot of Rameau's 
philosopher. He is dynamic, vital and growing. The Master 
on the other hand seems an unlikely candidate for representing
any facet of Diderot at any time in his life except by
carrying to an untenable extreme, some minor facet of the 
author. At no time in his life was Diderot ever so lethargic 
and apathetic. As a youth he was dynamism itself. Through 
the Encyclopedia years he was more controlled and less 
effervescent but still dynamic and vital. As a sexagenarian 
he was still productive and in fact wrote some of his most
original and vital prose. Much of Jacques can be seen as
Diderot, but it would rather seem that, in hierarchy-of- 
needs terms, the Master has little or nothing to do with 
representing his author. He is rather the death-kneLl of 
the feudal system.
CHAPTER V
MANGOGUL: A STUDY IN COGNITIVE DEGENERACY AND A
PROTOTYPE FOR RAMEAU AND JACQUES' MASTER
From the point of view of the totality of the works, 
there would at first glance appear to be little in common 
between Les Bijoux indiscrets and the other two novels thus 
far discussed, Le Neveu de Rameau and Jacques le fataliste. 
The latter two novels have juxtaposed a self-actualizer, or 
near self-actualizer, with someone still fixated at a lower- 
need. level; whereas Les Bijoux indiscrets appears solely to 
present the picture of Mangogul, a lower-need-fixated sultan. 
In this latter novel, no one seems to be self-actualizing.
No one seems to be doing more than gratifying some baser 
drive. No one is representative of self-denial or of 
stoicism or of maximizing one's potential. Even Mirzoza, 
who is closer to self-actualization than Mangogul, is in no 
wise comparable to Rameau's philosopher or even to Jacques. 
On closer examination, however, one notes that what Diderot 
does do, instead of comparing an actualizer with a simple 
hedonist, as was the case with Rameau and the philosopher,
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is to give a "before and after" picture of Mangogul. Thus 
we have a picture of Mangogul when he is exclusively self, 
and lower-need oriented, contrasted with himself when he 
seems to at least be approaching self-actualization. The 
only problem is that the natural order of things is reversed. 
First we have a brief, one page image of a near self- 
actualizing sv.ltan/monarch, and then, virtually an entire 
book devoted to him as a lower-hierarchy hedonist. This is 
of course a logical state of affairs since Diderot was 
humorously, and yet somewhat pointedly, showing the degenerate 
state into which nobility had fallen. This peiradox in the 
case of Mangogul will be discussed later, but it will suffice 
for the moment to point out that even here, in his earliest 
novel, (it preceded the others by some twenty years),
Diderot has juxtaposed individuals operating at higher and 
lower levels in the hierarchy. This is the case in spite 
of the fact that very little attention is given in this 
book to higher needs, since it was largely aimed at besting
Claude-Prosper Crébillon at his own game the licentious
tale.
If we then have only a fleeting hint of self- 
actualization, and if Bijoux is largely a philosopher's 
version of a Crébillon type work, how has Diderot handled 
the characters who are largely operative at lower hierarchy 
levels? How does Mangogul as a hedonist compare to Rameau 
or to Jacques' Master? At this point it would be appropriate
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to recall that these latter two characters exhibit a type 
of motivational-hierarchy deficiency, or hierarchial retarda­
tion. If we define deficiency broadly as a below-average 
level of functioning, of natural (i.e., hereditary) origin, 
we approach an ontogenetic description of Jacques' Master.
His degenerate state seems to have been the result of the 
progressive decline that characterized the noble class which 
had resulted from the feudal system. Genetic degeneracy 
had come largely as the result of inbreeding, which allowed 
debilitating, recessive, genetic characteristics to pair, 
resulting in various genetic inferiorities. This is even 
now reported as a concern of ruling houses of Europe where 
convention has for centuries imposed intermarriage. It is, 
of course, the basis for prohibitions against marriages 
within families or with close relatives. Possible problems 
include the greater tendency toward hemophilia, the tendency 
toward cerebral malfunction, etc.
Psychological degeneracy can be seen to result from 
practices such as that of forbidding nobles to exercise a 
profession or to engage in practical endeavors. (England, 
of course, was to reject this practice.) This along with 
other practices and attitudes, such as basing evaluations 
and merit on birth rather than ability, resulted in 
progressively weakened individuals. The above again seems 
nearly definitional of Jacques' Master. He is markedly weak
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by almost any standard of comparison, when measured against 
the vigorous, third-estate Jacques.
Retardation, on the other hand, describes someone 
whose individual, natural capacities exceed, for whatever 
the reasons, his usual performance. This is quite closely 
descriptive of Rameau. He is obviously functioning below 
his native ability. His is a type of self-imposed retarda­
tion. He deliberately and consciously acts in ways that 
are inferior to the quality of his potential. He has, as 
a result, been forced to adopt rather elaborate compensatory 
defense systems to help him maintain a consistent self­
picture. This is due to the fact that he, at least sub­
consciously, realizes he is operating beneath his capacity.
With a change of motivation and attitude, Rameau's degen­
eracy could be removed. This is not the case with the 
Master. His degeneracy seems to have been of too-long 
standing and to mount through too many generations.
It is immediately evident that Mangogul exhibits 
both deficiency and retardation. Thus, not only does he 
serve as a prototype for the antagonistic elements of motive 
hierarchy later to be represented by Rameau and the philosopher, 
i.e., a self-actualized versus a lower-need hedonist, he is 
also a prototype of the two types of degeneracy represented 
by Rameau and Jacques' Master. The thesis here then is 
that in spite of the haste or intent with which Diderot 
wrote this first work, in spite of the obvious superficiality
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of the literary development of Mangogul, Diderot included 
in the latter, from a hierarchy-of-needs viewpoint, a 
prototype of the four major protagonists of the two pre­
viously discussed works.
As was stated above, only fleeting reference is made 
to qualities that in any way approach those of the self- 
actualization of the philosopher or the "in process" 
actualization of Jacques. What qualities reminiscent of 
self-actualization are present, are evident primarily as 
Diderot paints a brief "before" word-portrait of Mangogul 
in the initial paragraphs. He tells the reader that in his 
early years, Mangogul had gained the reputation of " 
grand h o m m e . This was due to activities which the reader 
infers had been conceived and executed by a great and 
magnanimous, i.e., self-actualizing, sultan. Over a period 
of years, Mangogul had busied himself winning battles, 
enlarging his empire, pacifying provinces, repairing dis­
orders in the financial structure, bringing about a flowering 
of the arts and sciences, raising great buildings, institu­
ting and perfecting legislation, and establishing academies
2and universities. This is an impressive list for any
sultan or monarch. It exceeds the accomplishments of Louis
^Bénac, éd., Oeuvres, p. 5
^Ibid.
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XIV even after one omits those things for which he is more 
infamous than famous. Any sultan capable of such effective­
ness would necessarily be bright, energetic, democratically 
oriented, and enlightened. He would be akin to the enlightened 
despot sought by Voltaire. He would seem to be within range 
of self-actualization, to be in the process of becoming the 
best sultan of which he was instrinsically capable. One 
could logically expect that such a monarch would continue 
to display physical prowess, to evaluate and conclude with 
his quick and exacting thought process, to utilize his 
advanced aesthetic and humanistic appreciations in order to 
bring about a flourishing of the arts, to fight for the 
dignity and freedom of all men through enlightened and 
equitable legislation, and to promote the continued search 
for mastering the unknown through academies and universities.
In a word, this initial picture seems to be one of Diderot 
himself made sultan. It is a philosopher king.
Interestingly, this hint of self-actualization is 
largely limited to page five of a book some 225 pages in 
length. Then on page six, Diderot abruptly leaves the near- 
actualizing sultan, and in his stead reveals a bored, 
degenerate one, who thereafter shows only rare moments of 
any degree of greatness. It may well be that Diderot intended 
the initial portrait as a sort of prologue, because the 
sub-title of chapter three,which begins on this same page 
six, reads: "Qu'on peut regarder comme le premier de cette
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histoire."^ Evidently we are to forget, or to not take too 
seriously, the enlightened part of Mangogul's life that had 
just previously been described. It could be that author 
Diderot included this positive portrait, less to exemplify 
his particular concept of what Maslow would later call self- 
actualization, than to satisfy a censor who would otherwise 
have not tolerated the rest of the book, since the overall 
picture drawn was less than flattering to royalty. Be that 
as it may. the remaining ninety plus per cent of the book 
deals with a type of retarded, deficient Mangogul who is 
largely lower-need fixated. The vigorous reformer has 
become a lethargic sultan whose nearly sole interest now
2is hearing about " ... des aventures galantes de la ville."
We have to do now with a Mangogul who has learned that it 
is only " ... au pied du tr6ne q u 'on trouve le plaisir, 
et personne ... ne savait déposer plus à propos la majesté."^ 
This is the Mangogul that one remembers; this is the Mangogul 
that fills the book, even though on occasion an enlightened 
Mangogul makes an appearance. It seems on these enlightened 
occasions, that we have to do with author Diderot disserting 
on one of his favorite subjects. The following concerning
^Ibid., p . 6.
^ Ib i d ., p. 7.
3lbid., p. 129.
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the drama is typical. Here he speaks out against the tragedy
as inherited from the classical era:
Ne conviendrez-vous pas ... qu'à la démarche 
empesée des acteurs, à la bizarrerie de leurs 
vêtements, à l'extravagance de leurs gestes, à 
l'emphase d'un langage singulier, rimé, cadencé, 
et à mille autres dissonances qui le frapperont, 
il doit m'éclater au nez dès la première scène 
et me déclarer ou que je me joue de lui, ou que 
le prince et toute sa cour extravaguent.^
On rare occasion he concerns himself for his subjects, and
at these moments he seems exemplary of a noble, altruistic
monarch. Typical is the following incident -wherein he
counsels a young couple, after the husband had repudiated
his wife for supposed infidelity. After having determined
the innocence of the young wife, Mangogul informs her husband
of her innocence and advises him to pardon her. This the
husband does, but Mangogul counsels the innocent wife in
a Solomon-like manner. She had in very deed been innocent,
but her complete honesty made it so she allowed herself to
be seen in situations that resulted in the rumors. A more
sophisticated, and less innocent, woman would have been
more discreet. Mangogul advises her to avoid the very
appearance of evil: " ... souvenez-vous qu'une jolie femme
se fait quelquefois autant de tort par des imprudences que
2par des aventures."
^Ibid., p. 145.
"Ibid., p . 122,
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What is the probability that someone as vigorous as 
Mangogul formerly seems to have been, should become an 
indolent sultan with only occasional flashes of his former 
self? Literarily, of course, anything can happen in a 
book which confronts the reader with things such as magic 
rings, talking "bijoux", and a sultan who can, upon willing 
it. be wherever he desires or make himself invisible. 
Psychologically, such momentous change, after ten vigorous 
years, is less defensible. One would normally expect a 
sultan with such an insightful, reality-oriented beginning 
to continue to search for more opportunity and more challenge.
One thing that does seem to be implicit in Diderot's por­
trayal of Mangogul is that Mangogul never was completely 
self-actualized. His personal role, in the initial successes
of his empire, was likely more apparent than real. This,
Diderot could be infering, is not unlike the successes of 
any monarch. That is to say, success is more resultant from 
the conditions and events existing during a king's reign, 
than from any innate quality of the king himself. If this 
is in fact the case, Mangogul seems to have soon exhausted 
his challenge and horizon, and to have been unable to achieve 
auto-motivation. Being thus incapable of real self-direction, 
he merely remained a reactor to events; consequently he 
vegetated. Boredom is the first sign that needs and motives 
are absent or inactive. Dependent on external motivators, 
all Mangogul can do is " ... s'ennuie à périr, ..." Mirzoza
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tells him, " ... vous êtes distrait, vous baillez.” All 
activities and functions are at a low level. Typical is 
the description of Mangogul " ... étendu nonchalament sur 
une duchesse, vis à vis la favorite qui faisait des noeuds 
sans dire mot.” Activity of any type is at a minimal level. 
Even conversation requires more energy than they are wont 
to exert. When they do talic, Mangogul can only answer 
" ... en baillant à demi.”^
The activity level that is demonstrated by the 
foregoing examples is in sharp contrast to that force and 
vigor necessary to lead an army, to unite a kingdom or to 
reform legislation. Toward the end of the novel there is 
a singular evidence of his debilitated condition. He still 
” ... ne songeait qu'à varier ses plaisirs, ...” He had 
tired of hearing the confessions of the bi.joux of his court 
and wanted to hear some of those of the women of Paris.
" ... il eût fort désiré les consulter à son aise, et 
s'épargner la peine de les aller chercher.” When one 
considers that his ring not only had the property of making 
him invisible while he eavesdropped, but that it also could 
take him, in a twinkling, anywhere he wanted to be, his wish 
for an even easier state of affairs shows the advanced stages 
of his lethargy.
^Bénac, éd.. Oeuvres, pp. 6, 
^Ibid., p. 172.
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Considered as a prototype, Mangogul is closer to
Jacques' Master than to the other protagonists thus far
considered. This is in part due to the commonality of
their social origin, which alludes in both cases, to a
sort of genetic debilitation. In the descriptions that
Diderot gives of Mangogul's education, there are strong
implications of degeneracy. Diderot infers that degeneracy
is the case with all nobility, and even that some are in a
worse state than Mangogul.
Grâce aux heureuses dispositions de Mangogul, 
et aux leçons continuelles de ses maîtres, il 
n'ignora rien de ce qu'un jeune prince a 
coutume d'apprendre dans les quinze premières 
années de sa vie, et sut, à l'âge de vingt 
ans, boire, manger et dormir aussi parfaitement 
qu'au-'un potentat de son âge.l
It is evident that, in the manner of Voltaire,
Diderot need not underline "heureuses dispotions" for the 
reader. The fact that this "disposition", i.e., intellectual 
and neuromuscular potential has him capable of doing after 
twenty years of tutoring, what the normal youngster is doing 
after that many months, and that without benefit of tutors, 
is indicative of Mangogul's sad state. The weakened state 
of aristocratic heredity is underlined when Mangogul is des­
cribed as being like any other " ... potentat de son âge."
Diderot further spoofs nobility by saying that this is all 
that any young prince "a coutume d'apprendre" that is to 
say - nothing.
^Ibid., p . 4.
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However, the way in which Mangogul seems even more 
to look forward to Jacques' Master is in his need for a 
narcotic to help him endure life's seeming endlessness. 
Jacques' Master had accomplished this by stifling his 
thought process, by intellectually turning himself 
off, and by, at the same time "turning" Jacques ' love-life 
account on. In like manner, Mangogul has turned himself 
intellectually off and now rarely faces up to life. The 
theme and variations of governing, which formerly challenged 
him, now have no interest for him whatsoever. Mangogul 
does not have a Jacques who can help sedate him with tales 
of his love life. He does have in Mirzoza someone who 
possesses " ... le talent si nécessaire et si rare de bien 
narrer. ..."^ He has resorted to her tales in the past but 
they no longer seem to suffice. Like a drug addict, and 
like Jacques' Master, Mangogul must increase the dosage 
to obtain the same effect. Thus it is that he turns from 
Mirzoza's tales, to those of the b i ,j oux, who reveal their 
ladies' araourous indiscretions whenever Mangogul points the 
magic ring in their direction. Consequently, whenever time 
weighs heavily on the sultan, as it does often, he can sedate 
himself by magically whisking himself to some lady's chamber 
in order to listen to her bijoux tell of her love life.
^Bénac, éd.. Oeuvres, p. 6 .
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This gives him momentary respite from the heaviness life seems 
to impose on him, from his existential nausea. Diderot was 
never clear about the goal of Jacques' and his Master's 
journey. They end up at a village where the Master's supposed 
son is housed, but this seems more happenstance than purposive. 
In a way then, their journey is life's journey, and the Master 
wants to get from one end of it to the other having thought 
as little as possible. Mangogul, in like manner, wants to 
sedate himself and just exist. It is to be expected that 
neither of them contemplates suicide. They do not relish 
life as did Diderot, Jacques or the philosopher, but neither 
can they forcefully oppose life by way of suicide. They 
have opted for existence, but for existence in a semi­
conscious state. Life offers no intrinsic reward as it did 
for Diderot, so they seek an escape that is short of complete 
evasion.
In hierarchy-of-motives terms, how did Mangogul 
get to this impasse? Following him through the hierarchy 
would offer some explanation of his condition, in addition 
to those already offered. As to physiological needs, it is 
inconceivable that Mamgogul has even experienced them except 
as a small infant. In all probability his every physiological 
need has been immediately and completely fulfilled. They 
have in all likelihood never acted as motivators for him.
As to safety needs, he has probably never known them in any 
real degree. There may have been moments on the field of
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battle wherein Mangogul has experienced safety concerns but 
the likelihood is that even here he was surrounded by legions 
of his men and was as safe as if in his own chamber. He 
should have never experienced real belongingness or love 
deprivation. He was a member of the ruling class which 
carried with it a sort of automatic belonging. He is loved 
beyond deserving by a beautiful, intelligent woman, Mirzoza, 
and he in turn seems to love her. Thus his belongingness 
and love needs should be fulfilled on a general as well as 
on an intimate scale. As to esteem needs, one would expect 
that all his past accomplishments should give him complete 
esteem satisfaction. They should readily lead to feelings 
of confidence, worth and adequacy, and should have aided 
him to fulfill needs for prestige, status, dominance and 
recognition. Herein, however, may lie part of Mangogul's 
dilemma. Maslow states that the most healthy sort of esteem 
is that which is based on deserved respect and not on external 
fame or celebrity.^ It could be then, that Mangogul was 
not really deserving of the credit and honors that had been 
bestowed upon him, and he may have been aware that he was 
undeserving. If this were the case, that he had been the 
recipient of the notoriety merely because he was sultan and 
not for any deserved merit, the result might be that he 
never adequately filled his esteem needs. It often happens
^Maslow, Motivation, p. 91
138
that public figures, in spite of much notoriety, never have 
their esteem needs filled because they realize that they 
are not being accepted or esteemed for what they personally, 
intrinsically are, but merely for what they have come to 
represent. If this were the case, it would again emphasize 
the commonalities already shown with Jacques' Master and 
Rameau.
What does seem even more definitely to be the case 
is that Mangogul never fulfilled to any extent at all, those 
needs which follow esteem, that is, those of cognition. He 
gives no indication of ever having posed to himself any of 
the cosmic questions that would plague Diderot and most of 
his literary offspring- The above characteristics call to 
mind Louis XIV. His basic needs were all met, and he was 
the champion of arts par excellence. His cognitive interests, 
however, seem to have never reached fruition due to his 
limited capacity, and his rather puerile interpretation of 
himself and the world. His cosmic inquiries seem to have 
accordingly been nil. Certainly they kept aim from any real 
degree of self-actualization. This seems to be the case 
with Mangogul. If he ever was curious to know, to explain 
or to understand, he no longer is. His cosmic concerns like 
those of Louis XIV seem totally absent. He recalls again, 
as did Jacques' Master, the syndrome Maslow reports from
clinical impressions of the frustration of cognitive needs---
boredom, self-dislike, loss of zest for life, depression of
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bodily functions, deterioration of intellectual life and
of tastes.^ As was the case with Jacques' Master, the
above syndrome seems almost tailor-made for Mangogul. Lack
of cognitive, cosmic concern then seems to have stopped
Mangogul decidedly short of actualization growth levels.
Again and again he shows himself to be incapable of sustained
interest in a subject of any depth. ”Ahi! dit Mangogul
en baillant et se frottant les yeux, j'ai mal à la tête.
Qu'on ne me parle jamais de philosophie. Ces conversations
2sont malsaines." In cognitive matters, Mangogul seems 
rather like an adolescent who will embark on an intellectual 
query, only to tire of it and revert readily back to more 
juvenile interests. Mangogul had begun a discussion with 
Mirzoza and his intimates only to soon show signs of dis­
interest. Mirzoza chides him:
Vous nous embarquez vous-même dans un entretien 
sur les belles lettres: vous débutez .. . et
lorsque pour vous obliger, on se dispose à suivre 
le triste propos que vous avez jeté, l'ennui et 
les bâillements vous prennent; vous vous tourmentez 
sur votre fauteuil; vous changez cent fois de 
positions sans en trouver une bonne; las enfin de 
tenir la plus mauvaise contenance du monde, vous 
prenez brusquement votre parti; vous vous levez 
et vous disparaissez: et où allez-vous encore?
peut-être écouter un bijou.3
^Ibid., p. 95.
2Bénac, éd., Oeuvres, p. Il4,
^Ibid., p. 146.
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Mirzoza here offers some excellent insight into 
Mangogul and his fluctuation from higher motivations to 
lower sense gratifications worthy of Sade or Crébillon.
This assessment by the person who best knew him, and who 
was also of a temperament to speak her mind, is likely the 
most valid one offered in the novel. Mirzoza was insight­
ful; her assessments of persons or conditions seem to have 
Diderot's approval. This assessment of Mangogul is then 
likely close to Diderot's intent. It affirms that Diderot 
likely did intend that this fluctuation be incorporated 
into Mangogul's psyche. What we do have then, and what 
Diderot did apparently deliberately produce, was a rather 
unusual admixture of high and low motivations. Mangogul 
would initiate the fulfilling of cognitive or aesthetic 
needs, or a type of self-actualization, only to find it 
impossible to integrate this into his self-picture. He 
would momentarily become the benevolent sultan, aiding 
the needy in his kingdom, dispensing wisdom in Solomon-like 
fashion, evidencing concern for the individual dignity and 
worth of his subjects, only to find that this did not fit 
his self-concept, that it was not an integral part of him. 
So, unable to pursue higher motives, feeling hampered and 
at disparity with himself, Mangogul readily reverts to 
lower-hierarchy levels. Thus a little in manic-depressive 
fashion, where instability is the key-word, Mangogul 
oscillates up and down in the hierarchy.
l4l
In this dilemma of oscillation, there are reminiscences 
of Jacques who was in the process of self-actualization, but 
who had not arrived at complete equilibrium. It does, 
however, seem relatively evident that Jacques' moments of 
cosmic concern and of self-actualization were much more 
frequent and much longer in duration than Mangogul's.
Mangogul, in contrast, remained largely at a lower level 
with only flashes of cosmic interest or actualization motive. 
Mangogul realized this in himself but did not seem to have 
the strength to change nor did he feel the need. Following 
his chiding by Mirzoza, discussed above, he elaborates on 
these qualities in himself: "Je conviens madame, du fait;
mais je n'y vois rien d'offensant. S'il arrive à un homme 
de s'ennuyer des belles choses et de s'amuser à entendre 
de mauvaises, tant pis pour lui." He continues on, showing 
decided self-perception: "Cette injuste préférence n'Ste
rien au mérite de ce qu'il a quitté; il en est seulement 
déclaré mauvais juge.
In the jaove reply, we see why he can oscillate from 
high to low motives. He recognizes the superiority of higher 
interests and considers that when he opts for lower need 
gratification it is an "injuste préférence." However, since 
he Cannot achieve total self-actualization and feel the 
resulting sense of fulfillment, he is content to give lip
^Bénac, éd.. Oeuvres, p. l4?.
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service to those interests and merely declare himself to be 
a "mauvais juge." This attitude partakes somewhat of the 
self-justifications that Rameau so continually engaged in.
He too recognized the superiority of what the philosopher 
proposed, but he could so readily justify why he followed 
his course of action, that one would not anticipate any 
change. On occasion Mangogul would have the reader believe 
that his listening to bijoux is merely the futile search 
for women of integrity. He occasionally bemoans the lack 
of fidelity and pure love he has found: " ... Ce pur amour
dont on parle tant, n'existe nulle part; cette délicatesse 
de sentiments, dont tous les hommes et toutes les femmes 
se piquent, n'est qu'une chimère."^ In spite of this comment 
on the state of morals of the Eighteenth-Century, the fact 
remains that the major portion of the book seems dedicated 
to saying that some persons' level of involvement in life 
and level of intellectual inquiry is so low as to give their 
lives little meaning. Somewhat akin to characters from a 
work by Sartre, these people se sentent de trop; they have 
little raison d 'être. They are thus confronted with a life 
with little or no goal, but see no alternative but to live 
it. What they can however do, is make themselves less 
aware of reality and of time, and thus pass their days less
^Ib id., p . 229
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wearily. The simplest, least effortful means of getting 
from one point in time to another is their answer to the 
problem of life. On occasion, as has been shown, Mangogul, 
like Rameau, has insight into the folly of his position, 
but does not have the force to change. He is thus condemned 
to sedate himself and to do his best at self-delusion. It 
would again be in order to point out that this is a pole 
apart from the philosophy of life that motivated Diderot.
His was a life of total involvement, complete commitment, 
based on a view of life as a kaleidoscopic challenge to be 
met head-on.
How do the foregoing hierarchy-of-motives analyses 
of Mangogul and Les Bijoux indiscrets in general coincide 
with other analyses and previously held views? The most 
significant thing to be said in this regard is that Les 
Bijoux indiscrets and its protagonist Mangogul has been in 
large measure ignored. It has seemed sufficient to say, as 
does Venturi, that "II appartient à une tradition qui commence 
avec Crébillon et qui continue jusqv^à vers le milieu du 
siècle, de simples jeux littéraires sur un fond oriental."^
The enchantments, the emirs, etc. are drawn from this tradi­
tion. Even the idea itself of making the bi j oux spesik 
" ... est tirée d'un récit du conte de Caylus Nocrion publié
^Franco Venturi, Jeunesse de Diderot (de 1713 à 1753) 
Traduit de l'italien par Julette Bernard. (Paris: Skira,
1939), p. 120.
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en 1747. It partakes of the allegorical and fantastic
2of A Thousand and One Nights. Most commentators also point 
to the assertion made by Diderot's daughter, Mme de Vandeuil, 
that the book was " ... composé en quinze jours pour gagner 
cinquante louis afin de subvenir aux dépenses de Mme de 
Puisieux, maîtresse de Diderot, ..." Most also state as 
does Bénac that he was trying to prove that anyone could 
write a licentious tale " ... à condition de trouver* une 
idée plaisante, cheville de tout le reste»." Comments on 
Diderot's choosing to write a crébillonage are typified by
André Billy who said, "La galanterie n'était pas son fort,
IS  .
„5
Ziil le reconnut lui-même." Venturi excuses it as just
" ... une incursion passagère et momentaire. ...
How did Diderot himself feel about the book? Naigeon 
says Diderot never heard the book mentioned except with a 
feeling of "chagrin ... que donne le sourvenir d'une 
faute. ..."^ Georges May seems to feel Diderot did not 
regret writing the work as much for its licentiousness as
~"Ibid. , p. 123.
^Ibid., p. 124.
3Bénac, éd.. Oeuvres, p. 837.
4Billy, ed., Oeuvres, p. 13.
^Venturi, Jeunesse, p. 120.
^Ibid., p. 134.
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for the " ... énorme disproportion qui existe entre l'obscénité
et la prédication, - . . Venturi likewise feels it was not
2" ... entièrement renié par son auteur." Probably one of 
the reasons that Diderot would not completely reject this 
book is because, as Van Tieghem says, "On y retrouve les 
thèmes de la pensée de Diderot telle qu'elle s'était exprimée 
dans ses premières oeuvres philosophiques. ..." Bénac 
reminds the reader of Bijoux that even in a light work,
"Diderot n'oublie pas la philosophie et essaye, sous le 
couvert de la fantaisie ou de la gauloiserie, de glisser
lila bonne parole dans les têtes légères. ..." Another
commentator says that "Les seules parties du roman vraiment
notables restent celles oîi les idées philosophiques de
Diderot font leur apparition-"^ Billy even feels it is the
" ... point de départ de la réforme dramatique tenté dans
la suite par Diderot."^ For Naigeon it contains "
connaissance très étendue des langues, des sciences et des
beaux arts; des pages très philosophiques et très sages;
„7
Georges May, Diderot et la Religieuse. Etude 
historique et littéraire (Paris: Presses Universitares de
Franc e , 1954), pT 10.
2Venturi, Jeunesse, p. 134.
3Van Tieghem, éd.. Récits, p. 19.
U -------'Bénac, éd., Oeuvres, p. 838.
^Venturi, Jeunesse, p. 128.
^Billy, éd.. Oeuvres, p. 14.
^Bénac, éd.. Oeuvres, p. 838.
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What of Diderot's more specific social or satirical
intent? Was he in fact -writing a social satire? Naigeon
says it is a " ... satire des mauvaises moeurs, de la fausse
éloquence, des préjugés religieux, In this regard it
2has been compared to Dames galantes and is not unlike 
Lettres persanes in social criticism. For Ellrich it is an
3empirical inquiry into morality.
Is it even more specifically a "roman à clef" with 
Louis XV as its chief target? Most observers seem to feel 
Diderot did have in mind Louis XV, though the portrait is 
not exact. Most are in agreement with Fernand Drujon who 
says the people and places represented are Kangoglou as 
Louis XIV, Mirzoza as Mme de Pompadour, Mangogul as Louis 
XV, Le Congo as France and Banza as Paris. Bénac adds that 
the bramines are the clergy.^ There seems to be ample evi­
dence to support the idea that Mangogul is reminiscent of 
Louis XV, He did have the practice of reading each morning.
^Ibid., p. 838.
^Ibid., p . 843.
3 Robert J. Ellrich. "The Structure of Diderot's 
'Les Bijoux indiscrets'" Romanic Review, 52: 279-89, I96I.
4Jean Hervez, ed., "La Religieuse," L'Oeuvre de 
Diderot, deuxième partie (Paris: Bibliothèque des curieux,
1920), p. 5 .
5Bénac, éd.. Oeuvres, p. 84l.
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the report of the agents of the lieutenant general of police
of Paris concerning the scandalous happenings of the prior
night.^ Hervez says:
On Sait que Berryer de Renonville d'abord et 
ensuite Sartines, lieutenants généraux de 
police, avaient formé avec soin des inspecteurs ... 
chargés de surveiller spécialement le tout- 
Paris galant et de dresser des rapports détaillés 
sur les scandales d'alcove, les potins de 
coulisses, les escapades, les adultères des 
gentils hommes et des nobles dames de la cour.
These reports were " ... présentés au roi qui,* satisfaisant
sa lubricité, tachait de ranimer ses sens émoussés en
2remplissant son imagination de ces tableaux ordurleurs»." 
This is not at all unlike the portrait Diderot presents of 
Mangogul though, as has been implied, he does take some 
pains to make Mangogul more acceptable to his model Louis 
X\’, than a true portrait would have allowed. For sheer 
survival, as well as for greater marketability, Diderot's 
portrait was attenuated. It nevertheless served as a pro­
totype for elements of many of his characters that would 
come later.
^Ibid., p. 839.
2Hervez, ed., La Religieuse, p. 3*
CHAPTER VI 
SUZANNE, AN ACTUALIZER MADE WOMAN
La Religieuse, a novel indicting convent life, was 
written in I76O when Diderot was forty-seven years old. It 
relates very closely to his concept of man and Nature, and 
to his concept of free agency and responsibility. Diderot 
had an almost religious respect for the natural; however, 
he did not, as did his compatriot Rousseau, conceive of the 
natural as having to do largely with forests and lakes and 
with retreat from civilization to a simpler state of exis­
tence. Rousseau was to give this concept of the natural 
great popularity by way of his novel. La Nouvelle Héloise
(1761). Diderot did propose less artifice and more genuine­
ness among men, but he, like Voltaire, felt this could be 
achieved within the confines of an advanced, even rich, 
society. In La Religieuse, Diderot seems to have conceived 
of the natural in terms of that which is common to men or 
normal for the species, and to have conceived of the human 
body as being formed by Nature, and as maintaining its 
equilibrium only by the exercise of its normal functions, 
i.e. by engaging in normal, social interaction. He was in
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principle opposed to anyone or to any practice which robbed 
man of his natural social character, and said that " ...
quand on s'oppose au penchant gé'n^ral de la nature ...
1cette contrainte ... ddtourne à des affections déréglées. ..." 
One practice he particularly opposed was that of cloistering
young people in convents and monasteries away from real,
i.e. natural life. Gallier writes that in Diderot's time 
the practice of getting certain children out of the way by
sending them to convents was common. Gallier continues that
many times they were kept there by civil authorites, even in
9the absence of parental pressure." For Diderot, this violated 
man's inherent rights and mocked natural law.
Diderot's concept of the aim of literature is another
important consideration at this juncture. Georges May says 
that Diderot felt that "La littérature doit prêcher et
3disserter, et tout le reste n'est que dorure du pilule."
Diderot above all insisted that literature be committed on 
a moral rather than on a religious and political plane.
So it was that Diderot, abhorring the very basis of convent
^Bénac. éd.. Oeuvres, p. ]8l.
2Jean Walter, ed., La Religieuse par Denis Diderot 
(Paris: Editions de Cluny, 193#), p. xxi. Walter quotes
from an unnamed work by M. Humbert de Gallier who had studied 
the monastic life of Diderot's time.
3Georges May, Diderot et "La Religieuse," Etude 
historique et littéraire (Paris: Presses Universitaires de
Franc e, 1954). p"I 11.
^Ibid.
150
and monastic life and seeing literature as a tool for change,
attacked the problem with all his vigor. Ellrich says La
Religieuse unequivocally aims to demonstrate and persuade.^
Jasinski says Diderot " ... attaque le fanatisme avec une
2indignation sincère et s'élève souvent au pathétique." 
Elsewhere, Jasinski says, "Il condamne les mortifications,
3bannit les hypocrisies. ..." Daix says: "Il a su qu'il
fallait affranchir les femmes de toutes servitudes comme du
4despotisme de l'homme." Van Tieghem feels it is also, 
more specifically an " ... exposé vivant et concret des 
conséquences douleureuses de principes religieux.^ Jacques 
Proust says it is a defense of man and individual liberty.^ 
Diderot underlines the same idea, that of liberty and natural 
law, when he pleads for good laws, which eure those that do 
not require man to " ... s'opposer à sa propre nature.
Diderot seems to have succeeded eminently well in 
doing what he intended. Georges May considers it to be
^Robert J. Ellrich, "The Rhetoric of 'La Religieuse' 
and Eighteenth-Century Forensic Rhetoric," Diderot Studies, 
III (1961), p. 130.
2 ^René Jasinski, Histoire de la littérature française. 
Vol. II (Paris: Boivin, 194?) , p"I 208.
^Ibid., p. 203-
4Pierre Daix, éd., Diderot, "La Religieuse" (Paris: 
Club des amis du livre progressiste, I960) pi xix.
^Van Tieghem, éd.. Récits, p. 19-
^Jacques Proust, "Recherches nouvelles sur La 
Religieuse'," Diderot Studies, VI (1964), p. 209.
^Walter, éd.. La Religieuse, p. xv.
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" ... l'un des cinq ou six romans les plus importants du
XVlIIe siècle français."^ Walter sees in the work " ... un
2chef-d'oeuvre de psychologie et de vie." According to 
Ellrich it is a morally beautiful tale because innocence
3does not flag. Bénac considers its effectiveness to be
due to the fact that the moral comes not in the form of a
dissertation " ... mais à travers une aventure individuelle
... réelle." Benac points out one other interesting and
important fact when he says this allowed Diderot to study
one of the "conditions" of which he had spoken in the
4Entretiens sur le fils naturel. It is interesting to note, 
in light of the title of the work just mentioned, that 
another name for the book could have been. La Fille naturelle, 
this based on the "conditions" of Suzanne ' s births Heading 
Diderot's own v'iews of the quality of his work is interesting. 
He believed it to be gripping and effective: " ... Je ne
crois pas qu'on ait jamais écrit une plus effroyable satire 
des couvents." He also considered it to be filled with
^May, Etude, p. 17.
“Walter, ed.. La Religieuse, p. xxiii. 
Ellrich, Rhetoric, p. l46.
4Bénac, éd., Oeuvres. p. 869.
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scenes that could be put on canvas: "C'est un ouvrage à
feuilleter sans cesse par les peintres; ..-
Daix -writes that Diderot's depiction of the lesbian 
passion of the Mother Superior " ... se voit confirmée par
les travaux les plus récents, ..." and by Simone de Beauvoir's
oanalysis of the question in Le Deuxième Sexe.""~ This is 
understandably so because Diderot never felt that he had 
to cheat and make his views correspond to any preconceived 
ideas. He observed nature directly and so his conclusions
concerning man should be as valid as those of current
3observers. Nuns and convent life were not new to Diderot.
His o-wn sister Catherine joined a convent against the wishes
of the family aid was to meet a lamentable end. Angélique,
Diderot's daughter -wrote in lSl6 to Meister, Grimm's successor
as editor of the Corréspondance littéraire that:
Une soeur de mon père voulut, en dépit de la 
volonté de ses parents, se consacrer à l'état 
religieux. ... on abusa de sa force physique: 
le moral s'altéra; la tête s'éxalta; elle mourut 
folle à vingt-sept ou vingt-huit ans. C'est 
le destin de cette soeur qui a donné à mon père 
l'idée du roman de La Religieuse. ...^
^Bénac. éd.. Oeuvres, p. 869-




Undoubtedly this did have a marked effect on Diderot 
and served as genesis for some of his strong feelings con­
cerning cloistered life. He had treated convent life some 
twelve years earlier in chapter seven of Les Bijoux indiscrets 
(1748).^ He made the point then that though cloistered, 
these girls and women had the same physical needs as any 
other person- He even implied that their knowledge of 
these matters was little different from that of the promis­
cuous courtisanes. Jacques Proust offers one other source 
of Diderot's knowledge of convents. He refers to a journal, 
Nouvelles ecclésiastiques, which he says could have offered
2any number of models and incidents of convent irregularities.
The most direct model for Suzanne Simonin, the nun
of La Religieuse, is Marguerite Delamarre. She was born in
1717 and had spent the near total of her life in convents,
3having been sent at age three to Longchamp near Paris.
Many of the facts of her life such as approximate dates, 
names of convents, parental rejection and a court trial to 
secure her freedom, were borrowed by Diderot for his novel.
In 1758 she had brought civil suit to secure her freedom, 
charging that her parents had placed her in the convents
^Bdnac, ed. , 0 euvres, pp. 19-21. 
2“Proust, Recherches, pp. 210-11. 
^May. Etude, pp. 48-9.
Proust, Recherches, p. 202.
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against her will. One of Diderot’s and Grimm's great 
friends, the marquis de Croismare, became interested in 
the young nun's plight. The Marquis subsequently left 
Paris to concern himself with his lands in Normandy. When 
he did not return after an absence of over a year, Diderot 
and Grimm composed letters, ostensibly from the nun in whom 
the Marquis had been interested, asking him for aid. The 
hope was that the kind-hearted Marquis would return to Paris. 
Diderot wrote La Religieuse (supposedly the real adventures 
of this non-existent nun) in support of the letters. He 
revealed the entire adventure to the I-lcirquis, but not before 
having written an indictment of convents, a treatise for 
free agency and a literary classic.
As was stated above, Diderot seemed to have excellent 
information concerning lesbianism. Georges May writes that 
Diderot possibly had models very close at hand. At the time 
he was writing La Religieuse he believed that " ... les 
deux femmes qu'il aimait alors le plus au monde étaient 
unies l'une à l'autre par des liens impurs." It was a 
question here of Sophie Volland, the most important woman 
in his life, and her sister Mme Le Gendre. In a letter 
written by Diderot to Sophie in 1759 he told her: "
J 'approche mes lèvres des vôtres; je les baise; dussé-je 
y trouver la trace des baisers de votre soeur; mais non, 
il n'y a rien."^ Of the two, it was Sophie's sister that
^May, Etudes, p. 142.
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Diderot suspected of unusual desire for Sophie- May suspects
also that Diderot might even have been jealous of the sister
and not simply of Sophie. He feels the tone of some letters
indicates that he had more than fraternal sentiment for
Mme Le Gendre.^ Of even more direct relationship concerning
possible models for the lesbian aspects of the convents was
the fact that Diderot also suspected Mme Le Gendre of having
2overly passionate feelings for a nun.
All the foregoing influences and examples were 
largely restricted to fashioning Diderot's ideas concerning 
convents in general, nuns in general or to supplying him 
with the more superficial aspects of his protagonist Suzanne 
such as her demands to be released. However. Suzanne as a 
person partakes of none of the deviancy. of none of the 
weakness or narrow-mindedness of the typical nun as portrayed 
by Diderot. She is the antithesis of all they are or 
symbolize. She represents true religion and "naturalness" 
when compared to the other nuns. She is the personification 
of liberty, of free agency and personal dignity. She is
3" ... un symbole vivant, ..." For Ellrich she is the lawyer
4presenting the case against convents and hypocrisy.
^Ibid.. p . l4].
“"Ibid. . p . 14p.
3Bénac, éd.. Oeuvres, p. xiii.
kEllrich, Rhetoric, p. 138.
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Knowing Diderot even superficially would immediately
lead to the discovery of the model he likely used for these
more important facets of Suzanne. Sophie Volland embodied
all the strength, all the virtue and all the true dignity
of Suzanne. In writing to Grimm Diderot describes her:
Ah'. Grimm, quelle femme! comme cela est tendre, 
doux, honnête, délicat, sensé! ... Cela réfléchit, 
cela aime à réfléchir. Nous n'en savons plus 
qu'elle en moeurs, en sentiments, en usage, en 
une infinité de choses importantes. ... Cela a 
son jugement, ses vues, ses idées, son sentiment 
à soi ...1
Knowing Diderot's own towering intellect and his 
astute perception, Sophie Volland must have been an excep­
tional person herself in order to deserve such an assessment 
from him. Proof that she was in point of fact what Diderot 
assessed her to be is offered by the following evaluation 
from Grimm:
D'où vous vient, Sophie, cette passion de la 
philosophie, inconnue aux personnes de votre 
sexe et de votre âge! Comment, au milieu d'une 
jeunesse avide de plaisir, lorsque vos compagnes 
ne s'occupent que du soin de plaire, pouvez-vous 
ignorer ou négliger vos avantages pour vous 
livrer à la méditation et à l'étude! ... la 
nature en vous formant s'est plu à loger l'âme 
de l'aigle dans une maison de gaze, ...^
Babelon assesses her as being "Instruite, d'esprit 
libre, son charme, sa tendresse étaient inséparables d'une
^Babelon, éd.. Lettres, p. 9-
“Ibid.
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certaine virilité intellectuelle."^ Wliat seems evident is 
that Sophie Volland, like Diderot, was likely self-actualized. 
She seems to have been operating at a level decidedly above 
that of mere need gratification.
A self-actualizational assessment of Diderot's 
protagonist, Suzanne, shows her prime trait to center 
around a pronounced sense of autonomy, around an unusual 
feeling of being independent of her physical and social 
environment. She has complete assurance in her own value 
system and hence does not succumb to external pressures that 
the convent sub-culture imposes, almost universally, on 
other entrants. Suzanne's autonomy has evidently long been 
part of her life style. The most striking proof of this is 
the fact that she has been able to psychologically survive 
a family wherein she was very pointedly the rejected Cinderella 
She was born of a clandestine liaison between her mother and 
a man for whom her mother had a temporary passion. Her 
supposed father suspected the truth but never openly dis­
cussed the matter because he could not bear the public 
ridicule that would result. Instead, his hatred for his 
wife's action and his own sense of loss of masculine esteem, 
exhibited itself as hatred for Suzanne, the living reminder 
of his wife's infidelity and his own inadequacy. Her mother
^Ibid., p. 8.
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likewise rejected Suzanne the symbol of her guilt. Her
supposed sisters rejected her because she was prettier,
brighter and more gracious than they, and because she was
always being complimented for her skills and beauty. In
true Cinderella fashion, Suzanne paid a heavy price for the 
unsolicited attention and approval of others. " ... plus 
les étrangers m'avaient marqué de prédilection, plus on 
avait d'humeur lorsqu'ils étaient sortis." She would have 
much preferred to be ugly and stupid like her "sisters" in 
order not to be rejected. "0 combien de fois j ’ai pleuré 
de n'étre pas née laide, béte, sotte ... afin d'ê'tre aimée, 
cherie, fêtée, excusée toujours comme elles l'étaient, dès 
mes plus jeunes ans j'ai désiré de leur ressembler."^
Obviously she has the same love needs as anyone else. She 
wants to be "aimée, cherie" like her sisters. Somehow, 
however, her sense of autonomy is such that she survived 
psychologically where most children would have suffered 
severe personality damage due to lack of love, security and 
acceptance. She frequently observes that she felt " ... seule 
dans cette maison, dans le monde; car je ne connaissais pas 
un être qui s'intéressât à moi." After having been forced 
into the convent she has an even more pronounced sense of
“Bénac, éd.. Oeuvres, p. 236
^Ibid., p. 234.
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rejection and aloneness. "<cHélas ! Je n'ai ni père ni 
mère; je suis une malheureuse qu'on déteste et qu'on veut 
enterrer ici toute vive.»"^
It is of course unusual that any person could 
possibly survive a life-time of rejection and still have 
the healthy self-concept and the realistic ego-strength 
that Suzanne exhibits. We must either suppose some psycho­
logical developmental oversights on the part of author 
Diderot, or else infer that Suzanne vas in some way able to 
make use of the positive regard that people other than her 
family members used to exhibit toward her. Somehow she may 
have been able to utilize this regard to fill her love and 
belongingness needs. What Diderot may in part be saying is 
the same thing Maslow says of the self-actualized, that is 
that these superbly " . . .  healthy people are so different 
from average ones, not only in degree but in kind as well,
2that they generate two very different kinds of psychology." 
That is to say, they may be simultaneously explained by 
seemingly incompatible syndromes. As an example Maslow 
suggests that the most ethical and moral people may also be
3the lustiest and most animal. In the case of Suzanne we
^Ibid., p. 237<
2“Maslow, Motivation, p. 234.
^ I b i d . , p. 233-
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might say that she has much more capacity for belongingness 
and love and yet, at the same time she has such autonomy 
that she no longer needs these ingredients to survive.
One point must be kept in mind in considering 
Suzanne, that is that La Religieuse is a work of art and 
that whatever else Suzanne might be or represent, she is a 
literary creation. Diderot the author, the polemicist and 
exponent of individual liberty was not primarily writing 
to show a woman's ability to resist rejection and absence 
of love. He above all wanted to show the "unnaturalness" 
of convent life and to point out how Suzanne, who embodied 
wholesomeness and love and naturalness, firmly resisted the 
attempts of the system to destroy her. He even gives the 
impression that the aversion Suzanne feels for unnaturalness 
was placed in her by Nature itself. "Je le sens, cette 
aversion; je l'apportai en naissant, et elle ne me quittera 
pas."^ By extension he is saying that these aversions to 
the unnatural are common to all men, but that some fall 
victim to their environment and allow their sense of autonomy 
and liberty to die or to be stifled. Suzanne keeps them 
alive. Diderot implies that Suzanne had kept a vision of a 
full life that made her reject what the mothers superior 
were attempting to impose on her. On numerous occasions 
she lists her analysis of things: "Faire voeu de pauvreté.
^Bénac, éd.. Oeuvres, p. 280.
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c ’est s ’engager par serment à être paresseux et voleur; ..." 
Diderot felt nuns and monks were leeches and parasites and 
that it was not natural for man to beg and live off the 
industry of others. This criticism of the non-productivity 
of the religious orders was common to all the philosophes, 
especially Diderot and Voltaire. Suzanne vigorously opposed 
the unnaturalness of their hollow vows of chastity; " ... 
Faire voeu de chasteté, c'est promettre à Dieu l ’infraction 
constante de la plus sage et de la plus importante de ses 
lois; ..." Suzanne refers here to G od’s command to Adam 
in the book of Genesis to multiply and replenish the earth, 
something which would not occur if all lived as do nuns and 
monks. Diderot, behind Suzanne, is saying that nothing is 
more natural to a man and woman than to marry and enjoy a 
full life including normal sexual relations. Suzanne next 
speaks Diderot’s strong plea for human liberty and dignity:
" ... Faire voeu d'obéissance c'est renoncer à la prérogative 
inaliénable de l'homme, la liberté." One must sacrifice this 
in convent life but Suzanne considers it inalienable.
This was one of most basic of needs for which the Revolution 
would soon be waged. No man or system, Suzanne seems to be 
Saying, has the right to deny this right to even the humblest 
of creatures, i.e. a young girl rejected by her family. She 
continues her indictment of the system by decrying its 
hypocrisy and fanaticism. "La vie claustrale est d'un 
fanatique ou d'un hypocrite." She ends this particular
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attack by summarizing cloistered life as disruptive of the 
natural order, a place where " ... la nature révoltée d'une 
contrainte pour laquelle elle n'est point faite, ... devient 
furieuse, jette l'économie animale dans un desordre. ..."^ 
Suzanne remains above the disorder and unnaturalness. She 
obeys reasonable requests and retains complete faith in 
God and the Bible, but she rejects all that goes against 
her concept of Christianity, human dignity or liberty.
There was, however, a limit to Suzanne's force:
"Ma santé ne tint point à des épreuves si longues et si
dures; je tombai dans l'abattement, le chagrin et la
9mélancolie."” She would on occasion get to the point where,
strong as she was, she could no longer live so alone and
considered ending her struggle by leaping from a high window 
or jumping into the well. She became aware that the other 
sisters were subtly pushing her to take jusx these extreme 
measures. Again she resists reacting to her external 
environment and refuses to die: "On me dégoûta de presque
tous les moyens de m'Ster la vie, parce qu'il me sembla 
que loin de s'y opposer, on me les présentait.” She continues 
philosophically that: "Nous ne voulons pas apparemment qu'on
nous pousse hors de ce monde." She summarizes her resistance 
on these occasions by saying: "En vérité je ne vivais que
parce qu'elles souhaitaient ma mort."
^Bénac, éd., Oeuvres. pp. 310-11.
~Ibid.. p . 269 -
3 Ibid., p. 270.
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So, Suzanne is the personification of autonomy, of 
rational self-direction and resistance to enculturation.
She is almost completely independent of external motivators.
She is as alone as one can conceivably be. She does not 
know the identity of her real father; she is rejected by 
her supposed father and she has been repeatedly told by 
her own mother that she is a burden. The only way to cease
being burdensome, her mother says, is to enter a convent---
an act her mother knows Suzanne holds in horror. Even in 
the convent she is rejected because she refuses to succumb 
to practices she considers abominable or demeaning; as a 
consequence, she is mercilessly mistreated. When the sisters 
lead her to contemplate suicide she refuses to be dictated 
to and opts to live. None of Suzanne's resistance or show 
of autonomy seems remotely related to typical juvenile 
resistance to authority ; rather it is an affirmation of her 
fundamental belief in the dignity of each individual. In 
self-actualization terms, she could stand as an almost classic 
example of autonomy and resistance to enculturation.
Suzanne's resistance is so unflagging, and, given
the circumstances, so reasoned and unemotional partaking
of none of the rhetoric or emotion of the adolescent reformer---
that some explanation seems in order. The explanation that 
seems readily applicable leads to one more characteristic 
of the self-actualized, that of a more efficient perception 
of reality. In point of fact, Suzanne is much like her
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author and even like Jean-Jacques Rousseau in the sense 
that in the Disc our s (1749 and 1755) or in Contrat social
(1762), Rousseau seems to have cleared away centuries of 
confusion concerning equality of man. On this point at 
least he seems to have had a lucid perception of reality, 
though he was not always able to keep this clarity of vision 
as concerned himself. Suzanne, likewise seems gifted with 
an efficient perception of things as they really are. She 
alone seems in complete contact with the more real world.
She is not lost in a maze of confusion concerning this 
life's relationship to a post-earth life. She readily sees 
through the distortions of belief and religious practice.
She is not caught as are the others in an inextricable and 
self-perpetuating web of abstractions and self-justifications 
Holding uniquely to the Bible and basic Christianity, she 
is not blinded by the myriad fears and false hopes of the 
other members of the cloisters. The precursor then to her 
autonomy is her clear vision, her unambiguous, unblinded 
view of life as it most fundamentally is. She sees herself 
clearly: "Je me connais, et il ne me reste qu'à me conduire
en conséquence de mon état."^ She clearly, objectively 
sees herself in relationship to those she considers blind 
and bigoted: "J'ai souffert, j'ai beaucoup souffert; mais
le sort de mes persécutrices me paraît et m'a toujours
^Ibid., p. 252.
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paru plus a plaindre que le mien." She ends by saying
" ... J'aurais mieux aimé’ mourir que de quitter mon rSle,
à la condition de prendre le leur. She clearly assesses
the unreasoned and sheep-like qualities of many of her
sister nuns, particularly those who unwittingly follow:
"II y a dans les communautés des tê’tes faibles; c'est
même le grand nombre : celles-la croyaient ce qu'on leur
2disait, ..." She objectively analyzes the relationship 
of the basic needs of all men to vows and cloistered life
3and asks: " ... suspendent-elles les fonctions animales?"
Even in her condition, she did not allow her own needs to
enter into her perception of other's strong points. Speaking
of the lesbian mother superior she says of her piano ability:
" ... elle avait la main infiniment plus légère que moi.
Je le lui dis, car j'aime à louer, et j'ai rarement perdu
4l'occasion de le faire avec vérité."
One other example of her cleirity of perception of 
reality is important. On one occasion, after a change of 
mothers superior had taken place, Suzanne sees that the new 
mother is very strict and rule-bound; she decides that in 
order to survive she must combat the new mother on her own
^Ibid., p . 308.
^Ibid., p. 294.
3 Ibid., p . 310.
“̂ Ibid. , p. 335.
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grounds. Consequently, Suzanne says: "Je lus les constitu­
tions, je les relus, je les savais par coeur; si l'on 
m 'ordonnait quelque chose ou qui n'y fut pas exprime 
clairment, ou qui n'y fut pas ... je m'y refusais fermement."^ 
On occasion vrhen the mother superior would call in the arch­
bishop to judge Suzanne'®: actions, Suzanne says: " ... je
me défendais, je défendais mes compagnes; et il n'est pas
arrivé une seule fois qu'on m'ait condamnée, tant j'avais
2d'attention à mettre la raison de mon c8t é : ..." Thus
for ail her warmth and love of humanity, and for all her 
efforts in behalf of fundamental dignity, Suzanne is not 
confused by abstractions, fears or the unknown. She sees 
reality with a clarity unknown to her sister nuns.
A feature of self-actualization that somewhat cuts 
across those already presented is that of acceptance. It 
goes without saying that Suzanne is self-accepting. She, 
like her author Diderot, has no overriding shame or guilt.
She, as would be expected of a Diderot heroine who is the 
symbol of freedom and naturalness, accepts her own nature 
without chargin. She has no defenses and strikes no poses.
All this is part and parcel of her autonomy. A specific 
example of her self acceptance is that of an occasion when.
^Ibid., p. 267.
^Ibid., p . 268.
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upon first entering a convent, some of the sisters had told
her she was pretty. When she was again alone in her cell
she related: " ... Je me ressouvins de leurs flatteries ;
je ne pus m'empêcher de les vérifier à mon petit miroir;
et il me sembla qu'elles n 'étaient pas tout à fait déplacées.
Without over concern for self, still she wholesomely adnits
to being comfortable with what she is.
Another incident shows her to be free of guilt and
self-recrimination. She had reported something concerning
herself to the Marquis when upon reflection she thought that
it might give him a bad opinion of her. But then she rather
innocently goes on to tell him: " ... mais puisque je n'ai
point eu honte de ce que j'ai fait, pourquoi rougirai-je 
2de l'avouer?" Important here is the idea that she always 
behaves rationally and so has no cause to feel self-repugnance. 
She has happened, on one occasion, upon a group of sisters 
making light of some weakness of another sister. She was 
not aware of the characteristic at which the sisters were 
laughing and relates: " ... et quand j'aurais été plus au
fait, cela ne m 'aurait pas amusée davantage. ... et puis,
3qui est-ce qui n'a point un ridicule." Obviously, however, 
she does not accept everything about some persons. She




draws a line at inhumanity and injustice. " ... j'ai le 
caractère porté à 1 'indulgence ; je puis tout pardonner 
aux hommes excepté l'injustice, l'ingratitude et 
1 'inhumanité."1
Finally, as to her acceptance of life and Nature, 
it is necessary to point up the difference between accepting 
things over which one has some control, and which are in 
need of change, and those before which one is helpless. In 
a sense the entire novel concerns her unwillingness to accept 
conditions as they are; she resists where others acquiesce; 
she attempts change in areas that others consider immutable. 
In another sense, however, she had to have some qualities 
of stoicism, and of acceptance of her lot in life, in order 
to emerge with as few psychological scars as she evidences. 
Without an attitude of stoicism she could in no wise have 
survived. On one occasion she comments : "J'obéis à mon
sort sans repugnance et sans goût ; je sens que la nécessité 
m'entraîne., et je me laisse aller. On another occasion
when she has been taken back to the convent life she abhorred 
she states: " ... puisqu'il faut que je sois malheureuse,
qu'importe ou je le sois. She resists with all her energy, 
but with a certain degree of stoicism——  necessary in order 
to help her maintain equilibrium in her darker moments.
^I b i d . , p . 324 .
^Ibid., p . 261.
^Ibid. , p . 2 55 -
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It goes without saying that Suzanne is problem- 
centered rather than ego-centered. She is not merely 
fighting a battle for her own well-being or for her immed­
iate felicity; she is concerned with much more basic issues 
and with much more eternal questions. Her detractors con­
ceive of life in terms of the fulfilling of rote, petty 
requirements which will ultimately gain for them eternal 
felicity; theirs is a letter-of-the-law universe wherein 
one survives or perishes, wins or loses, depending upon the 
consistency of compliance. For these people all must be 
reduced to shalts and shalt nots, to neat categories of 
black and white. Suzanne's universe is much broader, much 
more based on principles than upon rules and regulations. 
Thus it was that when she was interrogated about her sub­
mission to the rules she could answer with a wider frame 
of reference. "Quand on me demandait si j'étais soumise 
à la Constitution, je répondais que je l'étais à l'église; 
si j 'acceptais la Bulle ... que j'acceptais l'Evangile."^ 
Here Suzanne is reminiscent of Christ being questioned by 
the Pharisees. His replies to them concerning his and his 
disciples ' observance of the letter of the law always 




Another example of Suzanne's broader vision is in 
conjunction with her mother. She had come to get Suzanne 
at the convent because of Suzanne's resistance to claustral 
vows. She sharply shoves Suzanne into the carriage causing 
her mouth to bleed. Rather than being angry, Suzanne goes 
to embrace her mother but in doing so gets blood on her 
mother^s dress. Her mother's vision is so restricted that 
all she can conceive of is the inconvenience she is being 
put to and the blood on her dress. The loss of a soul to 
whom she herself gave life does not fall within the scope 
of her vision. Suzanne tells her mother: " ... vous êtes
toujours ma mère, je suis toujours votre enfant ... et elle 
me répondit (en me poussant encore plus rudement, et en 
m'arrachant sa main d'entre les miennes): <<■ Relevez-vous 
malheureuse, relevez-vous .i)
This quality in Suzanne's make-up leads directly 
to another that she manifests in abundance, that of an 
abiding identification with all human beings in general; 
a feeling of older brotherliness or older sisterliness.
This is Maslow's characteristic of gemeinschaftsgefuhl. The 
most frequent examples of this characteristic occur in the 
convent. In spite of her anger with their lack of love, 
lack of insight into life, and treatment of her, Suzanne 
can still be magnanimous. At one point, when her lawyer
^Ibid., p. 247.
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has arranged for her to be transferred from one convent to 
another due to merciless treatment, the archdeacon asks her 
to tell him of irregularities that should be punished. She 
has no feeir of reprisal but still answers: "Je n'en connais
p o i n t . O n e  might question the wisdom of Suzanne's seeming 
magnanimity. The prime point seems to be, however, that 
Suzanne was so above pettiness, and felt such a strong need 
to help others, in the sense that an older, wiser sister is 
desirous of helping a younger, foolish one, that vindictive­
ness is foreign to her. She wants to help others; she does 
not seek to exact payment. This is not unlike Christ on 
the cross asking that his father pardon those who do not 
know what they are doing. Obviously one only does this
from a position of strength psychological strength not
physical or authoritarian.
On another occasion Suzanne shows her gemeinschafts- 
gefühl to its full extent. She was preparing for the trial 
to secure her liberty. It meant life itself to her, and 
she should have given carte-blanche to her lawyer to bring 
out whatever facts were necessary in order to secure her 
release. She is so insistent, however, on guarding every 
one else's dignity and rights, that she loses her case.
Thus in spite of her parents inhumane treatment, her instruc­
tions to her lawyer were that she does not want him to
^Ibid., p . 325•
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impugne " ... la réputation de mes parents." Further, even
though she had received extreme abuse at the convent, she 
instructed her lawyer that "Je voulais qu'il ménageât l'état 
religieux et surtout la maison oîl j'étais." Finally, even 
though her sisters had rejected her, and even though her 
brothers-in-law would do nothing to help her, she still 
recalls having instructed her lawyer: "Je ne voulais pas
qu'il peignit de couleurs trop odieuses mes beaux-frères 
et mes soeurs."^ Even in her prayers she conveys somewhat 
this idea of magnanimity and of being not unlike Christ:
"Mon Dieu, je vous demande pardon des fautes que j'ai faites
comme vous le demandâtes sur la croix pour moi." One
might argue that Suzanne was a little dramatic and self-
righteous, but she nevertheless embodies magnanimity and 
concern. Even on her death-bed, Suzanne's mother is incapable
of going beyond her own needs to those of others here
notably to those of Suzanne. She tells her daughter: 
"Priez-pour moi ... que Dieu me pardonne de vous avoir mise
3au monde. ... Surtout ne troublez point la famille; ..."
Her mother here shows herself so restricted that even in 
death she cannot be accepting and gracious. It remains for 
Suzanne to be a sort of magnanimous big sister to all those 
of lesser vision who surround her.
^Ibid., p. 309-
“Ibid., p. 277.
^Ib i d ., p . 265.
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Three additional actualization characteristics are 
closely related to each other and to the quality of 
.gjemeinschaftsgefuhl, these include (1) a democratic char­
acter structure (2 ) deep interpersonal relations and (3) 
discrimination between ends and means. Suzanne evidences 
all three of them though they are less striking than are 
the qualities already discussed. She does have a pronounced 
democratic character structure ; she seems totally unaware 
of the differences of class, of ability level or even of 
quality of belief. Recall that she has said she can accept 
all men for what they are but that she cannot condone 
" ... l'injustice, i 'ingratidude et l'inhumanité."^ Her 
list of exceptions is extremely limited. What is more, 
her rejection is one based on the quality of acts or attitudes
rather than on individuals as such. Like Jacques and Rameau's
philosopher, she distinguishes between the person and deed.
She does not reject people, she rejects inhumanity. Again, 
as with Jacques, one senses she has respect for all her fellow 
creatures, even for despicable mothers superior, simply 
because they are human. She resists condemning these women 
even though she was: " ... châtiée de la manière la plus
inhumaine; ... on me condamna ... à vivre de pain et d'eau;
... on me donnait à la fois les ordres incompatibles, et 
l'on me punissait d'y avoir manqué; ..."
^Ibid., p. 32k.
^Ibid., p . 269.
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SiJ"--Tine is never unsure about right and wrong. She 
observes often that: " ... la voix de la conscience qui
me pressait à chaque pas ... ne me permettaient pas; ..."^ 
She never tries to take advantage of her superior ability 
for her own ends. On one occasion, the sisters see her 
transfixed and deeply contemplative and think she is having 
a vision. She sees she could very easily capitalize on 
their gullibility but does not. "Si j'avais eu quelque 
penchant à l'hypocrisie ou au fanatisme et que j'eusse 
voulu jouer un rôle dans la maison, je ne doute point qu'il 
n'eût réussi."^ Her word is a pact, and she has to explain 
this to some sisters for vdiom honesty and oaths mean 
nothing: " ... et pourquoi ne le ferais-je pas après
3vous l'avoir promis?"
Ail the foregoing leads to the fact that Suzanne 
is capable of deep personal interaction. She forms with 
sister Ursule an attachment which seems more meaningful 
to each of them than life itself. This is possible because 
all of the preceding characteristics such as acceptance, 
democratic character structure and gemeinschaftsgefühl, 
are already present. These two communicate as though there 
were no intervening ego boundaries. There is nothing that
^Ibid., p. 383.
^Ibid., p . 282.
^Ibid., p . 360.
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one would not do for the other. Suzanne was able to feel 
this for her father even though the attachment was unilateral 
"II est sûr qu'un père inspire une sorte de sentiment qu'on 
n'a pour personne au monde que lui. She even seems able 
to establish a personal relationship with the Marquis whom 
she has never seen, because his character seems akin to hers. 
As she is writing down her experiences for him, she feels 
he is there: " ... il me semble que vous êtes présent, que
je vous vois et que vous m'écoutez." Suzanne even says 
of herself: "Je suis née caressante, et j'aime à être
3caressée." It should be again pointed out that such deep 
feelings on the part of someone who seems to have had no 
model nor consistent example of any of the qualities and 
attitudes she so pronouncedly displays is unusual. Never­
theless, Suzanne, as presented at this point in time, is a 
remarkably integrated girl.
One other actualization characteristic bears comment. 
Maslow says his actualizers evidence having had mystical 
experiences, a feeling of awe before the universe. He 
describes it as being akin to Freud's oceanic feeling 
wherein there is a type of transcendence, a loss of self in
^Ibid., p . 255•
^Ibid., p . 383•
^Ibid., p. 371.
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time and space.^ Unlike her author, Suzanne does pray:
"Tous les matins, mon premier movement est d'élever mon 
âme à Dieu, ..." but on one occasion she qualifies her 
having remained " ... le visage collé contre la terre; ..." 
with: " ... on n ’invoque presque jamais la voix du ciel
que quand on ne sait à quoi se résoudre; ..." This would 
seem to imply that profound mystical experience is not 
man's nor her forté. Her life style does in fact seem 
based more on action than on meditation and prayer. This 
was eminently true of her creator, Diderot. Taken in con­
cert with her life of action, Suzanne seems to say we must 
act without constant recourse to the supernatural, that 
action pre-empts meditation.
Is Suzanne a total self-actualizer? Has she 
arrived at the point of Rameau's philosopher? The answer 
is no. She is definitely not fixated at any lower hierarchy 
levels and is undergoing actualization growth. Neverthe­
less, she has some maturing yet to accomplish. As one 
example, she is almost too conscious of herself and a 
little too quick in proclaiming her naiveté and innocence. 
Furthermore, her innocence is somewhat inconsistent and 
occasionally a bit strained. As another example, one would
^Maslow, Motivation, p. 216.
2Benac, ed., Oeuvres, p. 283.
^Ibid., p. 255.
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not expect that a young lady who had so masterfully with­
stood cind so successfully coped with cloistered life, and 
who had for so long a time looked forward to freedom, would 
have been so incapable of coping with life outside the 
convent. Diderot never does directly compare Suzanne in 
the convent with Suzanne after her escape, but he does do 
so implicitly. In the convent he portrayed her as résiliant, 
resistant to torture and rejection and to all manner of 
abnormality. She possessed, more than any other nun, the 
strength of character and the intellectual and physical 
force to be and do what she felt she must in order to be 
true to her nature. Outside the convent she no longer has 
this strength and vision. When her liberator permitted 
himself some liberties with her she says: " ... Je regrettai
ma cellule, et je sentis toute l'horreur de ma situation."^
It is true that this is an experience she could not have 
practiced in the convent. Even before entering the convent, 
however- she speaks of seeking suitors, so the advances of 
the Benedictine should not have come as a complete surprise. 
Furthermore, a major reason for her desiring to remain at 
her mother's home was to seek a young man. Her desire to 
so readily return to her cell seems out of character with 
the Suzanne of the major part of the book. The fundamental 
explanation may be simply that Diderot had to end the story
^Ibid., p. 388.
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rather rapidly. Proof of this is that her escape, life in 
Paris^ and death, all occur in the space of five pages.
Finally, much in the fashion of Jacques' Master or 
of Mangogul, Suzanne seeks an escape, a sort of sedative 
to help her survive situations she finds intolerable.
In the following instance she wants a type of sedative that 
Voltaire often inveighed against: " ... J'ai demandé à
Dieu l'heureuse imbécilité d'esprit de mes compagnes; je 
ne l'ai point reçu."^ When she does not receive this gift 
of a deadened thought process, she resorts to other means. 
She finds that she can reduce herself to an almost machine­
like state: " ... J'ai été ce qu'on appelle physiquement
aliénée ... c'est comme ceux qui ont souffert une longue 
2maladie. ..." Reflecting on this condition elsewhere, she 
says: " ... Ce n'était pas que je pensasse à autre chose,
c'est que j'étais absorbée; j ’avais la tête lasse comme 
quand on s'est excédé de réflexions." She even says of 
her condition: " ... J'étais presque réduite à l'état
"3d'automate. ..." A fully actualized individual would not 
have needed to resort to such extreme measures but it has 
seemed to be a stop-gap measure for Suzanne. It is not, 
however, such a pronounced quality that it markedly detracts 
from her overall effectiveness and she remains largely at 
actualization levels.
^Ibid., p . 316.
^Ibid., p . 264.
^Ibid., p . 263.
CHAPTER VII 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The application of Maslow's concept of hierarchy
of needs and self-actualization has seemed fruitful in the
case of the Eighteenth-Century philosopher Denis Diderot.
As much as any human, Diderot has seemed to personify the
culmination of Maslow's hierarchy, the self-actualized man.
Walter's summation seems particularly apropos in seeing
how closely the theory fits.
Le génie intuitif de Diderot se manifestait sans 
cesse devant le spectacle du monde. 11 l'envisage 
comme s'il devait le comprendre tout entier par 
lui-mëme, et sans aucune aide. Il bouillonne 
d'idées, et les idées sont pour lui une matière 
chaude et vivante qu'il répand autour de lui, 
sans se soucier de voir exploiter par d'autres 
les richesses dont il déborde. Tout objet met 
en mouvement son esprit; toute pensée déclenche 
en lui une suite de réflexions originales. ...
11 était si bien ne pour les idées vivantes---
celles qui naissent comme les choses vivantes et 
traduisent en mots la vie elle-mSme et non les
abstractions que jamais il ne put se détourner
de son destin, se contraindre à aucune occupation 
régulière et monotone. 11 n'était pas de ceux 
qui, dans la quiète chaleur d'un bureau. con­
struisent une pensée aux termes soigneusement 
enchainés et architecturés.^
^Walter, éd.. La Religieuse, p. viii.
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Elsewhere Walter characterizes him as " ... 1'esprit
le plus vaste, le plus profond et le plus puissant, l'homme
le plus étonnant de son siècle."^ Concerning his multiplicity
of interests and capacities Walter concludes by seeing him
2as: "... le génie le plus compréhensif de son siècle."
Daix, in speaking of his comprehensiveness says of him as 
an anatomist: " ... c'est le précurseur de Bichat." In
speaking of his knowledge of chemistry and biology: " ...
c'est le précurseur de Lavoisier." Concerning Diderot's 
knowledge of cerebral functions he characterizes him as:
" ... le précurseur de Gall." His insights into transformism 
make him " ... le pércurseur de Darwin." In summation,
Daix says that he had " ... une connaissance à peu près
3parfaite des travaux de l'époque."
When it happens that someone with such a vast under­
standing also loved to write and create fiction, it would 
be reasonable to expect that some of his created characters 
would partake of some elements of his obvious self-actualiza­
tion. This seems especially so since few writers of any 
age have so frankly and naively exposed themselves. It is 
also based on the widely demonstrated fact that many 
characters of any writer will embody qualities of the author.
^Ibid., p . vii.
2Ibid., p . xvi.
3Daix, ed., La Religieuse, p. xvi,
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This is not to overlook the obvious pitfall of seeing hidden 
facets of authors in all their characters; such is on many 
occasions the very antithesis of the facts of the matter. 
However, Diderot, has, consciously or unconsciously, endowed 
each of the heros or heroines of his romanesque works with 
self-actualization qualities. It is most pronounced in the 
case of Rameau's philosopher wherein Diderot creates a 
mature self-actualizer, and it is least so in the case of 
Mangogul where self-actualization qualilies are evident only 
briefly in the sultan as a young man.
In Jacques le Fataliste and La Religieuse, Diderot 
presents self-actualizers in earlier stages of development. 
Jacques is nearing complete self-integration; one expects 
him to develop into a fully operative actualizer. He has 
all the markings of becoming another philosophe. The other 
near-actualizer, Suzanne, is in a sense the more unique; 
this is because she is in effect the combination of Rameau's 
philosopher and of Jacques made feminine. She might even 
be very logically called "the philosopher as woman," or 
"the actualizer as woman." She seems to embody two of the 
strongest, most actualized people Diderot knew: himself
and Sophie Volland. Consequently, if Suzanne seems to 
resist physical torture and to endure physical hardship in 
the manner that a stoic "à la Montaigne" would do, it is 
probably because Diderot incorporated much of himself and 
must of his master, Montaigne, into his creation.
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So it is that each major protagonist is an actualizer, 
or near-actualizer. Each is psychically integrated and self­
directive. Each is no longer concerned with deficiency 
motives hut is rather outer-oriented. Each seeks to bring 
about growth in others so as to help them more fully realize 
their potential. This is the basis of the philosopher's 
counsel to Rameau; it is the basis of Jacques' "lessons" to 
his Master; and is Suzanne's "message" to the nuns and to 
her family. The one exception to all the above is Mangogul; 
he alone has left actualization to seek gratification. In 
point of fact this would seem to be a normal state of affairs. 
In the first place, it was Diderot's first novel, written
from twelve to more than twenty years before the other works---
the others being the product of Diderot's post-Encyclopedia 
maturity. Secondly and more importantly, Mangogul is in 
large measure Louis XV, not Diderot; he is representative 
of a fading monarchy and not of a vigorous actualizer.
In each novel, Diderot has opposed to his actualizers, 
characters who are fixated at gratification levels. Rameau 
has never been able to solve his esteem needs and in large 
measure his life-style is one aimed at filling these needs 
which should have long since been adequately met. Jacques' 
Master is also still very esteem concerned. As representative 
of that portion of the feudal system which no longer serves 
its original, useful function, he must engage in much pos­
turing and self-delusion to keep some semblance of self-regard.
183
Mangogul likewise symbolizes a no-longer-useful segment of 
society. However, Mangogul's major concerns lie elsewhere 
than with esteem. Finally, the nuns as a group, and Suzanne's 
family, symbolize in a more general way, people lost in the 
morass of prejudice, unenlightenedness and lower needs. Some 
nuns feel compelled to gratify their physiological needs 
even though they must do so abnormally. Suzanne's family 
members are all fixated on filling various of their lower 
needs and can in no wise empathize with her. Not even her 
mother is able to rise above lower-need levels in order to 
save her daughter.
Is Diderot's vision of the world and of humanity 
summarized by these protagonists in his novels? Why has 
he chosen to include in each case, actualizers juxtaposed 
with characters operative and often even fixated at lower 
levels? Why not a book devoted entirely to actualizers or 
one devoted entirely to lower-need gratifiers? He of course 
comes close to the latter in Les Bijoux indiscrets but even 
there, he shows both extremes of the hierarchy. The answer 
would seem to be as simple as the basic philosophy of the 
Enlightenment: that is to say that the world does have
people with vision and capacity who will make the earth a 
better place; these are the philosophers and their allies.
On the other hand the world is replete with Rameaus, with 
masters, with nuns and with unenlightened parents, all of 
whom are unable, in their present condition, to reach
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anything approaching their real potential. Without the 
insight of a Jacques or the vision and fortitude of a 
Suzanne, they will be condemned to live out their existence 
in the morass of lower needs. Like the Master, Mangogul 
and Rameau, they will be compelled to delude themselves 
or to sedate themselves till death offers them an exit.
The answer, Diderot infers, is not delusion, nor sedation 
nor mere continued gratification; it is to be found rather 
in self-discovery, in realistic appraisal and in whole­
hearted commitment. The philosopher, Jacques, and Suzanne 
have all three repeatedly counseled more realistic analysis, 
to include gaining knowledge of oneself. This is much akin 
to Montaigne's efforts at self-analysis and discovery. The 
philosopher and Suzanne have argued for self-control, for 
self-mastery. Again we see the influence of Montaigne.
What seems increasingly clear is that as far as his novel- 
istic works are concerned, the progress Diderot envisioned 
as coming from enlightening the people, and the hope that 
he felt the Enlightenment held, pertains as much to self- 
knowledge and to enlightenment concerning oneself as it 
does to enlightenment resulting from science and research.
As a matter of fact, at no time does he specifically allude 
to scientific enlightenment as being the key to the progress 
of any of the characters who are locked at lower-need levels. 
He joins Montaigne in feeling that personal progress comes 
with objective and searching self-analysis. This alone can
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change Rameau; it is what will save Jacques' Master, the 
nuns and even Mangogul.
What is the prognosis that any enlightenment will 
occur? How does Diderot seem to view the probability that 
those persons now lost in lower-needs will rise to actuali­
zation levels? In point of fact the answer seems to be as 
simple as the fact that none of the lower-need victims have 
evidenced any improvement, and no change seems to be in 
the offing. The one exception to this is the one that would 
at first glance seem the least likely, Mangogul- By novel's 
end he has returned the magic ring and has forsaken his 
practice of "bijoux" listening. Once again, whether this 
presages a return toward actualization or whether it is 
simply another nod to the royal censor is impossible to 
determine.
Finally, what remains to be done in areas related 
to this study? The most evident answer is to apply the 
hierarchy of motives concept to Diderot's non-romanesque 
works such as his plays and his philosophical dialogues 
and treatises. It would be interesting to see just how 
extensively Diderot employed actualizers juxtaposed with 
lower-need characters. It would be interesting to see 
whether he included actualizers or has made allusion to 
them in all his creative works. It would be interesting 
to know whether he alludes to actualization principles in 
the Encyclopedia articles. Interesting also would be the
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determination of actualization qualities of his intimates---
what of Grimm, what of Holbach, what of his other mistresses? 
Finally, it would seem possible to evaluate more searchingly 
Diderot the man and Diderot the actualizer, with the point 
in mind of possibly extending or revising actualization and 
hierarchy-of-needs theory. It is not inconceivable that 
something felicitous might result.
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